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The IPC suggest using opposition groups to topple the regime in Tehran.
The Mujahideen-e Khalq (MEK) pictured above are considered a terrorist organization by Washington and Europe.
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IN THIS ISSUE
A Review of Persepctives on Iran Policy -
Iran Policy Committee: U.S. Policy Options for Iran
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The Committee on Present Danger: Iran – A New Approach
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Council on Foreign Relations: Iran: Time for a New Approach
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IRI Supreme Leader - Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. CPD suggest that he should be isolated from the Iranian people, punished for his leadership and convinced to return to the Mosque.
Iran inhabits a central and strategic location in the Middle East. CFR Task Force suggests there importance means they should be engaged in a measured dialogue.
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AIC Update is an information resource for US-Iran relations and the efforts of the American Iranian Council to promote dialogue and understanding between the United States and Iran.
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In the following weeks, the American Iranian Council will ask your help in developing a comprehensive policy paper on US-Iran relations. The release of a number of think tank reports in recent months has initiated heated debate over Washington’s Iran policy. The Council is preparing to enter this debate and has provided brief summaries of three of these reports as a public service to the Council’s supporters. The following policy papers by the Council on Foreign Relations, the Committee on the Present Danger, and the Iran Policy Committee present divergent views on how to address the United States’ relationship with Iran. Over the last twenty-five years, the United States and Iran have been able to maintain a “no peace, no war” relationship. In the wake of wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and because of differences on issues of regional security, nuclear technology, terrorism, and the Palestinian-Israeli peace process, the status quo is becoming increasingly difficult to sustain. The Council has not issued any opinion or analysis on the various approaches, but has presented them in a manner intended to promote debate.
Iran Policy Committee: U.S. Policy Options for Iran
In February 2005, the newly formed Iran Policy Committee released a report titled “U.S. Policy Options for Iran.” The IPC “believes that Washington should adopt an official policy of regime change for Iran that acknowledges the threat posed to American security interests and ideals by the totalitarian theocracy in Tehran. IPC also believe that the credible threat of economic and military ‘sticks’ in conjunction with diplomatic ‘carrots’ has a better chance of achieving change in official Iranian behavior or regime change than either alone.” With these premises in mind, the IPC suggests “that Iranian opposition groups ought to play a central role in U.S. policymaking regarding Iran.” The report considers the Iranian people as the principal agent for change and suggests that opposition groups, both endogenous and exogenous, be utilized to destabilize and collapse the current regime in Tehran.
The IPC considers six Iranian threats to U.S. interests and ideals.
1. Drive to acquire nuclear weapons: The IPC considers Iran’s drive to acquire nuclear weapons the first and most urgent threat to US interests and ideals. “An Iran with representative institutions with a nuclear weapons capability would not be as destabilizing as nuclear weapons in the hands of the unelected, expansionist theocracy.” The IPC has examined the testimony of various groups and have come to the conclusion that the nature and behavior of the regime increases the possibility “that it could and would collaborate with transnational networks to carry out nuclear terrorism.”
2. Continuing support for and involvement with terrorist networks: The IPC considers the regime’s support for and involvement with international terrorist networks a second threat to U.S. interests and ideals. According to IPC analysis, Iran provides “logistical, financial and operational assistance to Hizballah, al Qaeda, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in Iraq, Hamas, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad.
3. Publicly-stated opposition to the Arab-Israeli peace process: The IPC considers Iran’s support of the above mentioned groups a deterrent to the Arab-Israeli peace process.
4. Disruptive role in Iraq: The IPC suggests testimony and documentary evidence showing that officials at the highest levels of the Iranian regime have been involved with planning and providing support for terrorists and suicide bombers in Iraq. The IPC considers Iranian meddling is aimed at inhibiting the emergence of a stable and representative government in Iran and keeping the United States occupied with the Iraqi insurgency so that it will not have the interest or resources to deal with Iran’s nuclear program.
5. Expansionist radical ideology: The IPC believes Iran’s system of government (Velayat e-Faqih) an immediate expansionist threat, considering actions in Lebanon and Iraq.
6. Denial of basic human rights to its own population: The IPC asserts that the human rights situation in Iran has deteriorated severely over the past year. Iran has been rebuked by international organizations for its discrimination against minorities, women, and for its mistreatment of citizens under its judicial system.
A New Approach Toward Iran: Options
The IPC paper outlines a “full spectrum approach toward Iran, beginning with diplomacy and moving through increasingly more coercive measures, culminating with an outright commitment to regime change.”
Diplomacy: The IPC suggests that Washington cooperate with the Europeans to present a united front against the regime in Tehran and to convey a message that there are consequences for noncompliance beyond Europe’s ability to control.
Coercive Diplomacy: The IPC suggests that no approach will ever succeed without sufficient penalties for non-compliance. Economic penalties applied in a “concerted and cooperative fashion by all of Iran’s major western tradition partners include sanctions on oil, ban on airline travel, prohibition of financial transactions, bilateral or multilateral economic assistance, and general trade. Moreover, the IPC suggests increased funding of radio and satellite television broadcasts into Iran and public statements by the U.S. government in favor of Iranian exiles. The report also believes the U.S. should limit the scope of activity and travel of Iran’s representatives to the United Nations, bring Iranian leadership before international tribunals, and most importantly “stay the course in Iraq to ensure that a moderate system takes hold.”
Destabilization: If diplomatic measures fail, the IPC suggests that Washington should be prepared to embrace a new option, short of direct military action. This option would be a campaign of destabilization, “whose aim would be to weaken the grip of the ruling regime over the Iranian people sufficiently that Iranian opposition groups inside the country and abroad are empowered to change the regime.” The IPC believes that the next logical step would be to encourage Iranian opposition groups, namely the Mujahideen-e Khalq (MEK), to take the lead role in coordinating a campaign for regime change.
The Military Option: The IPC examines a range of military options including clandestine insertion of Special Operation Forces, blockade of Iranian naval vessels, and limited military strikes aimed at damaging Iran’s WMD and military capabilities. The IPC believes that such options must be carefully measured to prevent the United States from being drawn into a full-scale military confrontation. The IPC also examines a full-scale military invasion and naval blockade and concludes that there would be higher casualties than in Iraq and require a force several times the size of the force currently in Iraq.
Conclusions: The IPC concludes that Washington should consider not only diplomatic and military options, but should provide a central role for the Iranian opposition to facilitate regime change.
Click here to read the full IPC report.
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AIC has published and disseminated several important books, studies, and newsletters. These publications clearly demonstrate an objective, impartial, balanced and diverse approach. Please click on book to browse and purchase AIC publications. |
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The Committee on Present Danger: Iran – A New Approach
On December 20, 2004, the Committee on Present Danger published a policy paper titled “Iran – A New Approach.” CPD recommends “a peaceful but forceful strategy to engage with the Iranian people to remove the threat,” a threat the Committee has defined as the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. The CPD paper is based on the presumption that the Supreme Leader, in dictatorial fashion, is the greatest threat to freedom, liberty, and democracy for the Iranian people.
Threat and Opportunity
The CPD resolves that Iran, under the control of Khamenei, continues to be “the world’s foremost state supporter of terrorism,” and therefore should be confronted. The report suggests both regime engagement and regime change (at the highest levels) by offering supporting to the Iranian people and simultaneously convincing the Khamenei regime to relinquish governmental power.
A New American Policy
The CPD believes that the administration should announce its new approach, beginning with a pledge to reconnect with the Iranian people who want democracy, followed by the reopening of our embassy in Tehran and the utilization of the State Department’s Counselor (regardless of the decision to open an embassy) to generate support from our allies, speak frequently with the Iranian people via radio/tv/internet and meet directly with Iranians whenever possible.
To ensure response, the CPD suggest that Khamenei should be made to understand that if he does not comply with international standards regarding nuclear weapons, including third-party verification of all related sites in Iran, than the United States and others reserve the right to destroy his nuclear capabilities. The CPD uses the Libyan case as an example of how a sufficient threat can turn dictators away from WMDs.
The CPD stresses that the United States must make clear its renewed partnership and dialogue with the Iranian people and simultaneously assert that the representatives of the Khamenei regime are illegitimate. “Cultural, academic, and professional exchanges and programs must form an integral part of our efforts to assist Iranians in the democratizations of their country.”
To make clear that dialogue is aimed at changing the nature of the regime; the CPD insists that Khamenei be isolated from his support by developing relationships with the military and various services in Iran, to meet common regional objectives, and to call for the outright eradication of the Islamic Guard Corps and the Basij. The CPD also suggests developing “smart sanctions” that target the regime leadership and not the Iranian people, including legal cases against Khamenei and Iran’s Revolutionary Foundations (bunyads).
Unique to the CPD’s position, is the notion of dialogue with Khamenei and other Iranian government officials. The CPD suggest that we should enter into dialogue with the religious establishment, regarding its return to the mosque and with other Iranian officials on issues of concern, including human rights, terrorism, nuclear weapons, and regional stability.
Conclusions:
“The Committee on the Present Danger believes that we need a new approach, one base d on a sober recognition of the threat Khamenei presents, but also an appreciation of our new strengths and the opportunity before us.”
Click here to read the CPD report in full.
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Council on Foreign Relations: Iran: Time for a New Approach
The Independent Task Force, considering the importance of Iran to the U.S. policy agenda, has concluded that the United States must selectively engage with Iran to address critical U.S. concerns. The Task Force observed Iran’s domestic realities and overall direction of its foreign policy, in order to illuminate the context of U.S. policy. The Task Force has come to a number of conclusions and provided recommendations for the direction of Washington’s Iran policy.
A Revised Approach to Iran:
The Task Force concludes that direct dialogue should replace the current lack of engagement with Iran that harms U.S. interests in a critical region of the world. The nature and reason behind such dialogue is outlined below:
- “A political dialogue with Iran should not be deferred until such a time as the deep differences over Iranian nuclear ambitions and its invidious involvement with regional conflicts have been resolved.”
- “A ‘grand bargain’ that would settle comprehensively the outstanding conflicts between Iran and the United States is not a realistic goal, and pursuing such an outcome would be unlikely to produce near-term progress on Washington’s central role.”
- “U.S. policies toward Tehran should make use of incentives as well as punitive measures.”
- “The United States should advocate democracy in Iran without relying on the rhetoric of regime change, as that would be likely to rouse national sentiments in defense of the current regime even among those who currently oppose it.”
- The Task Force is mindful of efforts over the last twenty-five years to engage the regime in Tehran, but believes that U.S. military intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq “may offer both the United States and Iran new incentives to open a mutually beneficial dialogue, first on issues of common interest, such as regional stability, and eventually on the tough issues of terrorism and proliferation.”
Recommendation for U.S. Policy
In pursuit of the aforementioned approach, the Task Force has outline specific steps to address the most urgent issues. These steps follow below:
- “The United States should offer Iran a direct dialogue on specific issues of regional stabilization.”
- “The United States should press Iran to clarify the status of al-Qaeda operatives detained by Tehran and make clear that a security dialogue will be conditional on assurance that its government is not facilitating violence against the new Iraqi and Afghan governments or the coalition forces that are assisting them.”
- “In close coordination with its allies in Europe and with Russia, the United States should implement a more focused strategy to deal with the Iranian nuclear program. In the immediate future, Iran should be pressed to fulfill its October 2003 commitment to maintain a complete and verified suspension of all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities. In the short term, the United States should press the IAEA to exercise its Additional Protocol verification rights vigorously in order to deter and detect any clandestine nuclear activities.” A long term agreement “should include an Iranian commitment to permanently renounce uranium enrichment and other fuel-cycle capabilities and to ratify the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Additional Protocol, an expanded safeguards intended to verify the peaceful intentions of its nuclear program. In return, the Unites States should remove its objections to an Iranian civil nuclear program under stringent safeguards and assent to multilateral assurances that Tehran would be able to purchase fuel at reasonable market rates for nuclear power reactors as long as it abided by its non-proliferation commitments.”
- “The United States should resume an active involvement in the Middle East peace process and press leading Arab states to commit themselves to providing genuine, substantive support for both the process and any ultimate agreements.”
- “The United States should adopt measure to broaden the political, cultural, and economic linkages between the Iranian population and the wider world, including authorizing U.S. nongovernmental organizations to operate in Iran and consenting to Iran’s application to begin accession talks with the World Trade Organization.”
Why Iran Matters:
The Task Force has suggested that Iran is one of the United States’ most pressing policy dilemmas. The United States is currently engaged in various regions of the Middle East and Central Asia, and Iran occupies a central position, both physically and politically, in the complicated region. As such, Iranian actions have repercussions for regional and international stability and therefore considerable impact upon the interests of the United States
Iran’s Domestic Dilemmas:
The Task Force considers the domestic realities of Iran, to provide context for a meaningful U.S. policy. They believe that “the current Iranian government appears to be durable and likely to persist in power for the short and even medium term. However, Iran’s generational shift and prevailing popular frustration with the government portend the eventual transformation to a more democratic political order in the long term.”
Iran’s Approach to the World:
“Over the course of the past twenty-five years, Iran’s foreign policy has moderated in significant and meaningful ways.” “Tehran’s approach to Washington remains one of several exceptions to the general trend toward moderation and realism in foreign policy. In formulating Iranian policy toward the United States, ideological imperatives continue to outweigh dispassionate calculations of national interest.”
Iran’s Nuclear Program:
The Task Force considers Iran’s nuclear ambitions to be the most urgent issue confronting the United States. The topic has been discussed, in depth, in other forums and therefore will not be expounded upon here.
Assessments and Recommendations:
The Task Force stresses the importance of dialogue and measured engagement with Iran. This approach suggests that the United States and Iran addresses issues of mutual concern in the short term, with the long term effect of political evolution, rather than regime change.
- “Direct dialogue approached candidly and without restrictions on issues of mutual concern would serve Iran’s interests. And establishing connections with Iranian society would directly benefit U.S. national objectives of enhancing stability and security of this critical region.”
- “Dialogue between the United States and Iran need not await absolute harmony between the two governments.” “By its very definition, diplomacy seeks to address issues between nations, and so it would be unwise (and unrealistic) to defer contact with Tehran until all differences between the two governments have evaporated.”
- “Were the most serious U.S. concerns about Iranian behavior to be resolved, significant differences between worldviews and strategic priorities would remain. Instead we envision a relationship through which the two countries pragmatically explore areas of common concern and potential cooperation, while continuing to pursue other incompatible objectives at the same time.”
- “For these reasons, we advocate that Washington propose a compartmentalized process of dialogue, confidence building, and incremental engagement.” The Task Force believes that such an approach should be framed by a statement of principles, rather than a detailed road map of rapprochement.
Click here to read the CFR Report in full.
The American Iranian Council takes the institutional position that engagement and participation are necessary to address issues of mutual concern. In further developing this position, the Council will ask for your feedback in the coming weeks to clarify issues and ideas necessary for improved dialogue and understanding between the United States and Iran.
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Vision
The vision of the American Iranian Council is that the United States and Iran will work together, since their common interests far outweigh their differences. AIC also envisions the Iranian-American community playing an increasingly significant role in American society, and Iran becoming a democratically developed member of the global community with full respect for human rights.
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Mission
The mission of AIC is to be a constructive force, in cooperation and partnership with other organizations, in bringing the United States and Iran together, involving the Iranian-American community in the dialogue, and bringing attention to social and political conditions in Iran.
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Goals
The three interrelated goals of the American Iranian Council are:
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To serve as a platform for sustained dialogue on U.S.-Iran relations.
2. To serve as a catalyst to educate all Americans, including Iranian-Americans, regarding this dialogue.
3. To serve as a forum for discussion of issues of importance in Iranian society.
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