Iran's Use of Religion as a Tool in its Foreign Policy

By AIC Research Fellow Gabriela Billini

o   Introduction

Religion can be perceived as a core factor in the Islamic Republic of Iran’s foreign policy. As the only state in the Middle East whose government is guided by theology further encouraged by its constant usage of religiously-imbued messages, it is easy to come to such a conclusion, despite its fallacy. It is therefore important to analyze the limitations of religion in Iranian foreign policy to understand, instead, what drives it. This paper argues that religion is nothing more than a tool leveraged to aid Iran in its aspirations towards becoming a more significant regional player. I will discuss Iran’s foreign policy and show that despite the religious discourse, Iran’s foreign policy is shaped instead by the regime’s interests. It must not be overlooked that religion is an important tool and I will show how the regime leverages it in its involvements abroad. Religion, however, is not the core principle driving foreign policies. Further, it is crucial to discuss Saudi Arabia to address how both players use religion in their competition for regional power status. Analyzing Saudi Arabia is important because it has implications for the region’s future, as well as a mechanism of comparing Iran’s activity.
 

o   Religion in Iran’s Government, Policies

The Islamic Republic of Iran is a particular case in the Middle East and the Muslim world, as it is the only country whose government is modeled on the basis of theological guardianship. By contrast, other governments in the region are influenced by Islam and Sharia Law but are not entirely guided by it. The Revolution in 1979 brought an entirely new dimension of religion into the nation, dominating almost every aspect of daily life. The Revolution would also make religion and the state interact in new ways which would entirely influence Iran’s policies. This ideology, developed by the leader of the Iranian Revolution Imam Khomeini, is known as velayat-e-faqih. The basic principles of velayat-e-faqih is based on Twelver Shi’a ideology, stating that in the absence of the missing Twelfth Shi’a Imam, a jurist of Shi’a Islam with divine authority will lead the Iranian people until the Hidden Imam returns from occultation. This leadership is to cover social, political and religious life. In effect, the Guardian, with the title Supreme Leader, is the highest authority in the hierarchy of government and is entitled to oversee every law, government decision and guide such decisions in accordance to his interpretation of Islam.[1]

Shortly after the Revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini had desires to ‘export the revolution’, an important influencing factor in Iranian foreign policy even until today. Many efforts were put into place in order to effect the new Islamic Republic’s foreign policy, such as the creation of Hezbollah in Lebanon and the effort to exercise influence over the Shi’a community in Afghanistan during the Heart Uprisings in 1979 and the new government in 1992.[2] At this stage, the Iranian government claimed that Islam was the only factor capable of unifying discontented people and the only “salvation for humankind.”[3] Because the Islamic Revolution was successful, the leadership believed all Muslims should stand against any government model that was not adherent to Islam.

Iran sought to advertise the velayat-e-fakih doctrine as a solution to such discontent. Though the exportation of the Revolution to overthrow non-Muslim regimes in the region is no longer a foreign policy goal,[4] Iran continues its desire to influence states’ policies and behavior in the region. As Iran is eager for regional influence, it has effected many policies towards intervention and aid for some governments and groups within states. This presence abroad is often explained by a religious responsibility as per the velayat-e faqih doctrine. However, this paper argues that Iran uses religion as a tool for its state interests abroad, making its foreign policy agenda based far more on realpolitik than religious protection.
 

o   The Shi’a Crescent and Iranian Foreign Policy:

The theological division among Sunnis and Shi’as is one that is central to understanding the competition between Iran and Saudi Arabia – the former seen as the protectors of Shi’as across the world and the latter as the protector of Sunnis and the holy sites. This competition naturally takes a foreign policy dimension of which ideology is most prominent. Nevertheless, this is just another way to play power politics. The idea of the Shi’a crescent emerged in 2004 when Jordanian King Abdullah wanted to call the attention of the international community to Iran’s regional behavior. He claimed that Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon were all under direct Iranian influence. This is often used as a ‘warning’ against Iran’s foreign involvement, as a Western scare tactic to show that Iran is looking to impose its view of religion and politics wherever it has influence. What this theory does not address is the influence Saudi Arabia is equally seeking to impose in other forms across the region and beyond, using very similar tools.

Though the concept of “exporting the revolution” and a desire for regime change across the region lost its luster over the years, there is still a strong effort towards leveraging religion to justify Iran’s presence and actions abroad. To understand the difference between the religious cover and the state-interested reality, it is necessary to analyze Iran’s foreign policy strategy. In the Foreign Affairs article What Iran Really Wants, Iranian Foreign Minister Muhammad Javad Zarif outlines the state’s objectives in its foreign policy and the challenges they face. Most importantly to the subject at hand is Zarif’s third objective, “Iran will continue to support the cause of oppressed people across the world”.[5] This is the argument that is often used to explain Iran’s presence and behavior abroad. However, the flaw with this statement is that it is projected as a blanket for all oppressed Muslims, when really it is a policy that seems to only apply when it concerns Iranian national interest. Many argue the policy is specific to Shi’as, but Iran has not strayed from supporting Sunnis if it suits the regime’s interests.

There is solid evidence that shows Shi’as are usually oppressed in Sunni-majority countries and gives ground to this policy of protection in Iran’s foreign policy. For example, Shi’as represent 70% of the population in the eight Gulf states, though Iran is the only Shi’a state.[6] The social, political and economic rights of Shi’as in Arab states are highly neglected. In Saudi Arabia, Shi’as are kept from exercising religious practices and in Bahrain, they have little to no government representation.[7] These facts and figures, however, do not explain the basis of Iran’s help to Muslims and Shi’as abroad. An explanation of its foreign policy drivers will illustrate these motivations.

Before all else, similar to other Gulf governments, Iranian foreign policy seeks to ensure regime survival. The government uses its security apparatus, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which has three purposes, one of which is to protect the regime.[8] Because of the Iranian government structure, there is a difference in conduct between the elected bodies and religious figures, including the Supreme Leader and those whom he appoints.[9] As the Supreme Leader controls the armed forces, therefore, any actions the IRGC takes are decisions directly from the Supreme Leader. Secondly, identity plays an important role. Iran is the only majority Shi’a state, a title its citizens and government wear proudly. Consequently, the government has leveraged this sense of identity and authority in its foreign policies, taking shape in both soft and hard power. Though Iranians may be generally supportive of the government’s campaign to support and protect underrepresented Muslims, they actively oppose the government’s activity abroad, allowing the government to overlook domestic needs.
 

o   Saudi Arabia and the Battle for Influence

The political and military context of the Middle East will influence Iran’s approach to the policies and tools it uses to execute them. This particularly relates to its relationship with Saudi Arabia, as Iran’s use of religion in foreign policy reflects in their competition. Said competition takes many shapes, across many arenas. The religious component not only influences the spheres of military campaigns and political office, but is also a competition of ideological influence. Though the political and military dimension of Iran-Saudi Arabia competition is most commonly discussed, both players are also fighting for ideological influence. As I have already unpacked Iran’s ideological tool through Shiism and the Revolution, unpacking Saudi Arabia’s Wahhabism is also crucial.

 Wahhabism is a very conservative and literalist interpretation of Islam, seeking to encourage its followers to replicate the environment of society and practices of Islam during Prophet Muhammad’s time. It rejects other sects outside Sunnism and is distrustful of non-Muslims.[10] This form of Islam was preached in Saudi Arabia by Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, an important partner in the formation of the modern Saudi state.[11] Today, Wahhabism is used as a state ideology promoting loyalty to the ruler and loaning the ruler liberty to act in the name of believers in all theatres.[12] Saudi Arabia leverages this ideology to legitimize many of its policies, including soft power features abroad. These include training foreign Sunnis in seminaries to later spread Wahhabi ideology abroad,[13] and building mosques, madrassas and hospitals throughout the poorest Muslim communities across world.[14] These projects have been seen as a critical source for developing extremism through the capacity to influence and shape young minds using this ideology.[15] It further indebts those communities into depending on Saudi Arabia.
 

o   Sectarianism’s role

Often, the Iranian-Saudi competition is interpreted as sectarianism, actions purposefully intended to divide and create deeper cleavages in societies where their proxy wars take place. To counter this belief, F. Gregory Gause III presents a strong argument, asserting that Iran and Saudi Arabia are not purposefully creating sectarian divisions, rather are simply competing in the balance of power game.[16] Gause describes this as a new cold war with many players, in which Iran and Saudi Arabia are the leaders in the confrontation.[17] The states resort to other tools than direct military confrontation and both use the sectarianism already present to their advantage, though always with the larger aim of gaining regional influence.[18]

Religious identity is a convenient way to build legitimacy for their involvements abroad and to the ‘cause’ of supporting said groups to their domestic audiences. This is often done through agenda setting in the media. Once the state has decided to involve itself in a conflict, it begins to shape the discussion in society to justify their involvement. It will frame the conflict in a way that is convenient to explain their interests in terms of foreign policy. Each player takes the sectarian message into media coverage, at which point the media will shape the message to sell an agenda to the public, yielding support from the people and therefore further legitimize the state’s behavior.[19]
 

o   Weak States in the Arab Middle East

The proxy wars between Iran and Saudi Arabia are most visible in Yemen, Lebanon, and Syria, where there is impasse with no political or diplomatic solutions due to divisions, overall destruction, and societies torn apart by conflict. However, these cases have something else in common that is more profound than lending themselves as arenas for this competition. With the theory of sectarianism expelled, the core of the competition lies in the failure of Arab Middle Eastern states and their institutions to fulfill the public’s needs or serve them effectively, as a state is designed to do. This has resulted in a significant power vacuum[20] in which numerous players are involved – state and non-state actors alike. Iranian and Saudi involvement is a desire to influence the institutions and new states that will emerge, for an opportunity to influence their formation and court each state into an alliance that will last many years. Both states have been interested in influencing states for decades. The current power vacuum is an opportunity as so many states face existential questions. This critical time in the region will shape not only the individual states, but the region at large. As both states want to lead the Gulf and the Middle East, involvement is critical.
 

o   Identity

In weak and failing states, people lack whom to turn to, allowing identities to become increasingly relevant. In the Middle East, people have loyalties that are more profound than and go beyond the state itself.[21] Once the state structure shows itself to be weak or fails to protect certain groups, said groups will turn to their communities to seek protection and representation. Since Iran and Saudi Arabia are very present in said contexts ready to respond to peoples’ needs, turning to them seems only natural. Religion is one of the most important of these loyalties, particularly in the Middle East. Religion’s significance inevitably sets the groundwork for competing groups in each state. When local groups are looking to take control of the state, they turn to one of the two regional competitors for financial, weapons, and ideological support, among other features, to have an opportunity to take control and attempt to fulfill the needs the previous government failed to deliver. [22]

Despite this perceived solidarity of identity from the public, we also see how religion is not exactly a matter of exclusive support, rather a tool. Iran and Saudi Arabia have both supported groups of the opposite sect. For example, Saudi Arabia has offered support to some Shi’a movements such as the Iraqiya party during the Iraqi elections in 2005 and 2010. This political party was at the time headed by a secular Shi’a and the party included an “ethnic and sectarian cross-section of Iraq.”[23] Iran has offered significant support to Sunnis, most notably the Palestinian militant group Hamas.[24] Such support is particularly important for Iran, as Shi’as are a minority in the overall region and would limit its influence reach. The government has made efforts to reduce the Shi’a message in its foreign policy throughout, preferring to appeal to “underrepresented Muslims”.[25] With these examples, it is clear that what drives Iranian and Saudi foreign policies are regime survival and state interest, not a perceived solidarity and protection of groups. Turning back to Iran, I will discuss specific cases in which Iran leverages religious influence to achieve its aims.
 

o   Iran’s Religious Influence

As the Islamic Republic seeks to protect Shi’a communities across the region, it leverages many hard and soft power programs that assist it in developing a sense of loyalty to the regime. One very important example is the development of Shi’a militias in Iraq and Lebanon. These groups of religious young men who stand as defenders of their Shi’a communities are trained by Iran and stand as protectors of Iranian influence there. Their activities are also funded by Tehran and are recruited as fighters to carry out Iran’s missions in places such as Syria. Another example is Yemen, where it is understood that Iran has provided weapons and funds to the Houthi rebels who are fighting against Saudi Arabia for control of the government there, another proxy war between the competitors. Not only does Iran have a regional competition interest in Yemen, but the Houthi rebels are also Zaydis, a branch of the Shi’a sect.[26] Therefore, Iran’s support can easily be justified through this manipulation of religious connection.

Iran also uses soft power tools to influence through religion. It has a sizeable academic influence through the Islamic Azad University networks in Syria, Iraq, and other areas, where instructors are trained exclusively in Iran and texts are supplied by Tehran.[27] Culturally, Iran has invested in Iraq’s Shi’a cities of Karbala and Najaf, in efforts to be perceived as an Islamic and Shi’a protector. Further, Iran uses media as another space to advertise its Revolutionary ideology, through a variety of Arabic-language radio and television programs with the aim of shaping public opinion, while developing sympathy. These programs are available in Lebanon, Iraq, and the Palestinian Territories.[28]

Lebanon is the strongest example of Iranian religious influence through its funding and backing of Hezbollah. The group blurs the lines between hard and soft power, leveraging community and educative centers to promote the Revolutionary ideology. Further, the Cultural Center of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Lebanon is an organization sponsoring academic and religious centers in Shi’a areas that promotes regime ideology through media and propaganda throughout.[29] Iran also backs and is said to control a series of militia groups in Iraq, an alternative to its national military, which is made up completely by Shi’a Iraqis, called the Popular Mobilization Forces. With control over the Forces, Iran has the capacity to direct its overall missions and interests.[30]

During the Arab uprisings, Shi’a Bahrainis, 62% of the population,[31] protested against the Sunni ruling family for repression against their community.[32] Eventually, the protests began to get violent, with accusations of Iranian influence. Though the link to Iranian support is not official, Bahraini officials have claimed they uncovered “a large warehouse containing equipment, apparently supplied by Iran.”[33] A crackdown began almost immediately with Saudi Arabia eagerly assisting its ally to counter Iranian influence that so to the Arabian peninsula.
 

o   Conclusion

All of the aforementioned examples of Iranian influence are purposefully imbued with significant religious overtones, but are in place to satisfy policies that are critical to the regime’s interest and protection. Religion is nothing more than a tool to further achieve said policies and continue its battle for regional power status against Saudi Arabia. They gain access to foreign communities and influence their beliefs to develop sensitivities for the regime. Both states leverage similar tactics and succeed in using a symbol important to their domestic audiences to justify their behavior. As the only Shi’a state, Iran sees such as an opportunity to influence and shape the region towards the direction it desires. The more militias and hard and soft power programs are mobilized through religion, the closer Iran gets to securing its regime and defending its position in the greater Middle East.

Resources:

Billini, Gabriela. “Media Guide: Iran's Government Structure.” American Iranian Council. 1 Aug. 2017.

Billini, Gabriela. “Media Guide: IRGC and al-Quds Force” American Iranian Council. 13 Sept. 2017.

Billini, Gabriela. “Women, Religion and the State under the Pahlavi Dynasty and the Islamic Republic of Iran.” 2017.

Boucek, Christopher. “Saudi Extremism to Sahel and Back.” Carnegie Endowment, 26 Mar. 2009.

Eistenstadt, Michael. “The Strategic Culture of the Islamic Republic of Iran” Middle East Studies at the Marine Corps University. Aug. 2011.

Emadi, Hafizullah. “Exporting Iran's Revolution: The Radicalization of the Shiite Movement in Afghanistan” Page 5.

Gause III, F. Gregory. “Beyond Sectarianism: The New Middle East Cold War.”

Gause III, F. Gregory. “The Gulf States and Iran: Two Misunderstandings and One Possible Game-Changer,” Working Paper. Baker Institute for Public Policy. Page 1. 

Gause III, F. Gregory. “Saudi Arabia and the War on Terror.”

Gordon, Anna. “How the Houthis Became ‘Shi‘a.’” Middle East Research and Information Project, 27 Jan. 2018.

Haji-Yousefi, Amir M. “Whose Agenda Is Served by the Idea of a Shia Crescent?” Alternatives, vol. 8, no. 1, 2009. Page 116.

Hilse, Gwendolin. “Africa's Muslims: Pawns of the Saudis - Qantara.de.” Qantara.de, 4 Dec. 2017.

Katzman, Kenneth. “Iran’s Foreign and Defense Policies” Congressional Research Service. 20 Mar. 2018.

Majidyar, Ahmed. “Iran’s soft power: Islamic Azad University opening branches in major Syrian and Iraqi cities” 17 Jan. 2018.

Mavani, Hamid. “Khomeini's Concept of Governance of the Jurisconsult.

Murphy, Carlyle. “Why the Protest Movement in Bahrain Failed.” Public Radio International, 5 Apr. 2011.

Patterson, Molly. “The Shi’a Spring: Shi’a Resistance and the Arab Spring Movement in the GCC States” Page 3. 2015. Mathal: Vol. 4: Iss. 1 , Article 3

Pollock, David. “Sunnis and Shia in Bahrain: New Survey Shows Both Conflict and Consensus.” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 20 Nov. 2017.

Saouli, Adham, “Saudi Arabia: The Survival of a Homogenous State.” The Arab State: Dilemmas of Late State Formation, Routledge, 2014. Page 71.

Shane, Scott. “Saudis and Extremism: 'Both the Arsonists and the Firefighters'.” The New York Times, 25 Aug. 2016.

Zarif, Muhammad Javad. “What Iran Really Wants” Foreign Affairs, 2014.

[1] Mavani, Hamid. “Khomeini's Concept of Governance of the Jurisconsult. Page 208-9. and Billini, Gabriela. “Women, Religion and the State under the Pahlavi Dynasty and the Islamic Republic of Iran.” 2017.

[2] Emadi, Hafizullah. “Exporting Iran's Revolution: The Radicalization of the Shiite Movement in Afghanistan” Page 5.

[3] Ibid. Page 2.

[4] Gause III, F. Gregory, “Beyond Sectarianism: The New Middle East Cold War.” Page 9.

[5] Zarif, Muhammad Javad. “What Iran Really Wants” Foreign Affairs, 2014.

[6] Patterson, Molly. “The Shi’a Spring: Shi’a Resistance and the Arab Spring Movement in the GCC States” Page 3. 2015. Mathal: Vol. 4: Iss. 1 , Article 3

[7] Haji-Yousefi, Amir M. “Whose Agenda Is Served by the Idea of a Shia Crescent?” Alternatives, vol. 8, no. 1, 2009. Page 116.

[8] Billini, Gabriela. “Media Guide: IRGC and al-Quds Force.” American Iranian Council. 13 Sept. 2017.

[9] Billini, Gabriela. “Media Guide: Iran's Government Structure.” American Iranian Council. 1 Aug. 2017.

[10] Gause III, F. Gregory. Saudi Arabia and the War on Terror. Page 90.

[11] “Saudi Arabia: The Survival of a Homogenous State.” The Arab State: Dilemmas of Late State Formation, by Adham Saouli, Routledge, 2014. Page 71.

[12] Gause III, F. Gregory. “Saudi Arabia and the War on Terror.” Page 91.

[13] Boucek, Christopher. “Saudi Extremism to Sahel and Back.” Carnegie Endowment, 26 Mar. 2009.

[14] Hilse, Gwendolin. “Africa's Muslims: Pawns of the Saudis - Qantara.de.” Qantara.de, 4 Dec. 2017.

[15] Shane, Scott. “Saudis and Extremism: 'Both the Arsonists and the Firefighters'.” The New York Times, 25 Aug. 2016.

[16]Gause III, F. Gregory. The Gulf States and Iran: Two Misunderstandings and One Possible Game-Changer, Working Paper. Baker Institute for Public Policy. Page 1. 

[17] Gause III, F. Gregory. Beyond Sectarianism: The New Middle East Cold War. Page 3.

[18] Gause III, F. Gregory. The Gulf States and Iran: Two Misunderstandings and One Possible Game-Changer, Working Paper. Baker Institute for Public Policy. Page 1.

[19] Gause III, F. Gregory. Beyond Sectarianism: The New Middle East Cold War. Page 5.

[20] Gause III, F. Gregory. The Gulf States and Iran: Two Misunderstandings and One Possible Game-Changer, Working Paper. Baker Institute for Public Policy. Page 1.

[21] Gause III, F. Gregory. Beyond Sectarianism: The New Middle East Cold War. Page 8.

[22] Ibid. Page 4.

[23] Ibid. Page 6.

[24] Gause III, F. Gregory. The Gulf States and Iran: Two Misunderstandings and One Possible Game-Changer, Working Paper. Baker Institute for Public Policy. Page 2; and Gause III, F. Gregory, Beyond Sectarianism: The New Middle East Cold War. Page 6.

[25] Zarif Muhammad J. “What Iran Really Wants.” Foreign Affairs. 2014.

[26] Gordon, Anna. “How the Houthis Became ‘Shi‘a.’” Middle East Research and Information Project, 27 Jan. 2018.

[27] Majidyar, Ahmed. “Iran’s soft power: Islamic Azad University opening branches in major Syrian and Iraqi cities” 17 Jan. 2018.

[28] Eistenstadt, Michael. “The Strategic Culture of the Islamic Republic of Iran” Middle East Studies at the Marine Corps University. Aug. 2011.

[29] Majidyar, Ahmed. “Iran’s soft power: Islamic Azad University opening branches in major Syrian and Iraqi cities” 17 Jan. 2018.

[30] Billini, Gabriela. “Media Guide: IRGC and al-Quds Force” American Iranian Council. 13 Sept. 2017.

[31] Pollock, David. “Sunnis and Shia in Bahrain: New Survey Shows Both Conflict and Consensus.” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 20 Nov. 2017.

[32] Murphy, Carlyle. “Why the Protest Movement in Bahrain Failed.” Public Radio International, 5 Apr. 2011.

[33] Katzman, Kenneth. “Iran’s Foreign and Defense Policies” Congressional Research Service. 20 Mar. 2018.