Iran and U.S. Diplomacy
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Guest Article, by Franklin T. Burroughs, Ed.D.
I lived in Iran for fifteen years prior to the Islamic Revolution and left the country after several weeks of hiding following the takeover of the U.S. Embassy. While in Iran, I served as consultant to Prime Minister Hoveyda and the Minister of Health. I also served as consultant to the Ministry of Court during the 2500th Celebration of the Iranian (Persian) Monarchy. I was Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi's emissary to President Carter in the Shah's attempt to set up a constitutional monarchy prior to the Islamic Revolution. I presented to the U.S. Embassy the proposal made by the Iranian military with the support of Ayatollah Kazem Shariatmadari to undertake a coup shortly after Ayatollah Khomeini's return to Iran. I worked with Ambassador Richard Helms in the establishment of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce in Tehran in the 1970s. My latest book on Iran is titled Patterns on a Prayer Rug.
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Iran and U.S. Diplomacy
The Great Game of the nineteenth century between the British and Russian Empires over Afghanistan and neighboring territories also threatened Persia, now known as Iran. This confrontational ambiance and the negative implications created both fear and distrust within the Government of Iran toward England and Russia and prompted the acceptance of the United States as a more trustworthy foreign power.
The United States entered the Iran relationship with what Robin Hobb would term “the velvet glove that cloaks the fist of power.” America used a level of diplomacy that convinced the Iranians that the U.S. had their interest at heart and greatly heightened Iran’s expectations related to the American government. The trust reached such a level that the shahs in power appointed two Americans, Arthur Millspaugh and Morgan Shuster, treasurers-general of the country. The U.S. display of relatively soft power persisted until the mid-twentieth century.
The U.S. showed its “fist of power” to Iran essentially for the first time in 1953. In cooperation with the British intelligence agency, the U. S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) directed the coup d’état against the elected prime minister Mohammed Mosaddeq, returning Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi to power and setting up a government in Iran that could prove beneficial to U.S. security, economic and political interests. The reinstatement of the monarchy as the legitimate government of Iran required British and U.S. bare-knuckle diplomacy.
The intelligence agencies of both countries encouraged elements of the Iranian military to overthrow Prime Minister Mosaddeq. According to CIA documents, the organization employed mobsters in Tehran to stage pro-Shah riots and transported men into the city by bus and truck to dominate the streets. The documents also state that the CIA bribed high-ranking military officials and religious leaders. Papers from the National Security Archive suggest that two prominent religious leaders, Ayatollah Mohammad Behbehani and Ayatollah Abolqasm Kashani, received funds from the CIA to ensure their allegiance to the coup and its success.
After regaining the throne, the Shah directed his military court to sentence Mosaddeq to three years in prison and place him under house arrest for the remainder of his life. Several Mosaddeq supporters were sentenced to death. The coup and the reestablishment of the monarchy clearly showed the U.S. “fist of power” not cloaked in a velvet glove. Many Iranians began to view the United States and its diplomacy from a different perspective.
Following the coup, the United States continued to support Mohammad Reza Shah despite reports of his lack of popularity among much of the Iranian population and for the following twenty-five years used primarily the fist of power cloaked in velvet in relation to the Shah and Iran. In fact, the Shah relied on the U.S. to remain head of state.
The twenty-five years of cloaked diplomacy offered numerous opportunities for the development of ever stronger U.S.-Iran relations. American companies and the U.S. Embassy joined forces to establish a U.S.-Iran Chamber of Commerce, the membership of which grew substantially. The former Director of the CIA, Richard Helms, served as U.S. Ambassador to Iran from 1973 to 1977 and supported the establishment of the Chamber. Large numbers of Iranian students made their way to U.S. institutions of higher education with the help and support of an American organization known as American Friends of the Middle East (AFME). The U.S. Fulbright Program brought a significant number of American educators to Iran.
The two countries signed a nuclear cooperation agreement as part of the United States Atoms for Peace program in 1957. The agreement allowed Iran to lease several kilograms of enriched uranium and cooperate on peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The Shah issued orders for the creation of a nuclear research center at the University of Tehran in 1959. The U.S. had without foresight introduced an element of hard diplomacy that came to haunt America. Iran has for many years now successfully used the nuclear issue as hard diplomacy in negotiating with the United States and its allies.
Despite the Shah’s popularity among U.S. Government officials, he remained deeply unpopular among certain groups of Iranians, including the clergy. Prominent among the anti-Shah clergy was Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, a political as well as religious figure. To prevent Ayatollah Khomeini’s execution by the Shah in 1963, a more liberal religious leader by the name of Ayatollah Mohammad Kazem Shariatmadari and a prominent member of the Tehran bazaar arranged for Ayatollah Khomeini’s fifteen-year exile.
During the years between 1953 and 1979, three U.S. presidents visited Iran to demonstrate U.S. support for the Shah and his monarchy: President Dwight Eisenhower in 1959; President Richard Nixon in 1972; and, President Jimmy Carter on December 31, 1977 and January 1, 1978. During his 1977-78 visit, President Carter declared that Iran was “an island of stability in one of the most troubled areas of the world.” A short time after President Carter offered the tribute to the Shah, anti-Shah demonstrations began.
Already aware of at least some of the anti-Shah sentiment among Iranians, Mohammad Reza Shah quickly formulated a plan for the establishment of a constitutional monarchy based on the British model. He attempted several times to be in touch with President Carter, whose tribute had not only impressed but invigorated the Shah. He felt certain until his several unsuccessful attempts to communicate with the president that the U.S. was still supporting him.
Refusing to admit to himself that the American government might be taking off its glove of diplomacy vis-à-vis Iran and his continued reign, the Shah requested that I take his plan to the Carter Administration during one of our meetings in mid-1978. I made an appointment with the White house through the U.S. Embassy in Tehran and flew to Washington, D.C. The morning I was scheduled to meet with the White House representative a telephone call instructed me to visit the U.S. Department of State. The Iran Desk Officer at the State Department guided me into his office, forbade me to sit down and told me to mind my own business. He quickly informed me the Department of State knew what should be done and did not need my input, even if my message was from Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. I forwarded a message to the Shah about my experience and returned to Iran several days later.
Upon my return to Iran, I discovered that U.S. Ambassador William H. Sullivan favored a change in government for Iran from a monarchy to a religious-oriented regime. He promoted a compromise with anti-Shah demonstrators and the Ayatollah Khomeini. He was rumored to have interacted regularly with Khomeini advocates. In January 1979, Ambassador Sullivan instructed the Shah that the White House preferred that he abdicate the throne and depart the country at his earliest convenience. The U.S. had abandoned the “velvet-glove” diplomacy it had used in relation to Iran for twenty-five-plus years in favor of a fist of power. The Shah left Iran on 16 January 1979, never to return, and Ayatollah Khomeini prepared to return to Iran from exile in France.
Prior to his return to Iran on February 1, 1979, Ayatollah Khomeini secretly asked the White House if the U.S. could make certain the Iranian military would cooperate with him in establishing his government(1). He felt he had many supporters among the general Iranian population but remained uncertain about the level of acceptance among the armed forces. In return for U.S. support, he would calm the situation in Iran and watch over Americans and American interests in the country. President Carter’s response to Ayatollah Khomeini remains a mystery, but the Ayatollah’s return proved to be glorious and eye-catching.
The U.S. support, or at least acceptance, of Ayatollah Khomeini continued after his return to Iran, but segments of the Iranian military soon questioned his leadership and wanted to arrange a coup d’état. Representatives of the military visited Ayatollah Mohammad Kazem Shariatmadari’s bureau one Friday evening when I was working with the Ayatollah and asked if he would support them in a coup attempt. The Ayatollah commissioned me to take the request to the U.S. Embassy. The request was denied after two or three days without any explanation.
Ayatollah Khomeini quickly destroyed any expectations the U.S. might have had regarding positive U.S.-Iran relations or the establishment of a pro-Western government. He promoted clerical authority and referred to democracy in negative terms. He supported the hostage takers during the Iran hostage crisis. He defied U.S. expectations and went his own way. He certainly disappointed his American supporters who had apparently preferred his rule over that of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, a diplomatic friend of the U.S. for more than thirty years.
The rise and rapid success of Ayatollah Khomeini did not really shake the wisdom of political thought; his success demonstrated the inability of trained, experienced politicians, particularly American officials, to predict the outcome of a diplomatic experiment with a religious, conservative leader. The Carter Administration employed duplicitous tactics when declaring Iran an “island of stability” in an unstable region while communicating with Ayatollah Khomeini and his minions. The Ayatollah quickly detected the duplicity and obvious naivete of the Americans and declared the creation of the Islamic Republic. Iran felt
emboldened to use the U.S. as an external bogeyman to advance its objectives both at home and abroad; U.S.-Iran relations rapidly deteriorated.
Formal U.S.-Iran diplomatic relations ended early in 1980, and the two countries have sometimes been at odds, sometimes cooperative. The U.S. provided Iraq economic aid, training, and technology during the Iran-Iraq War, which continued from 1980 to 1988. The War resulted in the death of several hundred thousand Iranians.
In 1985, senior officials in the Reagan Administration secretly facilitated the sale of arms to Iran despite an embargo against the country. The sales caused a scandal known as the Iran Contra Affair and resulted in the indictment of several officials.
In 1988, the U.S. armed forces destroyed two Iranian oil platforms and a passenger jet in retaliation for an Iranian mine nearly sinking an American frigate in the Strait of Hormoz. U.S. sanctions against Iran began in 1979 after the seizure and occupation of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran and increased during the George W. Bush and Bill Clinton administrations. After the 9/11 attacks, the Bush administration secretly assisted Iran in defeating the shared enemy, the Taliban. Iranian government representatives quietly met with U.S. diplomats about the possible capture of al-Qaeda operatives and ways of combatting the Taliban. Talks ended when President George H. Bush identified Iran as part of the “axis of evil.”
Despite the diplomatic rupture between the United States and Iran, moments of diplomatic communication have occurred. The highest-level occurred in 2000 when U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright spoke at a conference of the American Iranian Council. The Secretary acknowledged the U.S. role in the overthrow of Mohammad Mosaddeq and admitted the overthrow was shortsighted. She expressed regret and subsequently extended an apology for the action (2).
Negotiations regarding the Iran nuclear deal began in 2013 during the Obama administration when the P5+1 and Iran signed an agreement in July 2015 known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. Despite the challenges the JCPOA faced, the imperfect resolution seemed to be enjoying increasing success in 2016, the year Donald J.Trump was elected President of the United States. Following his election, however, President Trump withdrew from the JCPOA in 2019. The departure widened the U.S.-Iran diplomatic chasm the agreement had theoretically narrowed and caused a diplomatic schism between the U.S. and European nations.
During the 2020 presidential campaign, Democrat candidate Biden frequently declared his willingness to reenter the P5+1. Reentry would allow the United States and its allies to extend and strengthen the agreement’s provisions but would require strict Iranian compliance. Iran continues to insist on the removal of U.S.-imposed sanctions and recognition of its sovereignty. A successful reentry into the P5+1 is not
a fait accompli. It presents a real challenge.
(1) Kambiz Fattahi, “Two Weeks in January: America’s Secret Engagement
With Khomeini,” BBC Persian Services, 3 June, 2016.
(2) John Lancaster, “U.S. Plans Major Gesture to Iran: Overture Acknowledges Past
Meddling in Affairs,” Washington Post, March 17, 2000. Page A01.
