The Impact of the U.S. Presidential Election on US-Iran Relations
/By Elliott Morton, AIC Research Associate
As the 2024 U.S. presidential election looms just a few short months away, many Americans’ minds are focused on the race between former president Donald Trump and Democratic nominee Kamala Harris. The contest carries tremendous implications for foreign policy. While the candidates’ approaches to conflicts in Ukraine and Gaza may be two of the most discussed foreign policy matters at stake, future US-Iran relations also heavily depend on the outcome of this election. Below, I will map out the possibilities for each candidate’s Iran policy should either be elected. While we cannot predict the future, the unusual circumstances of an incumbent vice president and former president competing for the White House allows for greater insight into future policies based in part on previous actions. This article will compare the Iran policies of the Trump and Biden-Harris administrations and will evaluate their likely impacts on Iran policy in a potential future term.
Previous Campaign Rhetoric
Before President Biden exited the race, in the sole presidential debate thus far, the candidates sparred for roughly 90 minutes on a wide range of issues. Of 17,652 words spoken during the debate, less than two hundred related to Iran, with an approximately even split between the candidates. Both Trump and Biden left the stage without giving any promise or indication of what a second term of their Iran policy would be like. Rather, they spent most of their time touting their “strength” on Iran and criticizing the other as weak. As expected, Trump championed his ‘maximum pressure’ policy, arguing “Iran was broke with me… They had no money for Hamas. They had no money for anything. No money for terror.” Later, he continued: “…the whole world is blowing up under [Biden].” This furthers previous attempts by the Trump campaign to claim that the October 7th attack would not have happened under his leadership, and that Biden’s relaxing of sanctions directly contributed to it. This fits with Trump’s overall argument that Biden is responsible for violence in Afghanistan, Ukraine, Gaza, and elsewhere. Weeks later at the Republican National Convention, Trump continued these lines of rhetoric - blaming the president for Iran’s alleged newfound economic achievements and status as a nuclear threshold state. Again, notably, Trump did not make any pledges on how he would handle Iran in a second term.
For Biden’s part, in the debate against Trump he claimed the Trump administration’s assassination of Qassem Soleimani resulted in retaliation by Iran with the largest ever ballistic missile attack on U.S. forces abroad, which caused traumatic brain injuries to 110 service members, and that Trump “[did] nothing about it.” Biden also criticized Trump for referring to the soldiers’ injuries as mere “headaches.” To assert his own strength on the matter, Biden notedthat he was “…the guy that organized the world against Iran when they had a full-blown… missile attack on Israel,” referring to Iran’s April 2024 launching of over 300 missiles and drones on Israel in response to Israel’s attack on its consulate in Damascus.
Now that Kamala Harris has taken Biden’s place atop the Democratic ticket, many expect her to continue to align with Biden on many foreign policy issues that she held throughout her term as vice president. However, as of the writing of this article, neither Trump nor Harris have issued a clear roadmap of how they would handle Iran moving forward. Most notably, neither has signaled support for a potential revival of the JCPOA or taken any stance on the future of Iran’s nuclear program.
Indeed the days of the JCPOA may be long over. While both Biden and Trump – before each was elected – claimed that they would replace the JCPOA with a better, longer-lasting deal, neither administration was able to accomplish this task. Iran has since neared the status of a “threshold state” – having the capacity to build a nuclear weapon without actively attempting to make one. Reports by the IAEA and other partner nations indicate Iran has roughly 833kg of uranium enriched between 20 and 60 percent – enough to create three nuclear devices if it was further enriched to the weapons-grade benchmark of 90%. In March 2023, then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Gen. Mark Milley concluded Iran would need 10-15 days to enrich enough uranium to produce a nuclear weapon, and a few more months to assemble it. After four years of President Trump’s “maximum pressure” strategy and nearly the same time of President Biden’s so-called “low boil” strategy, the United States is in no stronger of a negotiating position than it has been since the fall of the JCPOA.
Whichever candidate is elected, the next administration will be dealing with an interesting state of affairs in Iran. After the unexpected death of then-Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi in a helicopter crash in May 2024, new elections were held in Iran with reform candidate Masoud Pezeshkian winning. As a result, Iran now has its first reformist government since the JCPOA was inked nearly ten years ago, presenting a unique opportunity for rapprochement should the next U.S. President accept the challenge.
President Trump and “Maximum Pressure”
During his initial run for the White House in 2016, Trump campaigned on exiting the JCPOA, describing it as a “disaster” and “the worst deal ever.” After taking office, Trump was then required by the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA) to certify or not certify Iran’s compliance with the terms of the deal every 90 days. While he certified Iran’s compliance in April and July of 2017, he ultimately declined to do so in October. This decision aligned with a series of personnel changes in his administration, from the likes of the deal-supporting Rex Tillerson to the more hawkish John Bolton and Mike Pompeo. Then, in May 2018, Trump officially announced the U.S.’s withdrawal from the JCPOA.
At the outset of Trump’s term, Iran had been complying with the highly restrictive terms of the JCPOA for several years. It had limited its uranium enrichment levels to well below weapons grade, cut its centrifuges by two-thirds, and reduced its stockpile of enriched uranium. Even after the American pullout from the deal, it still abided by its terms until over one year after the U.S. withdrawal. At that point, Iran still maintained that it would resume compliance if the United States and other parties to the agreement returned to their commitments of sanctions reduction. By the end of 2020, Iran had increased its enrichment to 20% purity, up from the 3.67% permitted by the deal.
To pressure Iran back to the negotiating table, the Trump administration commenced its so-called “maximum pressure” strategy. Maximum pressure was designed to levy enough sanctions on Iran that it would then feel such an economic burden that it would have no choice but to negotiate. Maximum pressure was also intended to limit the Islamic Republic’s available funds to use for sponsoring terrorism or bolstering its nuclear program. Trump levied over 1,500 sanctions on Iran, going beyond those set by the Obama administration to target wide-ranging areas of Iran’s political and economic spheres. The sanctions impacted everything from senior administration and banking officials to military and IRGC members to key aspects of Iran’s economy. It restricted Iran’s oil exports to less than 400,000 barrels per day– down from over 2.1 million barrels exported while the JCPOA was in effect. Iran immediately felt the impacts of ‘maximum pressure.’ The year following was described as the “toughest” in the Islamic Republic’s history. In the two years following the American pullout, the Iranian rial dropped in value by 600%. Oil exports – which account for up to 70% of Iran’s government revenue - dropped to a historic low, costing Iran roughly $200 billion in oil revenues. Its gross reserves fell from $70 billion in 2017 to $4 billion in 2020.
Despite this pressure, however, Iran refused to concede to American demands and responded by developing an “economy of resistance” – diversifying its economy to rely less on oil revenues and becoming more able to skirt oil exporting restrictions through a “shadow fleet” of unmarked tankers. ‘Maximum pressure’ also drew high levels of scrutiny from international rights watchdogs due to its impact on Iranian civilians. Human Rights Watch wrote that the campaign “[posed] a serious threat to Iranians’ right to health and access to essential medicines,” including epilepsy and chemotherapy medications. This report cited the U.S.’s restrictions on Iran’s banking system creating high barriers to purchasing critical supplies needed for Iran’s healthcare and other industries.
Trump and Iran’s Military
US-Iran relations, especially in the past two decades, have been defined either by political/economic matters or around Iran’s military capability and growing capacity to build a nuclear bomb. In the military/nuclear arena, much of the US’ focus relates to its alliance with and defense of Israel. For its part, in Iran, a core part of the country’s foreign policy over the past few decades has been to build a so-called “Axis of Resistance” against Israel. And, while Iran has largely conducted its countering of Israeli influence through a series of military proxies (Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah in southern Lebanon, the Houthi rebels in Yemen, and a series of militias in Iraq and Syria), more recently in April 2024, Iran initiated a stunning attack of more than 300 missiles and drones on Israel directly, in response to Israel’s attack on its consulate in Damascus.
Given the United States’ ardent support for Israel, recent flare-ups in the Middle East have heightened the need for US Presidential candidates to promote their military toughness towards Iran as evidenced by some of their statements in the June 27 presidential debate. While both Trump and Biden (and now Harris) may all make similar “tough” postures while campaigning, it is important to recall that the Trump and Biden-Harris administrations actually had significantly different policies.
President Trump’s Iran policy notably culminated eighteen days before he left office, with the U.S. assassination of Maj. Gen. Qassem Soleimani. Soleimani was head of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps’ Quds Force, a key figure in Iranian foreign policy, and chief architect of the Axis of the Resistance. He has been cited as the “most important person in Iran after Ayatollah Khamenei.”
The strike on Soleimani, however, was simply the peak of a tense eight month period following the fall of the JCPOA. It was also a demonstration of Trump’s willingness to use force to achieve his ends. Before taking this military action, his “maximum pressure” campaign had involved significant diplomatic and economic measures beyond those of prior administrations. For example, in April 2019, the Trump administration designated the IRGC as a foreign terrorist organization – the first time the U.S. had placed such a label on a foreign government entity. In the following months, the U.S. deployed increasingly more forces to the Middle East to deter Iranian aggression – including troops, a Patriot missile battery, and a carrier strike group. As Trump continued to increase sanctions on Iran, Iran responded by breaking more bounds of the JCPOA, and by increasing attacks on U.S. troops in Iraq and other areas.
The exact rationale for the January 2nd strike on Soleimani has been disputed and debated. Some sources say that Pentagon officials offered Trump the option of doing so as a contrast to make other options seem more reasonable in comparison. The day following the strike, President Trump spoke, offering allegations that Soleimani was planning attacks on American military positions and diplomats abroad. Trump officials also compared Soleimani’s killing to that of Islamic State leader Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi three months prior. Regardless of the reason, assassinating Soleimani was a further demonstration of Trump’s strongman policy in attempting to bend Iran’s will towards U.S. interests. In response, Ayatollah Khamenei pledged “forceful revenge,” and did so on January 7th by launching a barrage of missiles causing brain injuries to 110 servicemembers. Thirteen days later, under lightning-high tensions, President Biden took office and sought to change course on Iran.
The Biden-Harris Iran Policy: Attempts at a New Deal
Before the Biden-Harris administration took office, Biden campaigned on making an “unshakable commitment” to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons. His plan for achieving this, however, was misguided. Despite 150 members of Congress signing on to a letter to the President urging him to rejoin the JCPOA without any preconditions, Biden instead opted to place the impetus on Iran to rejoin the deal, saying he would consider sanctions removal if and only if Iran immediately returned to full compliance of the agreement as it was pre-withdrawal. Experts noted that Biden likely viewed Trump’s four years of “maximum pressure” as leverage he did not want to give up by acquiescing to Iranian demands for sanctions removal. This strategy was problematic. American credibility has declined since the signing of the JCPOA. A hasty and catastrophic withdrawal from Afghanistan, failure to honor the nuclear deal, wavering commitments to Ukraine, and other incidents have made other countries skeptical of the United States’ ability to hold a diplomatic commitment through multiple, often disputing administrations. As members of Congress noted, “Americans have seen first-hand how withdrawing from multilateral agreements and abandoning our allies jeopardizes our national security goals.” With the volatility of American domestic politics, Iran in particular was skeptical of Biden’s offer and declined. U.S. diplomatic inconsistency reinforced Iran’s already anti-west sentiments and view that the United States was not to be trusted.
Also at the beginning of the Biden-Harris administration, a group of over 50 foreign policy and national security experts penned a similar letter, highlighting the fact that Biden did not need congressional approval to rejoin the JCPOA. He could rejoin via executive order, just as he did to rejoin the Paris climate agreement that President Trump had also exited. Instead of placing the impetus on Iran, President Biden could have taken the burden on himself to rebuild the trust that his country had broken. Any such move, however, even before the war in Gaza and Houthi attacks in the Red Sea, would have come at a significant political cost for Biden so early in his presidency. Instead, he opted for the politically safer option that resulted in no new deal.
Three months into Biden’s term in April 2021, negotiations began in earnest for a successor to the JCPOA. In these discussions, Biden sought increased concessions from Tehran, including a curbing of Iran’s cruise missile program and a reduction of Iran’s presence in the region – two core aspects of Iran’s foreign policy. A week into negotiations, Israel attempted to sabotage them by bombing Natanz, a major Iranian nuclear site. This set back Tehran’s nuclear capacity and undercut its leverage in the negotiations. In response, Ayatollah Khamenei increased uranium enrichment up to 60% purity, far above the 3-5% needed for civilian purposes that Iran alleges their program is for, and extremely close to weapons-grade.
The United States and Iran were at an impasse. President Biden demanded Iran first return to compliance before potential sanctions removal. Iran demanded the United States remove sanctions before they would dismantle any of their nuclear program. Then, in June of 2021, President Rouhani and Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif – both individuals whose support was instrumental in accomplishing the original deal – left office, leading to over a year of stagnated talks before both parties abandoned them in July 2022.
The Biden-Harris Post-Deal Strategy – “Low Boil”
After this initial attempt at reconciliation, the Biden-Harris Iran strategy can be best described, as an anonymous official familiar with the matter put it, “low boil.” The administration has sought neither to antagonize nor concede, responding to Iran’s actions proportionally. Their primary goal was simple: use minimal coercion to keep Iran in check, scoring marginal wins when possible, and keeping relations from spiraling out of control. Not long after the failed renegotiations, Biden spoke out in favor of the widespread protests that erupted after the death of Mahsa Amini in September 2022. His first major action regarding Iran followed a year later when Washington and Tehran inked a blockbuster deal to free five American hostages wrongfully detained by the regime in exchange for unfreezing $6 Bn in Iranian oil revenue being held in South Korean bank accounts. This deal was part of a key aspect of Biden-Harris foreign policy – bringing home Americans held wrongfully abroad. They have freed 35 such hostages to date.
The hostage exchange deal came under heavy scrutiny, with one Republican calling it a “ransom.” GOP Sen. Tom Cotton (R-AK) called the deal a “craven act of appeasement,” alleging that Iran would then use the “ill-gotten gains” to fund terrorism and attack U.S. troops. The newly released funds were restricted to only humanitarian purposes, but Republican detractors countered with allegations that additional humanitarian funding would then, in turn, free up other funds to be used for malicious purposes. This scrutiny intensified after the October 7th Hamas attack on Israel, with House majority leader and then-Speaker candidate Steve Scalise writing via X/Twitter: “The Biden Administration must be held accountable for its appeasement of these Hamas terrorists, including handing over billions of dollars to them and their Iranian backers.” Shortly after, the Biden-Harris administration announced they and Qatar, where the funds are held, would block Iran’s access for the foreseeable future. In response, Iran criticized the re-freezing, claiming in a statement: “The money rightfully belongs to the people of Iran… [for] all essential and non-sanctioned requisites for the Iranians.”
The Biden-Harris “low boil” strategy has carried over into the wide-ranging proxy war between the U.S., Israel, and U.S.-backed militias against Iran and its Axis of Resistance. In February 2023, in response to three American soldiers being killed by IRGC-backed groups in Jordan, Biden ordered a strike on 85 targets in Iraq and Syria. The targets largely comprised intelligence centers, logistics facilities, and other locations supporting the IRGC and the Axis of Resistance. After Iran famously fired over 300 drones, rockets, and missiles toward Israel in April 2023, Biden’s administration stepped up in Israel’s defense, but strongly discouraged Israel from retaliating, stopping any further escalation from an already near-boiling point.
Where Does Harris Stand?
Ever since Harris rose into the national political spotlight during her 2020 presidential run, she has largely mirrored Biden’s stances on Iran. Many expect her to continue these leanings if she is elected in November. During her initial run for president, she called Trump’s exiting of the deal “reckless” and pledged to rejoin the agreement, conditional on Iran’s return to compliance. She has also shared Biden’s desire not to escalate matters, criticizing Trump in January 2020 via X/Twitter, claiming that his assassination of Soleimani “put more American lives at risk.” Most recently as Vice President, she mirrored Biden’s stern message to Iran in response to its missile attack on Israel. Harris has only notably diverged from Biden in one key area regarding Iran: Israel. Harris has been slightly more critical of Israel in its war against Hamas, which could signal a potentially less strict stance against Iran.
Opportunities for the Next Administration
Since the Iranian revolution in 1979, there have been limited opportunities for rapprochement between the US and Iran. In what sometimes has seemed like tragic comedy, both countries have historically alternated in their desire to negotiate with the other. These alternations in desire have rarely coincided. Iranian President Mohamed Khatami (1997-2005) and U.S. President Bill Clinton achieved the most significant thawing in relations since the revolution, with Clinton penning a letter to Tehran and Khatami calling Clinton “courageous” for his efforts. However, shortly after, the Bush administration named Iran as part of its “Axis of Evil,” citing its sponsorship of terrorism and pursuit of nuclear weapons. Little progress was made between the two nations until the Barack Obama and Hassan Rouhani administrations negotiated the JCPOA from 2012-15. There are two things in common between these two détentes. First, a moderate was in Iranian presidential office who was willing to enter talks. The second is that the U.S. president was a Democrat in his second term. In recent history, Democratic presidents have been much more amenable to striking deals with Tehran, and even more so in their second terms.
If Kamala Harris wins in November, a third such opportunity will take place. Throughout Biden’s tenure and after JCPOA renegotiations broke down in 2022, he has consistently chosen the least politically costly option to keep Iran-US relations on “low boil.” However, if reelected, Biden’s successor in Harris would be in a uniquely strong position to pursue a détente – potentially achieving a new JCPOA, which Biden and Harris initially campaigned on in 2020. Of course, negotiations with Iran often come with domestic political fallout, and any sort of concessions made must be done at a not insignificant expense of political capital. As a lame-duck president, Biden would have had to worry much less about the potential political fallout of his actions. While Harris is not in as formidable a position given her ability to run for a second term, she would still be inhabiting an interesting middle-ground of having represented the previous Biden-Harris administration as VP, and also beginning her own first term as President.
Most importantly for the next administration, as described above, Iran has recently elected a moderate president. Masoud Pezeshkian campaigned on better relations with the West, including pledging to renegotiate a nuclear deal to alleviate the sanctions’ burden on Iran’s economy. Pezeshkian also notably allied with former foreign minister Javad Zarif, one of the key players behind the initial inking of the JCPOA in 2015. Together in a foreign policy roundtable, Pezeshkian and Zarif argued that re-engagement with Western institutions is a must for improving Iran’s restricted financial status. Pezeshkian’s somewhat unexpected victory is a sign that Iran has, at least, some appetite for such change, and a goal of improving conditions, which have been worsened by Western sanctions.
Unfortunately for US-Iran relations, many factors currently cloud this possibility for rapprochement. The United States continues to clash with Iran-backed Houthi rebels over attacks in the Red Sea, which U.S. Navy officials have said Iran is “very directly involved” in. Iran recently sent a massive barrage of missiles directly at Israel, the United States’ chief ally in the region. The war in Ukraine (where Iran’s military support for Russia in its war on Ukraine is at a “new level”) has also heightened American popular distaste for working with Tehran. Furthermore, the status of the war in Gaza will have a determining impact on US-Iran relations. The two powers stand opposite each other in the conflict – however, both parties are actively working towards a ceasefire. US-Iran tensions have certainly been strained by the war. However, collaboration on a ceasefire deal could pave the way for further small steps towards better relations.
Conclusion
Iran now has a window of opportunity in which it may seek rapprochement with the United States. However, in our view, this option requires a victory by Harris in the 2024 elections - something which Iran does not seem to expect. Prior to Iran’s presidential election, the six approved candidates – Pezeshkian and five hardliners – debated over who would best counter a second Trump presidency. Neither Biden nor Harris were mentioned once in the debates. Candidate and cleric Mostafa Pourmohammadi used Trump’s image in his campaign posters, with one reading “The person who can stand in front of Trump is me.” One foreign policy expert noted that the hardliner candidates believe their strength will best deter Trump, while moderates assert that a hardline position will provoke harsher sanctions and possibly trigger a repeat of the woeful economic conditions that followed Trump’s maximum pressure campaign.
The potential for a second Trump presidency has already raised concern among many in the Iranian political establishment. Under a second Trump administration, a return to the JCPOA or a similar such deal would be extremely unlikely as Trump made his views on the JCPOA clear when he withdrew from it and made minimal attempts to return. Notably, Trump’s dominating victory in the 2024 Republican presidential primaries aligned with an almost 20% drop in the value of the Iranian rial, suggesting that if Trump were to win, he will continue his maximum pressure campaign. Moreover, Israel may feel emboldened to further engage Iran or its proxies militarily. Indeed, one of the unfortunate outcomes of a four-year “low boil” strategy from the Biden administration, may be that adding a Trump presidency to the mix will lead to a complete boiling over of conflicts in Iran and the broader Middle East.
