Iranian Politics in the Age of Biden and Implications for the JCPOA
/By Senior Research Fellow, Andrew Lumsden
The election of Joe Biden to the Presidency of the United States awakened hopes and expectations around the world that Washington will re-enter into the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA or ‘Iran Nuclear Deal’), a landmark agreement which relieved some economic sanctions on Iran in exchange for limits on the country’s nuclear program. During the 2020 campaign, both the Biden Campaign and the Democratic Party vowed not only to re-enter the JCPOA, but to “strengthen and extend it,” as well as use it as a springboard to a more “comprehensive diplomatic effort” with Iran.
While a Biden-era U.S.-Iran thaw is certainly possible, it must be understood that Iran’s current domestic political landscape is very different compared to when the JCPOA came to be, and may be moving in a direction increasingly unconducive to diplomacy and compromise with the West.
The Current Impasse
Since taking office on January 20, 2021, the Biden Administration has maintained that it is willing to negotiate with Iran, but it must first “[come] back into full compliance with its obligations under the JCPOA” before sanctions will be lifted. Tehran has countered, asserting that since it was the United States, under the administration of former President Donald Trump, which unilaterally withdrew from the agreement, Washington must be the first to return to compliance.
Both sides remain entrenched in their positions. On February 7, President Biden said unequivocally “no'' when asked if Washington would be willing to reduce sanctions if it would bring Tehran to the negotiating table. Also that day, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei said that Washington has “no right to set conditions” on future negotiations and that “the U.S. must completely lift sanctions” if it expects his country to negotiate.
Iran’s Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif echoed his leader’s sentiments but suggested that the European Union’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs should mediate between Washington and Tehran and “choreograph” the actions both sides need to take for the diplomatic process to move forward. The U.S. State Department, for its part, says it is still “consulting with our allies...our partners [and] consulting with Congress” before committing to any formal negotiations. Zarif, on February 23 ruled out any formal bilateral talks with the U.S. regarding the JCPOA. On February 28, Iran also rejected informal talks with Washington proposed by the European Union.
For More on the Current State of U.S.-Iran Relations see AIC’s: “The Future of U.S.-Iran Relations Under President Biden’s Administration”
The current diplomatic deadlock begs the question of what is motivating Tehran’s hardline position as well as the prospect of a U.S.-Iran agreement being reached. The answers lie in Iran’s complex domestic politics which have experienced dramatic shifts in recent years.
I. Parliament
Legislative elections took place in Iran in February 2020. The conservative (or ‘Principlist’) bloc won control of the country’s 290-member Parliament with a 220 seat majority. Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, a former Brigadier General in Iran’s notorious Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), Tehran mayor and 2017 presidential candidate, was elected Speaker. Furthermore, 7 of the 12 members of the 11th Parliament’s leadership are former IRGC members.
The conservative takeover of Parliament is significant because Iran’s constitution requires that all international treaties and agreements must have parliamentary approval, and the new conservative majority has so far made its opposition to further dealings with the United States abundantly clear.
In his inaugural address as Speaker in May 2020, Qalibaf said that while the 11th Parliament supports “expansion of relations with the global community,” it considers further negotiations with “the terrorist America” to be “futile and harmful." The Speaker doubled down on his comments the following month, calling the U.S. and its European allies “untrustworthy and hostile.”
On December 1, 2020, Parliament passed the “Strategic Action Plan to Lift Sanctions and Protect Iranian Nation’s Interests,” a bill which, upon becoming law the following day:
Requires Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization (AEOI) to resume production and stockpiling of 20% enriched uranium (90% enriched uranium is required to produce a nuclear weapon, but this represents a significant departure from the 3.67% limit established by the JCPOA.) and work on “fulfilling the country’s need for uranium enriched above 20%”
Requires the AEOI to install at least 1000 centrifuges and design a new heavy water reactor
Calls for an end to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections on Iran’s nuclear facilities mandated under the 2015 nuclear deal unless European countries lift sanctions and resume “normal and satisfactory” commerce with Iran by February 21, 2021.
After the plan’s passage, other prominent legislators also issued statements:
On December 6, 2020, Deputy Speaker Amir-Hossein Ghazizadeh Hashemi said while he does not oppose negotiations, remaining in compliance with the JCPOA without sanctions relief would be “to the detriment of national interests and authority of the Islamic Republic of Iran.”
Shahriar Heydari, vice chair of Parliament’s National Security and Foreign Policy Committee, agreed, saying that if the “cruel sanctions” imposed on the country under the Trump Administration are not lifted, staying in the JCPOA would “certainly be a loss for Iran.”
Jalil Rahimi Jahanabadai, a member of the Parliament’s National Security and Foreign Policy Committee said on December 20 that “Iran demands that all JCPOA parties should return to the deal and implement it unconditionally,”and that Tehran “will not accept a new deal and negotiations.”
On January 4, 2021, Iran announced that production of 20% enriched uranium already began at the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant in Qom. Speaker Qalibaf himself revealed on January 29th that the facility has already produced 17 kilograms (~37.5 pounds) of this uranium.
Parliament’s actions have already garnered international attention. In response to the Anti-Sanctions bill, the three European signatories to the JCPOA, the UK, France and Germany (E3) issued a statement on December 7th warning that Iran “must not implement these steps,” as they risk “compromising the important opportunity for a return to diplomacy with the incoming US Administration.”
On February 21, 2021, Iran and the IAEA reached an agreement under which Iran would allow IAEA cameras to record its nuclear facilities over the next three months in lieu of a formal inspection. If U.S. sanctions are lifted, the footage will be turned over to the inspectors, if not it will be deleted. Foreign Minister Zarif insists that this agreement is compliant with Parliament’s “Strategic Action Plan.”
Could A New U.S.-Iran Agreement Pass This Parliament?
It is important to note that at the time of the JCPOA’s inception in 2015, conservatives also held a majority in Iran’s Parliament. The nuclear deal passed the legislature resoundly with a vote of 161-55. It is inferable therefore that a conservative-majority legislature does not in itself pose an insurmountable obstacle to U.S.-Iran diplomacy. However, there is a critical difference between the 2015 conservative Parliament and the one that exists now.
In 2015, Ali Larijani, a moderate conservative was the assembly’s Speaker. Hardliners at the time accused Larijani of being biased in favor of the JCPOA and forcing it through the legislative process. Hardline parliamentarians Mehrdad Bazrpash and Hamid Rasaei said in October 2015 that Larijani allowed only about 15 minutes of debate on the nuclear deal before the vote and rejected outright most amendments and recommendations from skeptics.
If it is indeed true that Larijani pushed the JCPOA through Parliament, it may mean that future agreements may not fare as well in today’s legislature given that the current Speaker, Mohammad Qalibaf has said that he views future diplomacy with the United States as “strictly forbidden and detrimental.”
Furthermore, as MP Jahanabadai noted in his statement, Tehran’s current position on JCPOA negotiations represents a political “consensus” in the legislature and beyond; borne from the belief that Iran “implementing the deal one-sidedly is wrong,” and indignation over how Iran was treated despite its compliance. Therefore, it is questionable whether even a moderate Speaker could pass a U.S.-Iran agreement in the current political climate.
II. The Rouhani Administration
Iran’s President, Hassan Rouhani has been in office since 2013. As AIC reported in 2018 and 2019, Rouhani has proven to be a political moderate, open to diplomacy with the West and a number of key progressive domestic reforms including those regarding the rights of women and the disabled. Though he remains at the helm, the political power of moderates and reformists in Iran has declined precipitously in the past two years, and this may significantly impair his diplomatic effectiveness.
Recent polling puts Rouhani’s approval rating at a dismal 25%, down from over 60% in 2016, with a net favorability rate of -39%. He is joined underwater by other prominent moderate and reformist figures including former Speaker Ali Larijani (-28%) and leading reformist Parliamentarian and former Vice President Mohammad Reza Aref (-15%).
Iran’s moderate/reformist bloc has already lost control of Parliament and is widely projected to lose the Presidency to conservatives in this year’s general election.
Experts are divided as to what caused the erosion of the moderate/reformist bloc, which enjoyed landslide victories in 2013, 2016 and 2017.
Kenneth M. Pollack, former CIA analyst and scholar for the conservative American Enterprise Institute blames the Trump Administration for weakening Iran’s moderates and reformists. Pollack argues that by withdrawing from the JCPOA, Trump “emasculated” Rouhani and moderates while proving Iran’s hardliners, who had always warned that the U.S. was not to be trusted, “entirely correct.”
Kulsoom Belal, Research Officer at Islamabad’s Institute of Policy Studies, agrees, arguing that Trump’s breach of the JCPOA and Rouhani’s inability to convince European signatories to the deal to defy U.S. sanctions, left “many Iranians [considering] him as inept in achieving his own goals.”
Brookings Institute scholars Ali Fathollah-Nejad and Amin Naeni on the other hand, counter that the role of foreign affairs in Iranian domestic politics has been “oversate[d],” and that it was moderates and reformists’ own handling of the economy, inability to deliver sweeping reforms and their reluctance to openly back the December 2017-January 2018 nationwide protest movement which cost them and Rouhani public support.
Another factor to note is that conservatives have actively worked to undermine their moderate and reformist counterparts. The Guardian Council, a body whose members are all appointed by the Supreme Leader and the Chief Justice (himself an appointee of the Leader), is under perpetual conservative control and has the power to veto Parliamentary legislation and disqualify candidates for public office. The Guardian Council has routinely blocked or watered down progressive legislation proposed by the Rouhani Administration and disqualified some 90% of the prospective reformist candidates from the 2020 legislative elections. President Rouhani likened last year’s vote to “a shop with 2000 of a single item.”
How Does the Decline of the Moderate/Reformist Bloc Impact U.S.-Iran Negotiations?
Whatever its cause, the new political reality in Tehran will impact JCPOA negotiations in several key ways.
Iran’s constitution does not permit the President to veto legislation that has been passed by the legislature and allowed by the Guardian Council. This means that Rouhani has little power to prevent escalatory actions taken by the conservative Parliament, such as the recent “Strategic Action Plan.”
In a December 2nd speech, he blasted Parliament’s plan as “detrimental to the process of diplomatic activities” and hailed the JCPOA as “constructive for the whole world,” but later told German Chancellor Angela Merkel that his administration had no choice but to implement the new law. Rouhani has, however, emphasized that he will not formally expel IAEA inspectors from Iran to avoid the appearance that Iran is pursuing a nuclear weapon.
Perhaps reflective of a more subordinate position on the issue, Rouhani also has been parrotting more hardline voices regarding the JCPOA. On February 16, he said that President Biden has “no option but to make up for the previous administration’s mistakes,” and that Iran will not return to JCPOA compliance until Washington “terminates the illegal sanctions.”
Rouhani’s political weakness may prove an even greater stumbling block to diplomacy seeing as given their current political advantage going into the presidential elections, conservatives may feel they have a vested interest in thwarting any deal with the U.S., at least so long as Rouhani is in office. Reuters reports that a source within Iran’s government reveals that conservatives are “not against dealing with Washington,” as they claim, but rather are trying to “stall any engagement to get more concessions” until after the election. A deal now could boost Rouhani and his political allies by potentially ushering in a stronger economy by the time of the vote in June. It remains to be seen if conservatives in Parliament and other parts of Iran’s government will continue to push provocative measures.
III. The Supreme Leader
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has been Iran’s Supreme Leader since 1989. He is the country’s ultimate authority, and has complete direct or indirect control of the armed forces, state media, the judiciary and the Guardian Council. He has expressed mixed views on the JCPOA and diplomacy with the West, but has been playing a far more vocal role now than he did during the original negotiations.
In 2015, Khamenei warned in a letter to President Rouhani that the U.S. “has shown nothing but hostility and obstruction and it is very unlikely that they will behave in any other manner than this in the future,” but he agreed to approve the JCPOA with strict conditions. A year later, Khamenei acknowledged that while he thinks they’ve been exaggerated, the JCPOA did have some “positive points and advantages.”
When the Trump Administration withdrew from the nuclear deal in 2018, Khamenei blasted Rouhani and Foreign Minister Zarif, saying that he never believed in the deal and raised his concerns with both men. He claimed he only approved the deal because he believed it was “not the Leader’s responsibility to intervene” on matters not directly related to national security.
In December 2020, following the election of Joe Biden, Khamenei expressed support for re-opening negotiations with Washington, saying “if sanctions can be removed, we shouldn’t delay, not even for an hour.” However, on February 7, he told state-run media that Iran’s “final and irreversible” position on the JCPOA is that Washington must first end all Trump-era sanctions. Then, Tehran would only return to full compliance “after verifying whether all sanctions have been lifted correctly.”
Khamenei took a harder line on February 22, endorsing Parliament’s “Strategic Action Plan” as “good” legislation which “should be executed precisely,” reiterating that his diplomatic “stance will not change,” and announcing that if U.S. sanctions are not removed, “Iran’s uranium enrichment level will not be limited to 20%...we may increase it to 60%.”
Khamenei’s threat is of particular concern in light of recent comments coming from Tehran regarding nuclear weapons. In 2003, Ayatollah Khamenei issued a fatwa (religious ruling) banning the “production, stockpiling, and use of nuclear weapons,” and labeling weapons of mass destruction as forbidden under Islamic law. However, on February 9th, Intelligence Minister Mahmoud Alavi warned that despite this fatwa, Iran may move in the “direction” of building a nuclear bomb if the West takes steps which “push Iran in that direction.” While he reiterated his ruling in a February 22 Twitter statement, Khamenei added that if ever Iran “had any such intention” to build a nuclear bomb, world powers “wouldn't be able to stop us.”
IV. The Iranian Public
While Iran is not a democracy, public opinion can have significant political relevance, particularly as the country is nearing major national elections. In 2015, the JCPOA had substantial support among the Iranian public. Polling in Iran organized by the University of Maryland’s Center for International & Security Studies (CISSM) found that 57% supported the deal. Vice President Eshaq Jahangiri said that government polling put the figure in excess of 80%. Celebrations even broke out in Tehran when the deal was adopted in anticipation of a brighter future and in praise for Rouhani.
Whereas strong popular support for the JCPOA could potentially have moved Iran’s leaders to take a more liberal diplomatic position, the truth is that public opinion on the deal has waned in recent years as has trust in the United States. This shift augurs poorly for U.S.-Iran diplomacy going forward.
Recent (October 2020-February 2021) CISSM polling found that public opinion in Iran is currently leaning in favor of Tehran’s current positions, and former President Trump’s defeat in last year’s presidential election has not moved the needle as much as expected.
Approval of the JCPOA is 51%, slightly up from 48% in October, but 71% say that it is “not worthwhile for Iran to make concessions” to world powers. 69% agree that Iran should not hold any talks with the U.S. until sanctions are lifted
73% support Parliament’s “Strategic Action Plan”
84% of Iranians view the United States unfavorably, down only three points since Trump was defeated
Asked their opinion on whether President Biden will be friendly towards Iran, a plurality (29%) say he will be “completly hostile,” 28% say “neutral” and only 3% say “completly friendly”
Interestingly, 58% believe President Biden will return to the JCPOA, but only 38% believe the U.S. would then honor its obligations
54% believe Iran should negotiate with the U.S. on issues beyond the JCPOA if Washington has complied with the nuclear deal for several years, but 66% would currently oppose a comprehensive bilateral deal
Diplomatically Pertinent Factors
With the Supreme Leader, Parliament and a majority of the public united around a rigid stance on nuclear negotiations to which Washington is unlikely to agree; and the Rouhani Administration powerless to diverge, prospects for an agreement appear dim. This however raises the question of whether there are other aspects of Iran’s present situation which could mitigate its hard line diplomatic position.
A. Sanctions and the Economy
The nuclear deal did provide Iran a significant economic boost. For example, oil exports, upon which the Iranian economy is highly dependent, soared from 1.08 million barrels per day (m/bpd) in 2014 to more than 1.8 m/bpd in 2018. Oil production saw a similar increase, rising from 2.7 m/bpd in 2014 to 3.8 m/bpd in 2017. This contributed to an economic windfall for Iran, with the country going from an annual GDP growth rate of -1.3% in 2015 to +13% a year later and growing by an additional 4% the year after. As AIC reported throughout 2018, prior to the re-imposition of sanctions, Iran was also succeeding in attracting investments from a broad range of international state and corporate partners, particularly in the areas of agriculture, healthcare and renewable energy.
The Trump Administration’s re-imposition of sanctions battered Iran’s economy immediately. Foreign investors fled, and in just a year the country’s oil exports plummeted to about 575,000 bpd. Iran’s GDP has contracted every year since the re-imposition of sanctions. Iran’s Foreign Minister alleges that restored U.S. sanctions have so far inflicted US$1 trillion worth of damage to the country’s economy.
The COVID-19 pandemic has only added to the country’s economic woes by devastating the non-energy sector which had carried Iran’s economy since the re-imposition of U.S. sanctions. Iran’s Labor Ministry estimates that more than 850,000 jobs have been lost nationwide, including more than a quarter or all industrial workers. Furthermore, inflation rates have increased by ten percentage points over the past year, led primarily by increases in the costs of food and household rent. This, the World Bank notes, is “disproportionately impacting low-income deciles.”
Will Economic Concerns Move Iran’s Leaders to the Negotiating Table?
Iran’s economic problems beg the question of whether Tehran’s leaders, regardless of ideological affiliation, can be swayed by the prospect of sanctions and COVID relief to consent to the Biden’s Administration's insistence on JCPOA compliance. The answer however is unclear.
Firstly, though painful, U.S. sanctions have by no means proved fatal to Iran’s economy or even its ability to export oil. In fact, Iran’s monthly oil exports are believed to have been rising since at least last September. Though the exact figure is unknown, it is estimated that Iran exported as much as 700,000-900,000 bpd of oil in December 2020.
These exports are possible given that oil tankers can, and have been known to, switch off onboard tracking devices. These measures are used by Iranian tankers to discreetly deliver oil to friendly ports and by foreign tankers to conceal visits to Iran. In December 2020, the U.S. Treasury Department sanctioned several fossil fuel companies based in China, Vietnam and the United Arab Emirates after discovering their involvement in sales and purchases of Iranian oil and petrochemicals.
While still a fraction of what Iran used to export, these clandestine transactions are still significant and will be difficult for Washington to stop. Russian state-run media has derisively compared U.S. efforts to a game of “whack-a-mole.” Moreover, they may lessen any pressure Tehran may feel to relent on its diplomatic positions. In fact, Iran’s Oil Minister last month, bragged that while “the enemy and Trump wanted us to perish and die, our exports to reach zero...but we are alive and working.”
Parliament has also signalled that it expects no economic relief this year. On February 2nd, it rejected President Rouhani’s proposed 2021 budget by a vote of 99-148. Rouhani’s proposal uses figures which suggest that he expects Iran to export oil at JCPOA-levels over the course of the year. Parliament countered that it considers these projections unrealistic.
B. The COVID-19 Pandemic
Iran has been one of the nations hardest hit by the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. There have so far been more than 1.5 million cases of the virus in the country, with about 60,000 deaths. A Parliamentary report in April 2020 warned that official numbers may not be accurately reflecting the true scale of the pandemic’s toll on Iran due to limited testing. A BBC report in August 2020 based on sources inside the country alleged that even when testing in Iran was ramped up, the government deliberately underreported COVID figures for political reasons. The report estimates that the actual death toll may be triple what has been reported.
In addition to the economic damage they have caused, U.S. sanctions have hobbled Iranian efforts to combat the pandemic. While it blasts Iran’s government as “brutal” and self-serving,” Human Rights Watch (HRW) reports that U.S. sanctions have exacerbated the COVID crisis in Iran by “severely limiting Iranian companies and hospitals from purchasing essential medicines and medical equipment” need for COVID testing and treatment.
The Trump Administration always maintained that humanitarian transactions are already exempt from sanctions, but HRW reports that governments, banks and corporations have still been hesitant to do any kind of commerce with Iran and that ongoing humanitarian efforts have been “hampered by a need to clarify the legal issues related to sanctions.” For example, in December 2020, 29 human rights advocacy organizations reported that banks in South Korea which hold Iranian assets were refusing to release them for Iran’s vaccine funding for fear of violating U.S. sanctions.
Could the Prospect of COVID Relief Aid Motivate Tehran to Soften its Diplomatic Position?
The question of whether COVID relief needs might impact the diplomatic positions of Tehran’s hardliners is perhaps answered by Ayatollah Khamenei’s January 2021 blanket ban on COVID vaccines made in the United States and the United Kingdom. Khamenei claimed without evidence that the vaccines were ineffective and an attempt to make the Iranian people a “testing device for vaccine manufacturing companies.” Parliament also issued a letter signed by 200 legislators supporting the ban on the unproven grounds that U.S. and UK vaccines cause “shock, side effects, and even deaths.”
The ban, condemned by health experts inside Iran, suggested that both Ayatollah Khamenei and the conservative Parliament were willing to put their ideological beliefs above the needs of the people.
Interestingly, despite the official hardline position, Iran did ultimately purchase 4.2 million doses of the AstraZeneca vaccine with health officials emphasizing that AstraZeneca is a partly Swedish owned company. Vaccines are also being sourced from other countries, with 600,000 doses of Russia’s Sputnik V vaccine having already arrived, and two million more expected by March 20. On February 28, Iran received 250,000 doses of China’s Sinopharm vaccine. Successful clinical trials of COVIran Barekat, a domestically produced vaccine have also been reported.
COVID is a hard reality on the ground in Iran. And although pandemic relief needs might not drastically modulate the diplomatic positions of Tehran’s hardliners, there is some potential for COVID relief to impact U.S. diplomatic positions. As we reported in The Future of U.S.-Iran Relations Under President Biden’s Administration, sanctions relief has significant pushback in US politics. However, sanctions relief coated with - or framed as - humanitarian aid may permit the Biden Administration to gain support for such measures in Congress, with non-governmental organizations and other international partners.
Future Outlook
What Kind of Leader is Likely To Succeed Rouhani?
Having served two consecutive terms, President Rouhani will leave office following presidential elections this June. Given their approach to last year’s legislative elections, it is more than likely the Guardian Council will only allow conservative candidates to run for the Presidency.
Mostafa Hashemi-Taba, reformist activist and former presidential candidate said that he expects reformist candidates to play only a “minor role” in the coming elections. Mohammad Atrianfar, another leading reformist speculates that in that event, reformists may unite around a moderate conservative candidate such as former Speaker Ali Larijani if he enters the race.
While a moderate conservative may stand a chance at Guardian Council approval, their ability to defeat a hardline candidate in the current climate is certainly in question. CISSM’s poll this month found that 64% say they wanted a candidate who has opposed President Rouhani’s policies and 60% say they support a candidate who will not “compromise on Iran’s rights” with other countries. Hardline conservatives currently lead hypothetical election polls with Chief Justice Ebrahim Raisi, former President Mahmoud Ahmedinijad and Speaker Qalibaf on top. None of these men have declared their candidacy, though all are considered potential candidates.
A few candidates have formally entered the race including:
Hossein Dehghan, former Revolutionary Guards commander, Minister of Defence and aide to Ayatollah Khamenei
Ali Motahari, moderate-conservative former Tehran member of Parliament disqualified from running for re-election in 2020
Fereydoon Abbasi, member of Parliament and former head of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization, personally sanctioned by the United Nations
Mostafa Kavakebian, reformist former member of Parliament
Mohammad-Ali Afshani, reformist former Tehran mayor
The full slate of candidates, and those who have been approved to run by the Guardian Council may not be known until May.
Conclusion
Little over a month into the Biden Administration, prospects for a swift U.S.-Iran resolution appear dimmer than perhaps previously imagined. Conservative hardliners are steadily grasping the levers of power in Tehran, the Iranian public, despite the hardships caused by U.S. sanctions and COVID-19, remains largely unenthusiastic about compromise with Washington, and sanctions have so far failed to deliver the knockout punch to Iran's economy that American conservatives had hoped.
However, there remain reasons for optimism. Despite their entrenched stances, neither side has, at least explicitly, ruled out diplomacy. Still, both Washington and Tehran must come to terms with some inescapable truths.
Given the Trump Administration's unwarranted and unilateral withdrawal from the JCPOA, Iran is right to question American trustworthiness. It is important that all sides involved in the deal establish through domestic legislation or other means that no side can end compliance without due cause and due process. Furthermore, there must be tangible consequences for any side which does again violate the deal. For example, other signatories to the JCPOA, as well as relevant non-state actors, should make clear they absolutely will not comply with unjustified future sanctions. Conversely, all JCPOA members, regardless of their relationship with Tehran must make clear they will impose sanctions if the deal should be verifiably violated on its end.
Tehran for its part must recognize that its commendable but erstwhile compliance with the JCPOA does not erase its decades of violent anti-American rhetoric, support for regional terrorism, nor its recent esclations. Sanctions may not have totally crippled Iran's economy but millions there are still hurting and fearful about the future, and the pandemic has made this incalculably worse. Tehran's leaders, conservative or otherwise, must not continue to play politics, but make the most of the opportunities currently before them for meaningful diplomatic and economic progress.
One option for all sides would be a step-by-step process towards de-escalation, under which one demonstration of renewed compliance by Tehran is reciprocated by the relief of a certain sanction or class of sanctions, all following a simultaneous mutual first step.
However Washinton and Tehran choose to proceed, political conditions in both countries mean that the road ahead will not be easy, but traversing it is necessary. As AIC previously noted in its analysis of the current U.S. political climate, the "real stakes'' of U.S.-Iran diplomacy are "millions of everyday Iranian lives, the potential of Iran to acquire a nuclear weapon, regional stability, and the reputation of the United States [and liberal democracy by extension] in the Middle East and the international stage."
