Media Guide: Iran’s “Axis of Resistance,” An Uncertain Future
/By AIC Senior Research Fellow Andrew Lumsden
Though perhaps not out of place in a region that has seen countless kings and empires rise and fall, the political upheavals in the Middle East of the past several months have shocked even some of the most jaded of observers.
The devastation of Hamas in the Gaza Strip, the near-total decapitation of Hezbollah in Lebanon and the whirlwind collapse of the Assad government in Syria have left Iran’s “axis of resistance,” once heralded, even begrudgingly by Iran’s opponents, as a formidable geopolitical force, greatly diminished and facing an uncertain future.
This Media Guide will revisit Iran’s main allies and proxies in the Gaza Strip, Lebanon, Syria, Yemen and Iraq and explore how their circumstances have changed over the past two years and what these shifts may mean for Iran’s geopolitical future.
Iran’s ‘Proxy’ Strategy
AIC’s May 2024 Media Guide examined Iran’s ‘proxy’ strategy and its impact on the unfolding crisis in the Middle East.
Since the Islamic Revolution of 1979, Iran’s national security and foreign policy strategy has revolved around utilizing external actors, generally non-state militant organizations with similar goals and ideologies, to achieve its geopolitical aims of undermining adversaries and rivals, particularly Israel, the United States and Saudi Arabia. Some core members of what has come to be known as Iran's “axis of resistance” are Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in the Gaza Strip and the Houthi movement in Yemen.
These actors, with Iranian funding and armaments support, enable Tehran to undermine and distract adversaries, while allowing it to maintain plausible deniability and avoid direct conflict where its conventional military forces would be substantially outmatched. Furthermore, Iran's web of alliances deters powers like Israel and the United States from direct confrontation, as they would inevitably be drawn into a grueling, complex, and costly multi-front conflict.
Former Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett has called Iran’s strategy “simple yet brilliant.” Over the past four decades, Iran, with the help of these allies, has had many significant geopolitical achievements. In the 1980s, it succeeded in forcing the withdrawal of U.S. military forces from Lebanon; 20 years later, Israeli forces were also pushed out of Southern Lebanon. Following the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, Iran succeeded in undermining the U.S. mission by backing insurgent militias which carried out attacks on American forces and weakened Iraq’s U.S.-backed government. In Yemen, Iranian backing helped rebels topple the country’s pro-Western government and successfully resist an intervention by a Saudi-led coalition.
However, since the outbreak of the recent Gaza War on October 7, 2023, Iran’s ‘axis’ has suffered what are arguably, the most devastating setbacks in its history. The war has directly, or indirectly, left several key Iranian allies catastrophically weakened.
Hamas and the Gaza War
Hamas, officially named the, “Islamic Resistance Movement,” is a Palestinian, Islamist organization formed in 1987. It has both a political and military branch. Hamas’ stated goal is to “liberate Palestine” using “all means and methods” from occupation by Israel, the establishment of which Hamas calls “entirely illegal.” Hamas has been in control of the Gaza Strip since 2006.
Iran has provided substantial financial and military support to Hamas since the 1990s, including an estimated US$100 million per year in financial aid, as well as weaponry, military training, and instruction in rocket production. Though often labeled a “proxy” of Iran in some political circles, analysts see Hamas’ relationship with Tehran as more of a “marriage of convenience.” The two share mutual antipathy towards Israel. Iranian aid helps empower Hamas to carry out its militant “resistance” against Israel, while Iran benefits by keeping Israel preoccupied and less able to confront it directly.
On October 7, 2023, Hamas launched a massive, coordinated attack on Israel, unprecedented in its scale. It fired over 2,000 rockets and 1,500 Hamas militants crossed over from the Gaza Strip. An estimated 1,200 Israelis were killed and 240 were taken hostage. There is no definitive evidence that Iran was involved in the 10/7 attack or even knew about it in advance. However, Iran’s decades of financial and military support undoubtedly enabled the attack, and it was universally praised by Iran’s top officials. Israel declared war on Hamas the next day. The fighting continued until January 2025 when the two sides agreed to a ceasefire. Nearly 50,000 people are estimated to have been killed in the Gaza War.
While the exact number of Hamas casualties is unknown, it is clear that the group has been critically weakened. Israel claims that it has killed about 20,000 Hamas fighters, basing its estimate on intelligence assessments, intercepted Hamas communications and counting bodies on the battlefield. Hamas has dismissed the Israeli figures as exaggerated, but has not released any of its own.
What is clear however, is that the group has lost much of its top political and military leadership. Hamas’ political head, Ismail Haniyeh, was assassinated in Tehran in July 2024. Also that month, an Israeli airstrike killed Mohammed Deif, the commander of Hamas’ military forces. Haniyeh’s successor Yahya Sinwar, was killed by Israeli forces in October 2024. Hamas has also confirmed that its deputy military commander, Marwan Issa has also been killed.
That said, Hamas has managed to avoid complete destruction so far. Moreover, according to former U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, the group has already “recruited almost as many new militants as it has lost.” Also, adds Blinken, Hamas has managed to successfully “regroup and reemerge” in parts of Northern Gaza. Blinken concludes that the current situation in Gaza is a “recipe for an enduring insurgency.”
Though it is unclear that the group will be able to rebuild its military forces or its political control of the Gaza Strip to the level they were before the War, it is very much within the realm of possibility that Hamas, in some form, may remain a threat to Israel, and ally of Iran, well into the future.
Hezbollah
Compared with Hamas, the militant group Hezbollah can far more accurately be described as a proxy of Iran. Its leaders have openly pledged allegiance to Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Former Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah stated that Iran has been involved with Hezbollah from “the very early hours” of the group’s establishment, providing training, armaments, financial aid, and political advice. Based in Lebanon, it was founded by Shia clerics amidst the upheaval of the brutal and sectarian Lebanese Civil War. Hezbollah is, in many ways, the linchpin of Iran’s axis.
The group was instrumental in precipitating the withdrawal of U.S. and European military forces from Lebanon in the 1980s and Israeli forces from southern Lebanon in 2000. It has also served as a conduit through which Iran has been able to train and supply militant groups across the region, including in Iraq and Yemen. During the Syrian Civil War (2011–2024), Hezbollah deployed between 7,000 and 9,000 fighters in support of embattled Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad, a close ally of Iran.
The Hezbollah-Israel Conflict
One day after the beginning of the war in Gaza, Hezbollah began rocket attacks on northern Israel in support of its Hamas allies, prompting the evacuation of tens of thousands of civilians on both sides of the Israel-Lebanon border. The conflict escalated in 2024 when Israeli intelligence triggered explosions of pagers and walkie-talkies used by Hezbollah operatives. The attack killed about 30 people and wounded approximately 3,000, including some civilians. Israel also launched airstrikes on hundreds of Hezbollah targets. On September 27, one strike killed Hassan Nasrallah, the group’s leader of 32 years. In October 2024, Israel launched ground incursions into southern Lebanon.
Israel and Hezbollah agreed to a ceasefire in November 2024. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) claim that they have successfully eliminated over 70% of Hezbollah’s “strategic weapons” and killed 3,800 Hezbollah operatives. Tel Aviv University's Institute for National Security Studies puts Hezbollah’s casualty figures at 2,450. Hezbollah has acknowledged only 500 deaths and has not reported casualty numbers since Israel began ground operations in September 2024. In addition to Nasrallah, Israel has also managed to kill many of Hezbollah’s senior military commanders.
While Hezbollah has by no means been destroyed, it is clear the group has suffered catastrophic losses. It can be argued that the degradation of Hezbollah is among the most crippling of Iran’s recent setbacks. A weakened Hezbollah will be less capable of playing the role it once did in supplying and aiding Iran-backed groups throughout the Middle East, including in the Palestinian territories. The conflict with Israel also forced Hezbollah to withdraw its forces from Syria, which contributed heavily to the rapid downfall of former Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad, whose regime was once also a keystone of Iran’s axis.
Syria
Between 1971 and 2024, Syria was ruled by an authoritarian regime headed by the Assad family. Hafez al-Assad was President of Syria from 1971 until his death in 2000. Hafez al Assad, was an early ally of Iran’s theocratic government after the 1979 Iranian Revolution. His government was the first in the Middle East to recognize the Islamic Republic, and in 1980, Syria was the only Arab country to support Iran during its bloody, eight-year war with Saddam Hussein’s Iraq.
The relationship deepened during Bashar al-Assad’s presidency. The 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq and the overthrow of Saddan Hussein pushed Tehran and Damascus closer together. While they welcomed the downfall of their common adversary, they feared that the U.S. presence in Iraq may threaten their own regimes. Syria and Iran collaborated to arm and supply insurgent groups in Iraq to undermine U.S. forces and the U.S.-backed Baghdad government.
Under the Assad regime, Syria became a crucial transit point through which Iran could send funds, arms and personnel to Hezbollah in Lebanon and Palestinian militant groups like Hamas in the Palestinian Territories. Syria has been hailed by top Iranian officials as an “intrinsic part” and the “golden ring” of Iran’s “axis of resistance.”
Accordingly, Iran was quick to intervene in 2011, when a popular uprising in Syria spiraled into civil war, which threatened Bashar al-Assad’s rule. Iran deployed members of its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) to Syria. The IRGC provided military advisors, supplies and intelligence support to the Assad government. It also arranged for paramilitary militias like Lebanese Hezbollah and several Iraq-based groups to fight in Syria on behalf of Assad. Moreover, Iran organized additional militias from fighters recruited from Syria’s Shia community, and as far away as Afghanistan and Pakistan.
In all, it is estimated that Iran invested between US$30 and 50 billion towards supporting the Assad government between 2011 and 2024. Iranian support, along with that of Russia, was instrumental in enabling Assad’s regime to weather the pressures of the civil war for far longer than previously expected. Between late 2011 and 2015, the Assad government went from controlling less than 20% of Syria’s territory to about 60%, although various opposition groups managed to take control of large parts of the country’s north.
The Fall of Assad
On November 27, 2024, a coalition of Syrian rebel groups, led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) launched an offensive from their base in Idlib Province. They quickly captured Aleppo, Syria’s second-largest city. By December 8, the rebels had captured the Syrian capital, Damascus, and confirmed that Assad had fled the country.
The swift collapse of the Assad regime took many international observers by surprise, particularly given that Assad’s longtime allies, Russia and Iran, seemingly chose to offer minimal resistance to the rebel offensive. It appears that Assad was caught in a perfect storm—a culmination of circumstances that had been unfolding over the course of many years.
In 2020, Maj. Gen. Qasem Soleimani, the head of the IRGC’s Quds Force—a unit responsible for the IRGC’s foreign operations—and the chief architect of Iran’s military strategy in Syria, was killed in a U.S. airstrike in Baghdad.
In 2023, an Israeli airstrike in Damascus killed Sayyed Razi Mousavi, a senior IRGC advisor and reportedly a key coordinator of Iranian operations in Syria. In April 2024, an Israeli strike on Iran’s consulate in Damascus reportedly killed 7 Iranian military officers, including Brig. Gen. Mohammad Reza Zahedi, a senior IRGC commander. The strikes caused the IRGC to reduce its presence in Syria.
In 2024, Hezbollah accelerated the withdrawal of its forces from Syria in response to rising tensions with Israel following the outbreak of the Gaza War. While the group had been gradually scaling back its presence in Syria over the past five years, the escalation of its conflict with Israel and the ensuing Israeli ground offensive in Southern Lebanon prompted a swift and general disengagement from Syria, leaving Assad bereft of an important ally.
By late 2024, Iran was reportedly disillusioned with Assad. According to Reuters, Iranian officials suspected that Israel’s airstrikes were facilitated by intelligence leaks from the Assad government. Iran was also frustrated by Assad’s increasingly uncooperative stance, as his government began limiting the IRGC’s freedom of action within Syrian territory. Moreover, both Iran and Russia were angered by Assad’s refusal to pursue any form of negotiated settlement to the conflict. By November 2024, neither Iran nor Russia—due to Russia’s ongoing invasion of Ukraine—were in a position to meaningfully contribute to Assad’s defense, and may have had little desire to do so at all.
What does Assad’s Fall Mean For Syria-Iran Relations?
Relations between Iran and Syria’s new government headed by former HTS leader Ahmed al-Sharaa, have already gotten off to a rocky start. In an interview with Saudi state media in late December 2024, al-Sharaa said that “there is a wound among the Syrian people caused by Iran,” and that “Iran must not consider using Syria as a platform to attack or disrupt other countries again.” He criticized Tehran for having “aligned themselves with a regime that oppressed [the Syrian] people.”
Additionally, Syria’s interim Foreign Minister, Asaad Hassan al-Shaibani, has issued a statement saying that “Iran must respect the will of the Syrian people and the country's sovereignty and security” and that the new Syrian government is warning Iran “against spreading chaos in Syria.”
The new Syrian government has also been signalling its intention to develop closer relations with Saudi Arabia and the West.
For his part, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei has said that he considers Assad’s overthrow the product of a “joint American-Zionist plot.” However, Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi has said that Tehran will “support any government that the people of Syria approve of."
Regarding Syria’s existing interim government, Fatemeh Mohajerani, the Government of Iran’s official spokesperson said that Tehran will determine its approach towards the new Syrian government based on “important factors” including “their distance from the Zionist regime” and their “behavior and performance.” Iran has also said that the new government is responsible for any debts owed to Tehran by the Assad regime.
Meanwhile, Iranian state-affiliated media has been harshly critical of Al-Sharaa, with headlines denouncing him as a “Western tool against Iran,” and a “Netanyahu wannabe.” He is also accused of “submission to Israeli Aggression” for his limited reaction to Israeli airstrikes on Syria and the brief advance of Israeli forces into the United Nations-patrolled buffer zone on the Syrian side of the Golan Heights.
It is evident that Iran's influence in Syria has notably diminished, and a post-Assad Syria is unlikely to align with Iran's interests in the foreseeable future. Assad's fall represents a catastrophic setback for Tehran and its 'axis of resistance.' Iran can no longer use Syrian territory to transport aid or station forces, limiting its ability to threaten Israel or open a new front in a direct conflict.
Future Outlook: What Will Iran Do Now?
Iran has tried to project confidence in the face of its obvious and severe political setbacks. Ayatollah Khamenei said that it would be “ignorant” to believe that Iran has been weakened by recent events. He further argues that the ‘axis of resistance’ will actually become stronger. “The more pressure you apply,” Khamenei says, “the stronger it becomes; the more crimes you commit, the more motivated it becomes; the more you fight them, the more expanded it becomes.”
Option 1: Rebuild the Axis
Though it could easily be dismissed as bluster, Khamenei’s words may also suggest that Iran hopes to rebuild its axis of resistance. Such a feat would certainly require a great deal of time and expenditure, yet it may not be impossible. Iran’s axis, weakened as it may be, has still by no means collapsed entirely. As discussed earlier, Hamas and Hezbollah are severely damaged but are still intact. They, if left unmolested, may have the potential to recover.
Moreover, some key members of the axis have weathered the recent crisis virtually unscathed. Despite a brief conflict with U.S. forces in the early months of the Gaza War, Iran’s allies in neighboring Iraq, the politically and militarily powerful Shi’a militias, remain potent. Iran’s influence in Iraq may even be on track to increase in the coming years, as the U.S. announced in 2024 that it is drawing down its remaining military presence in the country, to the expressed delight of some of the country’s Iran-backed militias.
Iran can also still rely on support from its axis’ newest member, the Yemen-based Houthi movement, which has proven stubbornly resilient over the past decade. The Houthi movement, which began as a provincial insurgency by a Shi’a minority community against Yemen’s authoritarian, Sunni, pro-Western government in the 1990s, has now come to control about a third of Yemen’s territory, including the capital, Sana’a, and 70 to 80 percent of Yemen’s population. Since the outbreak of the Gaza War, the Houthis have launched missile and drone attacks against Israeli territory and maritime shipping in the Red Sea. Israel, the U.S. and other allied countries have launched airstrikes against the Houthis with very limited success. The Houthis have pledged more attacks on Israel in the future if the Gaza War resumes.
Tehran may also be trying to cultivate a relationship with a new actor, Sudan. Iran and Sudan had a close relationship during much of the tenure of Sudanese dictator Omar al-Bashir (1993-2019). However, relations soured as Sudan grew closer to Saudi Arabia, and even joined Riyadh in formally severing diplomatic relations with Iran in 2016. Al Bashir was overthrown in 2019 in a military coup and it initially seemed that Khatoum’s new government would move further away from Iran. However, Iran appears to have made strides in mending ties with Sudan’s transitional government. Tehran and Khartoum agreed to resume diplomatic relations in 2024. Iran has also supplied drones and other munitions to the Sudanese Armed Forces, arms which have been instrumental in the army’s gains in its civil war with the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), a paramilitary faction which has been at war with the government since 2023.
Though perhaps not to the same scale, Sudan, like Syria, was once a major transit point through which Iran funneled arms to its allies in Yemen and the Gaza Strip. If the Sudanese government is successful in its war against the RSF, Iran’s support could pave the way for ties to deepen once more.
This approach, though feasible, may not necessarily be the most desirable for Iran. The recovery of its allies and proxies will take years of time and resources, and depends in no small part on inaction by Israel and the United States. In the meantime, Iran remains more vulnerable than it has ever been.
Option 2: Establish Conventional Alliances
Another approach Tehran may take is to utilize more traditional relationships with other states as an alternative to the “axis of resistance.”
Part of the reason Iran’s defense and foreign policies have relied so heavily on non-state actors is that since its establishment in 1979, the Islamic Republic has been largely isolated politically from much of the international community. Over the past two decades, however, Tehran has worked to build more conventional bilateral and multilateral relationships with other Global South nations, as well as powers such as Russia and China, which share its antipathy towards the United States and the Western-led international order. These efforts have begun to bear some fruit.
In 2021, Iran was accepted as a full member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), an intergovernmental organization consisting of China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, India, Pakistan and now Iran. While not a NATO-style military alliance or a European style economic union, the SCO promotes military and economic cooperation between members to further economic development, security and counterterrorism goals.
In 2023, Iran formally became a member of BRICS, an informal association begun in 2009 of what at the time were the world’s top emerging economies, Brazil, Russia, India and China. South Africa joined in 2010. In addition to Iran, Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates became members in 2023.
Though not a treaty-based organization, BRICS promotes dialogue, people-to-people exchange and economic cooperation among members. The group also advocates for reform of international institutions and the creation of alternative financial institutions to the Western-led International Monetary Fund and World Bank.
Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Russia’s bilateral relationship with Iran has deepened considerably. Iran has a major supplier of drones and munitions to the Russian military. According to Ukraine’s Foreign Ministry, Russia has launched more than 8,000 Iranian drones over the course of the war so far. Moscow has also reportedly purchased ballistic missiles and hundreds of thousands of artillery shells from Iran. Iran, for its part, is reportedly planning to acquire fighter aircraft and naval vessels from Russia.
In January 2025, Russia and Iran signed a “Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement.” While it does not include a formal military alliance, the agreement calls for the two sides to “consult and cooperate in countering common military and security threats.”
In light of the erosion of its axis, Tehran may seek to pivot toward more conventional bilateral and multilateral partnerships. Iran’s inclusion in BRICS and the SCO signals that key segments of the global community—especially emerging economies and authoritarian states—are increasingly open to engaging with Iran. Although it is important to note that none of these partnerships entail a military alliance. Moreover, not all SCO or BRICS members concur with Iran’s geopolitical interests.
Some SCO members like Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, which have concerns about Islamist militancy in their countries have expressed wariness of Iran for its ties to militant organizations. In fact, opposition from smaller Central Asian countries like Tajikistan was instrumental in keeping Iran from attaining full SCO membership for many years.
China, a leading member of both SCO and BRICS, has had a complicated relationship with Iran. Though it has offered consistent rhetorical support, rarely has been willing to actively confront the West on Iran’s behalf. Unlike Iran, China has extensive trade relationships with the U.S., the EU and even Israel. It is therefore less likely to meaningfully support Iran in a conflict.
Additionally, many BRICS members like Brazil, India and Argentina are democracies, with cordial relationships with the West. Even among most of BRICS’ authoritarian members, like Saudi Arabia and the UAE, there is little geopolitical consensus with Iran.
Option 3: Develop Nuclear Weapons
There are concerns, particularly among some Western officials, that Iran instead plans to respond to its recent setbacks by developing nuclear weapons, which can serve as the new guarantor of its security. On November 29, 2024, Sir Richard Moore, Chief of the United Kingdom’s Secret Intelligence Service, warned that “Iran’s allied militias across the Middle East have suffered serious blows, but the regime’s nuclear ambitions continue to threaten all of us.”
Iran has repeatedly maintained that it has no intention of developing nuclear weapons. In 2005, Ayatollah Khamenei issued a fatwa (religious ruling) declaring that nuclear weapons are forbidden under Islamic law and that “the Islamic Republic of Iran shall never acquire these weapons.” Khamenei has expressed this view many times over the years, and insists that Iran’s nuclear program is strictly for peaceful purposes.
However, The Daily Telegraph reported on February 8th that IRGC commanders and some members of Parliament have recently begun lobbying Khamenei to rescind his ruling in light of Iran’s new vulnerabilities. Britain, France and Germany issued a joint statement in December 2024 saying that Iran has already “ramped up” its nuclear program, and has already developed 60% enriched uranium, not far from the 90% enrichment required for a nuclear weapon. The so-called E3, also warns that these activities do not have “any credible civilian justification.”
Tehran has denied all of these allegations. Iran’s embassy in London issued a statement calling The Daily Telegraph’s reporting “malicious disinformation” and “truly beyond ridiculous.” Iran says that its nuclear program has “absolutely no link to weapons of mass destruction," and that its “national values and religious beliefs strictly prohibit their development or use."
Kelsey Davenport, the Director for Nonproliferation Policy at the Arms Control Association, estimates that Iran, if it were to decide to produce a nuclear bomb, would be able to do so in as little as six months. Although, it would still take one to two years for it to create a sophisticated nuclear weapon.
Taking this approach would be a tremendous risk for Iran as it would certainly invite military action by Israel and the United States. In fact, The Washington Post reports that Israel already has plans to conduct preemptive strikes on Iranian nuclear sites in the coming months. Davenport however, argues that the geographical location of Iran’s nuclear sites and the level of sophistication the program has reached, even successful destruction of all of Iran’s nuclear sites, is not likely to cause more than a temporary delay.
Conclusion
It is clear that the balance of power in the Middle East has shifted. Iran’s “axis of resistance,” has been decimated. The region now stands at a crossroads, between a path of diplomacy and reconciliation and one yet further escalating violence.
As they celebrate the recent victories, Israel, the United States and other opponents of Iran should not make the mistake of assuming that Iran is now helplessly vulnerable. It still has powerful militant allies in Iraq and Yemen. A direct war would still be far more destructive, extensive, chaotic and costly than most realize.
For its part, Iran should not attempt to downplay the significance of its losses. Recent events show clearly that for Iran, like any other power, contributing to militancy, extremism and instability will backfire in unpredictable ways.
It is important that all sides forego further militant escalation and pivot toward diplomacy, dialogue and negotiation as the way forward in resolving remaining conflicts in the Middle East, and transforming it into a region defined by stability and cooperation instead of violence.
