Media Guide: Iran-Qatar Relations
/By AIC Senior Research Fellow Andrew Lumsden
In December 2022, Qatar made history as the first Arab and Muslim-majority country to host the FIFA World Cup international football tournament, a milestone which highlighted the tiny Persian Gulf emirate’s meteoric rise to global prominence.
Though only roughly the size of the U.S. state of Connecticut, Qatar holds the world’s third largest reserves of natural gas, and is tied with the United States as the largest exporter of the fuel, made all the more valuable as the ongoing conflict in Ukraine drives European countries to seek alternatives to Russian gas. Qatar’s resource wealth has put it, per capita, among the top twenty wealthiest countries in the world, topping economic powers such as the United Kingdom, Japan and Germany.
Politically however, Qatar has found itself caught up in a proxy conflict waged by its powerful neighbors, Iran and Saudi Arabia. Although some points of contention exist between the two, Qatar has generally maintained much better relations with Iran relative to most of the other Persian Gulf monarchies. These ties have in recent years put it at odds with some of its neighbors.
This Media Guide will explore how the relationship between Iran and Qatar has evolved over the past five decades and how it has affected Doha’s relations with other regional powers.
1972-1979
Iran was among the first countries to recognize Qatar’s independence from British suzerainty in 1972. Throughout the 1970s, relations between the two countries were friendly, with Qatar’s ruler Sheikh Khalifa bin Hamad Al Thani (r. 1972-95) expressing praise for the “sagacious” leadership of Iran’s monarchy. In a joint statement in 1975, Doha and Tehran described themselves as “friendly,” and “fraternal countries.”
Qatar’s approach to Iran during the 1970s was similar to that of Israel’s “periphery doctrine” whereby Iran is viewed as a valuable counterweight to the aggressive and ideologically radical states in the region such as Baathist Iraq. Accordingly, Doha expressed public backing for Iran’s Shah in 1978, as his embattled regime faced growing public opposition. Speaking to Qatar’s legislature, Sheikh Khalifa said that it was his hope that Iran would “enjoy the security and stability it deserves…under the leadership of his majesty, our brother the Shah.”
1979-1990
The Iranian Revolution of 1979 toppled the Shah and gave rise to a theocratic, republican government in Tehran, sending shockwaves throughout the Middle East. This was especially felt among the Persian Gulf monarchies who feared similar uprisings in their own countries and deeply resented Iran’s new revolutionary regime for backing opposition parties and militants across the region.
In 1981, Qatar joined with Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), to form the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Under the umbrella of the GCC, these monarchies pursued economic and security coordination. The GCC’s first Secretary-General, Kuwait’s Abdullah Bishara described the organization as the “protectors of the status quo.” Adding that while they do not have a “hostile attitude” to the Iranian Revolution, they “cannot accept” Tehran’s efforts to upend the “political texture” of the region “by resorting to force.”
During the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1989), the GCC backed Baghdad. However, whereas states like Saudi Arabia and Kuwait provided billions of dollars in financial aid, Qatar did not supply significant support to the Iraqi side beyond some rhetorical endorsements, such as Sheikh Khalifa’s 1983 call for Iran to “follow Iraq’s lead” in pursuing an end to the war. It has been speculated that Doha’s de facto neutrality stemmed from fears of antagonizing its domestic Shi’a Muslim minority and of possible Iranian military retaliation.
1990-2000
The 1990s would see a deepening of relations between Iran and Qatar. It is in this period that exploitation of the South Pars/North Dome gas field began in earnest. Known as South Pars in Iran and North Dome in Qatar, the gas field located between the two countries is the largest in the world, spanning nearly 10,000 square kilometers (~3800 sq. mi) and containing an estimated 51 trillion cubic meters of natural gas. Doha and Tehran share control of the gas field, with about 60% in Qatari territory and 40% in Iranian waters. The two countries have in general, amicably shared the lucrative field.
Political shifts in the 1990s would also change the dynamic of Iran-Qatar relations. In Tehran, the decade saw the rise of more pragmatic leaders such as Presidents Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani (1989-1997) and Mohammad Khatami (1997-2005) who pursued diplomacy and rapprochement with Iran’s neighbors. In Doha, longtime ruler Sheikh Khalifa was overthrown in a bloodless coup and succeeded in 1995 by his son Sheikh Hamad.
Sheikh Hamad believed firmly that Qatar, now boosted economically by its gas production, would be best served by a flexible and independent foreign policy unchained to that of any geopolitical bloc and free from the dominance of Saudi Arabia, the GCC’s largest member and de facto leader. As a result, Riyadh reportedly took part in three failed coup attempts against the new emir.
Qatar’s new foreign policy would revolve around maintaining positive relations with all global powers and regional actors wherever possible, and attempting to mediate regional conflicts as a neutral, unbiased party. Analysts have noted that Qatar’s post-1995 approach to foreign relations has yielded benefits, including allowing Doha to exercise political influence disproportionate to its small size while preserving its national security by generally avoiding conflicts with other states.
Qatar’s approach to Iran since the 1990s has been described as taking a “middle ground.” While Doha remained aligned with Saudi Arabia through the GCC and opened its territory to a significant U.S. military presence, it engaged in high-level diplomacy with Iran, as well as economic and security cooperation. Qatar also criticized confrontational moves against Tehran by the U.S. In 1999, Sheikh Hamad, during a meeting with U.S. President Bill Clinton, urged rapprochement with Iran, particularly in light of the election of pro-reform President Mohammad Khatami. Khatami himself would visit Qatar that year upon the emir’s invitation.
2000-2010
Over the course of the 2000s and early 2010s, Qatar and Iran would deepen bilateral ties and come to align on several key regional political issues, much to the chagrin of Saudi Arabia and its allies. In 2006, Qatar and Iran each pledged US$50 million in aid to the newly-elected Palestinian government in the Gaza Strip, headed by the Islamist group Hamas.
Also, that year, Qatar was the only country on the United Nations Security Council (serving as a non-permanent, rotating member) to vote against a resolution demanding that Iran end its uranium enrichment program. Doha would however, vote in favor of a resolution in December 2006 sanctioning Iran for its nuclear program, saying that while Tehran has the right to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes, Qatar is committed to keeping the region free of weapons of mass destruction.
In 2008, Qatar mediated an end to an escalating political crisis in Lebanon. The resulting agreement prevented another sectarian civil war in the country, but analysts have argued that the deal was a victory for Hezbollah, a pro-Iranian Shia Islamist political party and militant group which gained greater influence in the Lebanese government.
Similarly, Qatar between 2007 and 2008 mediated a ceasefire between Yemen’s pro-Saudi government and Iran-backed Houthi rebels. Doha was accused by some Saudi and Yemeni officials of doing Tehran’s bidding by mediating the ceasefire at a time when the Houthis were supposedly on the backfoot in the conflict and faced decisive defeat.
Between 2009 and 2011, Qatar and Iran signed bilateral agreements promoting greater cooperation on border security as well as efforts to combat terrorism, organized crime, drug trafficking and human trafficking. Sheikh Hamad also reportedly pledged not to allow Qatari soil to be used “for purposes of striking Iran,” a likely reference to the presence of over 10,000 U.S. troops and hundreds of military aircraft based in the country since 2001.
2011-2017
The outbreak of the Syrian Civil War in 2011 would cause a noticeable rift in Iran-Qatar relations. Whereas Iran firmly and actively supported the government of Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad, Qatar provided extensive political and financial backing to the opposition. In addition to providing billions of dollars in financing (US$1-3 billion by 2013), Qatar allowed the Syrian opposition’s self-declared government to open an embassy in Doha, and pushed successfully to transfer Syria’s seat in the Arab League to the opposition. The rift over Syria reportedly led to the cancellation of a planned visit to Qatar by Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmedinijad in 2011.
Generally positive relations between Doha and Tehran would however persist as the two countries underwent political shifts in 2013. In Qatar, Sheikh Hamad stepped down as emir and was replaced by his son Sheikh Tamim. In Iran, conservative President Ahmedinijad was succeeded by Hassan Rouhani, a more moderate leader.
Beginning in late 2013, the two sides also began discussing opportunities for Qatar to assist in the development of Iran’s share of the North Dome/South Pars gas field. Its access to Western technology and investment allowed Qatar to, at the time, extract about three times as much gas from the jointly-owned field as its counterpart. Officials with Qatar’s state-run oil company said that Doha planned to “give [the Iranians] advice on technology and exploring the geology of the field,” as well as “many studies on the field that…can benefit Iran.”
In 2014, Qatar’s foreign minister said of Iran “we have differences for sure,” yet “Qatar and Iran relations have always been a good relationship.” That year, the two countries unveiled plans to expand bilateral commerce and establish three joint free trade zones, one in Iran and two in Qatar. In 2015, Qatar would facilitate meetings between the Speaker of Iran’s Parliament and Hamas leaders living in Doha.
Qatar however, that same year would buck Tehran by joining a military coalition led by Saudi Arabia and intervening in a resurgent civil war in Yemen with the aim of defeating the Iran-backed Houthi rebels which had seized control of the capital. Qatar contributed fighter aircraft to the mission. In 2016, Qatar again stood with Saudi Arabia, recalling its ambassador to Iran in solidarity with Riyadh and other GCC states after the Saudi embassy in Tehran was stormed by protestors outraged at Riyadh’s execution of a prominent Shia cleric. However, Qatar did not sever diplomatic relations with Iran entirely.
The Blockade (2017-2021)
Qatar’s efforts to maintain positive relations with all sides would ultimately collide with the Middle East’s changing political realities. As their own concerns about Iran and other actors in the region grew, Saudi Arabia and other Arab states would become decreasingly tolerant of Qatar’s foreign policy, particularly its relationship with Tehran.
On June 5, 2017 Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Egypt announced a blockade of Qatar. All diplomatic relations were severed, diplomats and Qatari nationals ejected and all air, land and sea trade and traffic halted. Qatar was given 13 demands. The first of these was for Doha to curb diplomatic relations with Iran. Diplomatic missions there were to be closed, all military cooperation was to end and trade was to be limited to only that which complies with U.S. and international sanctions.
In response, Qatar’s Foreign Minister called the blockade “clear aggression” and accused the participants of attempting to force Qatar to “surrender our sovereignty,” which Doha will “never do.” Iran also condemned the blockade, with President Hassan Rouhani calling it a “siege” of Qatar which is “not acceptable.” Rouhani also pledged to Qatar’s emir that “Tehran will stand by Qatar’s government.”
Far from estranging Qatar from Iran, the Saudi-led blockade created a surge of new economic activity between the two countries.
In the first week of the blockade, Tehran delivered more than 90 metric tons of food to Qatar by air, with more being sent by sea. By the end of 2017, Iran had exported nearly US$140 million worth of goods to Qatar, more than 117% the value of trade between the two countries in the previous year. Iran also allowed Qatari-registered aircraft, now blocked from their traditional flight paths to Europe, to use Iranian airspace. According to Iranian media, some 200 Qatari flights a day use Iranian airspace, and it is estimated that Doha has paid Iran an estimated annual rate of about US$100 million in fees.
Between 2017 and 2020, Doha and Tehran signed several deals aimed at facilitating greater cooperation in several economic fields including e-commerce, banking and maritime trade. In 2018, Iran began exporting glass and gabbro (a type of rock used for construction and decoration) to Qatar for the first time. The two countries also signed a deal to begin exports of Iranian-made pharmaceuticals to Qatar.
New transport links between the two countries were also created. Direct flights between the Iranian port city of Bandar Abbas and Doha began in 2018. Also that year, the head of Qatar’s Ports Management Company said that Doha “has long-term plans to increase trade ties with Iran” and plans to invest in developing the country’s Gulf coast ports. In 2019, Iran began direct maritime cargo transportation between the port of Bushehr in southern Iran and Qatar’s main seaport, the Hamad Port near Doha.
Following the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic in March 2020, Qatar sent Iran more than 30 tons of medical supplies.
The End of the Blockade
The Saudi-led blockade of Qatar would come to an end in January 2021, after mediation by Kuwait, Oman and the United States. At a GCC summit in the Saudi city of Al-Ula, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman said that the end of the blockade was borne from a “desperate need” for Gulf nations to “unite our efforts” and “confront challenges…especially the threats posed by the Iranian regime’s nuclear and ballistic missile program and its plans for sabotage and destruction.” Qatar’s Foreign Minister however, has said that rapprochement between Doha and the Saudi-led coalition would have “no effect on our relationship with any other country.”
Future Outlook
Two years on from the end of the blockade, relations between Qatar and Iran show little sign of cooling. Qatar’s Foreign Minister said his country “will never forget Iran's support and assistance” during the blockade and that “we consider ourselves alongside Iran.” In 2022, the two countries announced their intentions to boost the value of Iranian exports to Qatar to US$1 billion by 2024 and the value of total bilateral trade to US$3 billion by 2025.
In February 2022, Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi visited Doha and signed 14 bilateral agreements to, according to Raisi, “increase relations and diversify areas of cooperation.” Tehran also signed agreements to supply 250 tons of food and agricultural products to Qatar on a daily basis during the World Cup. The following month, to the chagrin of the United States, Qatar allowed Iran, despite sanctions, to advertise its weaponry at a maritime defense exhibition in Doha. Moreover, in January 2023, Qatari and Iranian firms agreed to export 200 tons of Iranian saffron, a spice with culinary and coloring uses, worth US$300 million to Qatar.
It is clear that Qatar values its cordial relationship with Iran. It has been an emblem of Qatar’s standing as a mediator of conflict, an expression of a small country’s independence from its larger neighbors; and to some degree, a source of stability and peace of mind for a state which would have much to lose in the event of armed conflict. Given its hosting of U.S. forces and its lucrative gas field, Qatar would likely be a military target in any war between Iran and the U.S. or GCC, and disruption of Persian Gulf traffic would be devastating to its economy. The Saudi-led blockade has done little if anything to change this calculus in the minds of Qatari leaders.
On the other hand, areas of potential future contention between Iran and Qatar do exist.
While so far not a particular source of conflict, shared control of the lucrative North Dome/South Pars gas field could easily emerge as a source of future tension between Iran and Qatar. Concerns over Qatar’s exploitation of the field have been raised in Iran, including by the Iranian Chamber of Commerce, the head of whose Energy Commission accused Qatar in 2014 of extracting US$150 billion worth of gas in excess of their fair share of the divided field.
In 2017, Qatar ended a moratorium on new developments in its zone, one which had stood since 2005 over concerns about potential consequences of rapid extraction on the future health of the field. In 2022, Qatar announced a US$1.5 billion deal with the French company TotalEnergies aimed at increasing Doha’s gas production by 60% over the next four years. Additional deals with European and U.S. companies are also reportedly in the offing.
With U.S. sanctions blocking Iranian access to Western investment, and China proving unwilling to serve as an alternative partner, Iran may continue to lag behind Qatar in its ability to exploit the gas field, a dynamic which could fuel further accusations of Qatari infringement.
Also, with the blockade at an end, deepening ties with Iran is no longer necessary to Qatar’s survival. Despite its pledges of loyalty, Doha will still have to contend with lingering geopolitical conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia, as well as an Iranian economy under heavy sanctions, which show no signs of being eased in the near future. This means in continuing to cultivate a close relationship with Iran, Doha may run the risk of either angering the United States, with which it has fostered very good relations and in part relies on for security, or further antagonizing its Arab neighbors who may be motivated to try more aggressive and destabilizing means of changing Qatari policy in the future.
