Redefining Peace: A Strategic Approach to the Middle East Conflict
/By Dr. Hooshang Amirahmadi, AIC President
Abstract
The Middle East is engulfed in a sustained conflict spanning over 70 years with no end in sight. The core contributing factor is the imbalance of power between nuclear-armed Israel and its regional adversaries. Achieving peace will require a balance of power, akin to the nuclear equilibrium established between Pakistan and India. Currently, I trust, Iran is the only country determined to build nuclear weapons and it will ultimately build the bomb. This essay outlines the arguments for and against a nuclear Iran. Considering global and regional experiences, proponents appear to hold a more valid, albeit unpopular, argument. In pursuing nuclear capabilities, Iran must overcome significant challenges and meet stringent prerequisites, which are detailed in this essay. As Iran cannot be stopped to build nuclear weapons, Washington is better advised to coopt rather than confront Tehran. This is a risk well worth taking. I conclude that, for peace and economic growth, the Islamic Republic must relinquish its hostility towards the United States and Israel, as well as its support for radical proxies. Such changes, in exchange for nuclear capabilities, would foster Iran's self-reliance and prompt the regime to adopt a more peaceful stance towards its citizens, the region, Israel, the US, and the international community.
Towards a Balance of Power between Iran and Israel
The Middle East is the world's most conflict-ridden region, perpetuating a seemingly endless cycle of conflict. At the heart of this turmoil for the past seventy or so years has been the conflict between Israel and its adversaries, including the Palestinians. This raises critical questions: Why has this prolonged conflict persisted, and what can the global community do to end it, bringing stability and peace to this rich and historic region?
A multitude of forces contribute to the enduring conflict in the Middle East, but the primary reason is the significant power imbalance between Israel and its rivals. Israel boasts one of the world's most formidable military forces and possesses nuclear weapons. It also enjoys the unwavering support of the United States, the preeminent military power globally.
This military prowess, coupled with American backing, diminishes Israel's incentive to seek compromise and reconciliation with its regional adversaries, such as Palestine, Arab nations, and Iran. With no compelling reason to concede, Israel does not feel the pressure to make the necessary concessions crucial for peacemaking.
In response to Israel's dominance, regional rivals have employed both conventional and unconventional strategies to forge a balance of power, albeit with limited success beyond causing inconveniences. They have bolstered their conventional military capabilities, leveraged Islamic ideology, and formed proxy groups, primarily for irregular and ideological warfare. Yet, none of these efforts have achieved a power equilibrium with Israel's military might.
Consequently, the power imbalance persists, transforming the quest for balance into a vicious cycle that exacerbates the original conflict. As Israel confronts these countervailing forces, it has enhanced its power, prompting its enemies to escalate their conventional and unconventional efforts in kind. Far from resolving the imbalance, this escalation has compounded the problem.
So, what is the solution? How can this vicious cycle be broken, and tension in the Middle East reduced? Drawing on international experience, the most effective approach appears to be establishing a balance of power. However, the question remains: Who can achieve this balance, and how? Given that Israel is a nuclear power, only another nuclear-capable country can establish equilibrium.
Among Israel's adversaries, who can develop such a nuclear capability? The Palestinians lack the resources, and Arab countries have shown little interest in pursuing nuclear options against Israel, as decades of history have shown. This leaves Iran as the only country with both the capability and ambition to assume such a role. It stands as the sole regional power with the significant size and historical stature to legitimately claim a leadership position.
As an Iran expert with deep knowledge of the Islamic Republic’s foreign relations, security thinking, and defense doctrine, as well as the nation’s foreign and domestic challenges, I can safely surmise that Iran is indeed resolute in building nuclear weapons. I can also securely claim that the country cannot be stopped becoming a nuclear state by any means including toughest sanctions or even a war. The only option remaining is for the US to coopt Iran into accepting certain prerequisites and making sure that it is an amicable state.
Should Iran, currently Israel's principal adversary, develop nuclear weapons, it could establish a power balance with Israel. This equilibrium could serve as a foundation for reducing tensions not only between Iran, the US, and Israel but also among Israel, Palestine, Arab nations, and other anti-Israeli entities. Historically, this power-balancing strategy has produced tangible benefits. The Middle East is no exception.
In the aftermath of World War II, despite the exponential increase in the global nuclear arsenal, no nuclear weapons have been detonated in conflict. Indeed, nuclear capabilities have evolved into stabilizing and peace-promoting forces. To illustrate this thesis, supported by prominent international relations theorists, military strategists, and statesmen, consider two relevant examples:
Firstly, Pakistan and India experienced regular conflicts until Pakistan developed nuclear weapons in 1998. Since then, full-scale wars have given way to low-level tensions, leading to a state of relative peace beneficial to both nations. This détente has allowed them to redirect resources previously wasted on warfare towards human capital, economic development, and national security(1).
Secondly, the history of India and China, who fought a significant border war in the Himalayas in 1962, underscores this thesis. Following their acquisition of nuclear capabilities—China in 1964 and India in 1974—their conflicts ceased. To avoid escalation into major wars, their military engagements are deliberately low-tech, involving melee rather than firearms(2).
Thanks to their nuclear arsenals, India and China now enjoy relative peace, and their economic ties have flourished. In 2022, India's trade with China matched its trade with the US at approximately $135 billion, signifying immense savings and benefits from the cessation of their previous conflicts. Meanwhile, India and China have forged alliances to address global challenges.
Arguments for and Against an Iranian Nuclear Capability
The debate over whether an Iranian nuclear arsenal would stabilize the Middle East and foster peace is polarized, with supporters and critics presenting formidable theoretical, political, and ideological arguments. Esteemed international relations theorists, military strategists, national security experts, and peace activists have all contributed significant opinions to both sides of the argument.
Among the proponents is Kenneth Waltz, a late professor of political science at both Berkeley and Columbia universities, who posited in a significant Foreign Affairs article that an Iranian nuclear capability would lead to a more peaceful Middle East(3). Similarly, John Mearsheimer, a University of Chicago political science professor, and Stephen Walt, a Harvard international relations professor, have argued that a nuclear-armed Iran would enhance regional stability(4).
Conversely, opponents, including Scott Sagan, a Stanford University professor, Benjamin Netanyahu, the Prime Minister of Israel, and Dov Zakheim, a former Pentagon official, have argue against this perspective(5). They contend that the revolutionary regime in Iran, characterized by its radical military forces and ideological proxies, lacks rationality, and could act suicidally. Entrusting such a regime with nuclear weapons, they argue, is untenable and would likely spark a “proliferation cascade” in the Middle East.
Critics of Pakistan’s nuclear capability voiced similar concerns regarding its military disposition, undemocratic governance, and Islamic identity. They insisted that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons will end up in the hands of radical Islamists. Yet, in practice, Pakistan's nuclear arsenal has not posed a threat but has instead contributed to balancing power with India, resulting in bilateral peace and regional stability.
Western politicians have often asserted that a weaker Iran would be preferable for regional stability. However, historical evidence suggests that a stronger Iran has seldom initiated interstate conflicts, whereas a weaker Iran has frequently been attacked, destabilizing the region. Moreover, a nuclear Iran would serve as a deterrent rather than an outright augmentation of its strength, as its adversaries would still possess more nuclear weapons.
Those advocating for regime change in Iran argue that nuclear capabilities would hinder democratic development. However, the possession of nuclear weapons by a state does not correlate with its governance system; both democracies and dictatorships have maintained nuclear arsenals. The underlying concern is that a nuclear-armed Iran would deter potential US and Israeli military interventions aimed at regime change.
Additionally, some claim that nuclear-armed dictatorial regimes are more likely to persist and use nuclear weapons. However, historical evidence, such as the Soviet Union's collapse and restraint despite its vast nuclear arsenal, contradicts this assertion. Democratic regimes have also been overthrown and the United States, a democracy, remains the only country to have used nuclear weapons in conflict.
The argument that the Islamic Republic's stated goal to "destroy" Israel would lead to nuclear aggression if it acquired such weapons is contested. Despite decades of hostile rhetoric, Iran until April 13, 2024, had never directly launched a missile at Israel, suggesting a disconnect between its declarations and actions. The April attack, which followed Israel’s attack on Iran’s Consulate in Syria and death of 7 top Iranian generals, was indeed undertaken in coordination with the United States(6).
Critics also overlook Israel’s "second-strike" capability. With an estimated arsenal of two hundred nuclear weapons, Israel could inflict significant retaliation against any nuclear attacker(7) Iran would also be dissuaded by the intervention of the US, which is committed to Israel’s survival. International response would also be an important dissuading factor.
Thus, unless the Iranian regime is irrationally or suicidally inclined, it is unlikely to employ nuclear weapons against Israel. Historical precedents demonstrate Iran’s capacity for rational decision-making in perilous situations, including cooperation with the United States against common adversaries (e.g., Saddam Hussein and Taliban), negotiating the JCPOA, and adopting conflict-averting policies.
Recent conflicts, such as the Gaza-Israel war that began in October 2024, further illustrate Iran's pragmatic approach. The Iranian government quickly distanced itself from the conflict, even urging Lebanese Hezbollah to abstain from involvement, showcasing its crisis management and survival instincts. This policy was employed despite the proxies’ insistence and readiness to fight Israel(8).
Iran’s April 2024 missile and drone attack on Israel is another instance of the Islamic regime’s calculated approach to international conflict. Before initiating the attack, Iran made sure that the United States is fully aware of its intention and coordinated information concerning the type and extent of the operation to minimize risk and damage. Iran also made sure that the proxy forces, notably Lebanese Hezbollah, are not involved.
The concern that an Iranian nuclear capability would trigger widespread proliferation in the Middle East lacks substantiation. For instance, Turkey, under NATO's nuclear umbrella, and Arab states, increasingly normalizing relations with Israel, are unlikely to initiate nuclear programs in response to an Iranian arsenal. They are also expected to recognize the potential of a nuclear Iran to reduce conflicts.
Interestingly, the establishment of a nuclear balance could lead to unexpected benefits, including prompting Israel to avoid conflicts and explore economic opportunities with former adversaries. Such a shift could release vast resources for constructive purposes, enhance technological collaboration, and possibly pave the way for a two-state solution. The balance could also alleviate the US’ burden of unconditional support for Israel and improve its relations with Middle Eastern nations at a time when the US’ main global rival, China, is expanding ties and increasing presence in the region.
However, an Iranian nuclear arsenal could pose risks to the global order, potentially undermining the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), leading to global nuclear arms proliferation. Yet, the responsibility should not solely fall on Iran, as the IAEA and UNSC have strayed from their duties, perpetuating a world of nuclear disparities. Moreover, the cost of this potential proliferation must be weighed against the benefits of regional stability that a nuclear Iran could generate.
Iran's Challenges and Prerequisites in the Path to Nuclear Capability
Iran faces formidable challenges in its pursuit of nuclear capabilities and must meet several critical prerequisites.
Normalizing relations with the United States: The first major hurdle is reducing hostility towards the US. Iran could propose comprehensive negotiations to address outstanding issues and seek normalized relations, including economic collaboration. Former President Donald Trump proposed this path to Iran when he left the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)(9). Adapting a non-hostile stance toward the US is essential for Iran as it pursues nuclear development.
Reducing Hostility Towards Israel: The antagonistic rhetoric against Israel poses another challenge. Direct dialogue may be currently untenable, but Iran could use the US as a mediator and engage in broader peace initiatives, such as the Abraham Accords, as an observer, leveraging diplomatic channels to ease tensions indirectly.
Engaging in Peace Initiatives: Encouragement from peace-loving nations and pro-democracy opposition could bolster Iran's efforts to normalize relations with the US and reduce tension with Israel. Historical patterns suggest that diplomatic engagement with the US is often a precursor to democratic development, a principle applicable to Iran as well.
Reevaluating Proxy Relationships: Iran's reliance on proxy forces has been both a strategic tool and a source of international criticism. A reassessment of these relationships, focusing on humanitarian support over military involvement, could mitigate risks of over-reliance and align with a more home-based national defense and security strategy.
Exiting the JCPOA: The US withdrawal from the JCPOA and the failure of other signatories to meet their commitments have placed Iran in a difficult position. Exiting the agreement could relieve Iran of its non-proliferation commitments in the deal, a necessary step for Iran to pursue nuclear capabilities.
Withdrawing from the NPT: Membership in the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) commits Iran to non-nuclear weapon status. Withdrawal from this Treaty is a critical step towards nuclear development. Regardless of Iran's ultimate intentions, given that the IAEA's role has been more contentious than facilitative, Iran's exit from the treaty would defuse tension with the agency’s member states.
Maintaining Neutrality in Global Politics: Iran's position in the shifting landscape of international relations is crucial. By advocating for a balanced approach and emphasizing its independent defense capabilities, Iran can navigate the complexities of global geopolitics without aligning strictly with Eastern or Western blocs. Iran should seek to become a “bridge” for world peace rather than a bridge for victory in a potential world war by either side.
Engaging the Iranian Public: Addressing domestic concerns about democracy and living standards is essential. A transparent national dialogue about the nation’s nuclear ambitions and their implications for national security and economic development can garner public support.
Addressing Internal Security and Corruption: The Islamic Republic must continue its efforts to fortify internal security and combat rampant corruption, which have historically undermined national stability with far reaching implications for regional security.
Clarifying Religious Stance on nuclear weapons: The interpretation of the use of nuclear weapons as “forbidden” (haram) in Islam, as attributed to Mr. Khamenei, needs clarification. This stance, while aligning with global non-proliferation norms, has been misrepresented in diplomatic contexts to include production and stockpiling – which in Mr. Khomeini’s view are “wrong.” A clear articulation of this position is necessary to address misconceptions(10).
Why Should the US Support a Nuclear Iran?
This essay assumes that the US and Israel prefer a more stable Middle East than currently exists. Some argue against this assumption and claim that these states will oppose the idea of Iran becoming a nuclear state because stability is not in their best interest. My thesis, which looks “outrageous” on the face of it, also runs counter to established wisdom about Iran and nuclear weapons. Notwithstanding these perceptional difficulties, I believe peace, as the most critical condition of human existence, should be given a chance by implementation of the proposed idea.
Opponents of a nuclear Iran argue that the US must not allow Iran to develop nuclear weapons because it is most harmful to the US interest. They maintain that the Islamic regime is fanatical and tyrannic and cannot be trusted with such weapons. They are particularly emphatic about dangers that a nuclear Iran poses for the US allies, including Israel, and the moderate Arab states. A nuclear Iran also will become more aggressive, dramatically increasing threat of terrorism and human rights abuses as well as political instability. They even caution that Iran’s nuclear weapons could be passed to its radical Islamic proxies thus endangering global safety.
Throughout this essay I have argued against these and similar charges, showing that Iran can indeed be trusted with nuclear weapons. I would also like to note that, generally, any country that has wanted to build nuclear weapons it has hardly been stopped. Iran wants and sooner or later will go nuclear. There is two ways Iran can build its nuclear weapons: by defying the US or by working with the US. If Iran was to build its weapons through defiance, it will come under heavy sanctions and threat of war but given that Iran is already under numerous sanctions, increasing such burdens on a sanctioned-harden nation will not work. A war against Iran will also be futile and counterproductive.
An uncooperative US will also loose a future important partner in a rich and nuclear Iran. The country can also be pushed even further into the China-Russia orbit. It is indeed to the US advantage to work with Iran and make sure that as it develops its nuclear weapons, it also normalizes relations with the US and becomes a major political and economic partner. This US support for a nuclear Iran will indeed be most beneficial to US interests.
Throughout this essay I have pointed to many such benefits. In this regard, US-China delicate relations must be highly weighed. China is the main future rival of the US, and China is fast expanding its political and economic relations in the world, including the Middle East. Meanwhile, China is moving ahead of the US in developing and utilizing AI technology. Already an AI Cold War is shaping up between the US and China. Besides, China, has a highly centralized bureaucracy, and is already building an AI-based efficient e-Government. The US will not be able to easily apply AI for that purpose given its decentralized and democratic system.
The US won the cold war with the USSR because capitalism was more efficient than socialism at the time. Now, the AI is providing an opportunity for Chinese socialism to become more efficient than US capitalism. The emerging AI Cold War will then be won by China. Worst yet, Chin will easily export its AI-based e-Government system to countries in the Middle East and elsewhere, isolating them from the US.
The US then at that time needs reliable and rich partners to compete effectively. Iran is one such country. It is a rich country in human and material resources and has a huge market as well a West-oriented culture. Iran is also among that rare group of countries that has not yet “emerged”. Thus, US-Iran rapprochement will be easy and safe for Iran to emerge and partner with the US to the benefits of both nations. They will indeed complement each other; one with rich resources and educated people and the other with capital and technology.
Another side but important benefit for the US is a possible moderation effect of nuclear weapons on the Islamic regime’s radical behavior. It is a well-known fact that nuclear weapons make states of any type more conservative and cautious. The Islamic Republic has tried to create a heterogeneous balance of power with a nuclear-power Israel: using proxies, irregular warfare, and ideology. Yet, the only outcome of this balancing strategy has been to further radicalize the region and Tehran. A nuclear Iran will balance Israel in a more conventional way, thus reducing the said radicalism, leading to stability. As Winston Churchill has said, stability is the sturdy child of terror.
The US must also be cognizant of the fact, witnessed by the last 200 years or so, that a strong Iran is a better Iran for regional stability than a weaker and less confident or humiliated Iran. Working with the US and building a balance of power with Israel will make Iran a conservative regional stabilizer benefiting the US and every state in its neighborhood, including Israel. Another benefit for the US is a change in its growing tarnished image in the region because of its unconditional support for Israel and animosity for Israel’s adversaries. Rapprochement with Iran will relief the US of such burdens, opening new opportunities for the US in not just Iran but also in the larger Middle East.
The present world is too volatile for the US to mismanage a hotspot like the Middle East and an important country like Iran. The war in Ukraine is already endangering continental peace. A flare up of conflicts in the Middle East can ignite more fires in the region and beyond, including Taiwan. Managing Iran means normalizing relations with that country and helping reduce tension between Iran, Israel, and the Arab states. It also means containing radical Islamic forces and proxies utilizing Iran’s significant influence on them. Helping Iran go nuclear is a risk well worth taking and this risk must be weighed against the harmful condition that the US and Israel find themselves in the region, and the dangers that regional instability creates for the world peace.
Concluding Reflections
In this essay, I have argued that the persistent tension in the Middle East primarily stems from a power imbalance between nuclear-armed Israel, a significant military force, and its regional rivals. Drawing from global precedents, I've proposed that rectifying this imbalance could be pivotal in diminishing tensions and fostering peace. Specifically, I have suggested that Iran's evolution into a nuclear state could establish the necessary equilibrium with Israel.
I have further argued that Iran will build nuclear weapons and that it cannot be stopped by any means. An Iran that builds its bombs clandestinely is to no one’s interest, and the US must make sure that this road is not followed. Rather, Iran’s bombs must be built through cooptation making sure that Iran meets certain prerequisites and becomes an approachable state.
The debate surrounding an Iranian nuclear capability is undeniably complex, but it must also be viewed in the context of the protracted and often violent conflict in the region. The experiences of China, India, and Pakistan offer insightful lessons that could illuminate a path forward for the Middle East. Without addressing the power disparity, the prospects for resolving the conflict seem dim. Iran emerges as the only candidate for this role, notwithstanding the significant hurdles and prerequisites that it must navigate.
I propose a grand strategic trade-off between the Islamic Republic and the US, aiming for a transformative realignment. This exchange would necessitate Iran renouncing its hostility towards the United States and Israel and severing military ties with proxy groups. In return, Iran would achieve nuclear capability, peace, and enhanced economic cooperation. Such a shift could significantly boost the Islamic Republic's self-confidence and alter its domestic and international posture.
The creation of the Quds force and proxy networks by the Islamic Republic, conventionally perceived as efforts to export its revolution and destabilize moderate Arab states, was fundamentally a defensive strategy. It stemmed from a lack of self-confidence in the regime's survival capabilities against formidable foreign adversaries, notably the US. The war initiated by Saddam Hussein and the subsequent isolation highlighted the regime's vulnerability, prompting a search for regional allies.
The pivotal question is whether Mr. Khamenei recognizes the urgency of adopting the proposed strategic redirection. His belief that the current policy is adequate and his longstanding investment in anti-American and anti-Israeli rhetoric, coupled with support from similar-minded Islamic forces, might suggest a reluctance to deviate from established policies. His ambiguous position on nuclear weapons notwithstanding, his generals want and will build the bombs.
However, given his advanced age and the escalating challenges confronting his regime, coupled with increasing tension in the region and the growing independence of the proxy forces, there might be an openness to reconsideration. Meanwhile, his current concern with and focus on preparation for a successor suggests that Mr. Khamenei is looking for an heir who could undertake this significant pivot.
For years, I have posited that Iran's military elite, particularly the IRGC and its affiliates, will eventually ascend to governance, a prediction increasingly validated by recent developments. These entities would play a crucial role in steering Iran towards the domestic and international changes I advocate. While currently constrained by loyalty to Mr. Khamenei, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)’s power will exponentially increase following his demise.
Contrary to conventional perceptions, the IRGC and its allies are potentially more receptive to normalizing relations with the US and reducing tension with Israel than the current clerical leadership, including Mr. Khamenei. Hence, even if the present leadership hesitates to embrace this proposal, the likelihood of its future realization remains substantial. Thus, it is imperative for US policymakers to remain cognizant of this potential shift and maintain patience for eventual progress.
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Hooshang Amirahmadi, a Distinguished Service Professor at Rutgers University, President of the American Iranian Council, and a Senior Associate at Oxford University, has dedicated over 35 years to fostering peace between Iran, the United States, Israel, and the Arab world. Despite his opposition to nuclear arms, he acknowledges their role in promoting global peace.
