The Origins of Hezbollah: An Export of the Islamic Republic
/By AIC Research Associate Brendan Rettberg
Exporting the Revolution
A key component of the Iranian Revolution was that Ayatollah Khomeini’s Shia Islamist ideology should be exported across the Muslim world. This goal was explicitly articulated by Khomeini and his fellow revolutionary leaders in multiple political writings and speeches during the period. A speech penned by Khomeini on the eve of the Iranian New Year in 1980 reveals his dedication to spreading the ideas of the revolution. In it he declared, “We should try hard to export our revolution to the world, and should set aside the thought that we do not export our revolution, because Islam does not regard various Islamic countries differently and is the supporter of all the oppressed people of the world.” Furthermore, the constitution of the Islamic Republic states that its “mission is to realize the ideological objectives of the movement and to create conditions conducive to the development of man in accordance with the noble and universal values of Islam.” The constitution also declares itself to be “the necessary basis for ensuring the continuation of the Revolution at home and abroad.”
In the wake of the Iranian Revolution, observers in the West were concerned that Iranian leaders would lend their support to other revolutionary Islamic movements in the Muslim world. In March 1980, the Central Intelligence Agency completed a report entitled “Iran: Exporting the Revolution” warning U.S. officials that efforts by the Iranian regime to inspire revolutionary activity among Shiite populations in countries such as Iraq and Afghanistan would pose a grave threat both to American interests and stability in the Middle East. The CIA analysts included in their report a quote by Ayatollah Khomeini urging Muslims “to liberate Islam and the Islamic countries from the clutches of the colonialists and those who are subservient to them.” They also cited President Bani-Sadr who asserted that the “revolution will not win unless it is exported” and that the Islamic Republic intended “to create a new order in which deprived people will not always be deprived.” A close analysis of history shows that Iran sought to export its revolution to Lebanon through the creation of Hezbollah, the infamous terrorist organization that emerged following the eruption of the 1982 Lebanon War. Iran sponsored Hezbollah through both ideological and material means. Furthermore, the considerable extent to which Iran was involved in the creation and growth of Hezbollah raises the question of whether the organization could have existed at all without the backing of Iran.
The Roots of Shia Unrest in Lebanon
The historical evidence strongly indicates that the leaders of the Iranian Revolution hoped to export the revolution beyond the borders of the Islamic Republic by sponsoring Shia groups who believed in Khomeini’s vision of revolutionary Islam. Hezbollah is perhaps the most well-known and formidable group fitting this description. Far from being a spontaneous event, the formation of Hezbollah was a process that resulted from the gradual mobilization of the Lebanese Shia community over years. By the time Hezbollah was founded in 1982, Shias in Lebanon had already been deprived of political and economic opportunities for hundreds of years. Historically, wealth and political power was concentrated in the hands of Sunnis who detested and marginalized the Shias in Lebanon. It was the Shia community’s experience of being marginalized that oriented them towards revolutionary ideologies and movements that challenged the status quo.
The trend of Shia marginalization was continued with the introduction of confessional politics into Lebanon in 1943. Immediately after Lebanon achieved its independence from France, the nation’s Maronite President Bishara al-Khouri forged a gentlemen’s agreement known as the National Pact with Sunni Prime Minister Riyadh al-Solh. The agreement established Lebanon’s confessional political system which divided the country’s population into sectarian communities based on religious identity. Each sect gained representation in government based on the approximate size of their populations. Because Maronite Christians and Sunni Muslims were the two largest groups in Lebanon, they were granted the presidency and premiership, respectively. As the third largest group in the country, Shias were allowed to hold the comparatively weaker position of Speaker of the Parliament.
The political inequalities that resulted from confessionalism coincided with a poor economic situation that caused the Shia population to become increasingly discontent with the nation’s elites. Many of the Shia farmers of southern Lebanon and the Beqaa valley were deeply impoverished, and those who sold crops to the state-owned monopoly could not subsist on the meager compensation they received. The state also did not adequately invest in the development of Shia-majority rural communities. Additionally, a considerable number of Shia agricultural laborers were unable to find work after employers began taking advantage of the cheap labor provided by the approximately 100,000 Palestinians who flooded into southern Lebanon in the wake of the 1948 war. These poor economic conditions motivated young Shia men to depart from Lebanon in search of better opportunities across Africa, Latin America, and the Arab states. Those who chose to return to Lebanon after making their money abroad were often resentful of the nation's elites who they blamed for the country’s host of continuing political and economic problems.
The Early Militarization of Shias in Lebanon
The 1950s marked the beginning of widespread Shia political mobilization and militarization. During this period, a considerable number of Shias from countries such as Lebanon, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Kuwait began to support secular parties such as the Lebanese Communist Party, the Syrian Social Nationalist Party, the Organization for Communist Labor Action, and the Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party. Shias joined these organizations because they promoted an end to the repressive status quo and the advancement of social, economic, and political equality. In the early 1970s and onwards, large numbers of Shias were recruited by the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), which dominated southern Lebanon as a result of the Cairo Agreement (1969). Shias were active in Palestinian guerilla groups throughout the Lebanese Civil War and many acquired high-ranking positions within the PLO. For example, one one of the top operatives for Fatah was Husayn al-Khalil who later became the head of Hezbollah’s intelligence service. An even more notable figure was Imad Mughniyah who was trained by Palestinian terrorists during the 1970s and served as the commander of a Shia group within Yasser Arafat’s elite special operations unit known as Force 17. Mughniyah later held a prominent role within Hezbollah as the leader of the Jihad Council.
Another factor that influenced the political mobilization of the Shia population in Lebanon was the rise to prominence of Imam Musa al-Sadr. The Iranian-born cleric came to Lebanon in the 1950s and was disturbed to find Shias living in communities wracked by poverty and underdevelopment. Al-Sadr was an outspoken critic of the Maronite-controlled Lebanese government who neglected the needs of the Shia community. Al-Sadr founded the “Movement of the Deprived” as part of his efforts to mitigate poverty and secure more socioeconomic opportunities for the segments of the Lebanese population who had been neglected by their political leaders. In 1969, al-Sadr became the chairman of the Supreme Islamic Shi’i Council, establishing himself as an important political figure in Lebanon and the leader of the Shia community. He used his platform to demand an increase of Shia representation in high-level government roles, additional funding for the construction and renovation of schools and hospitals, and for the defense of southern Lebanon. Al-Sadr was unable to force the Lebanese government to successfully enact major reforms. However, he did succeed in undermining Lebanon’s elites who had contributed to the social, political, and economic turmoil affecting the Shia community for many years.
The Amal Movement Before 1979
The most significant accomplishment of al-Sadr was his creation of the Amal movement. Al-Sadr believed that a militant group needed to be formed “to defend the Shi’i community from both government neglect and deprivation, and from the Israeli aggressions against the South.” On January 20, 1975, he exhorted the Lebanese people to take up arms and defend the South from incursions by Israel. Al-Sadr believed that it was the duty of the Lebanese people to protect national security after the government had failed to defend the nation from Israeli aggression. The Shias who joined al-Sadr’s fighting force acquired training in camps run by the PLO. In 1975, the Israelis caused an explosion at a PLO training camp in the village of Ain-al Binya located in the Bekaa valley. As a result of the attack, forty Amal fighters were killed and an estimated one hundred sustained injuries. This event prompted al-Sadr to appear before the Lebanese public on July 6, 1975 and formally announce the creation of Amal. “Here I am at this moment; I declare the birth of this noble National Movement [Amal Movement], which took on itself the responsibility to protect the nation’s dignity and stop the Israeli assaults,” al-Sadr declared.
It should be noted that the Amal quickly grew following the Lebanese Civil War which began in April 1975. During this conflict, an estimated 100,000 Lebanese were killed, including a large number of Shia combatants who served in the country’s militias as well as Palestinian guerilla groups. In 1975, Amal was composed of approximately 800 volunteer fighters who received little or no pay. As the war continued into the 1980s, Amal grew rapidly and absorbed 30,000 militiamen into its ranks, including 4,000 combatants who served on a full-time basis.
The growth of the militia was further accelerated in response to the Israeli invasion of southern Lebanon on March 14, 1978. The stated impetus for the invasion was a Palestinian terrorist attack that resulted in 30 Israeli deaths two days earler. However, Israel’s main goal was to eradicate PLO bases and create a security zone in southern Lebanon. According to Israeli Defense Minister Ezer Weizman, Israel intended to "clear this infested area once and for all" and occupy the territory until the PLO could no longer strike Israel from southern Lebanon. The large-scale military operation involved the deployment of around 25,000 Israeli troops who were backed by artillery, fighter planes, and tanks. During the Israeli occupation, divisions began to emerge between Lebanese Shias and Palestinians. This is because the Israelis had successfully cultivated opposition to Palestinian groups among many Shia villagers in the occupied area. Furthermore, there was also a widespread notion that the PLO had failed to protect the Lebanese population from Israeli aggression. As a result, a large number of Shias withdrew their support of the PLO and joined Amal. After Israeli troops finally withdrew from Lebanon, Palestinian fighters were prevented from reentering Southern Lebanon by Shias who supported Amal. It should be noted that the power-struggle between Amal and Palestinian organizations would continue into the 1980s and tensions would frequently escalate into violence. Among the causes of these outbreaks of violence was Amal’s close relationship with Iran after the 1979 revolution and the PLO’s support of Saddam Hussein during the bloody years of the Iran-Iraq war.
The Amal movement underwent a transformation after the disappearance of al-Sadr in 1978. During this year, al-Sadr traveled extensively around the Arab world to meet with leaders and convince them to help bring an end to Israel’s highly-destructive occupation of Lebanon. In August, al-Sadr and his associates disappeared in Libya where they had gone to meet with Colonel Muammar Qadafi. Al-Sadr was the most important Shia political leader in Lebanon, and his disappearance left a void that created divisions within Amal and the greater Shiite community. Importantly, the absence of al-Sadr created a space for the emergence of a new religious element inspired by the Iranian Revolution that would pave the way for the foundation of Hezbollah.
The Formation of Islamic Amal
The invasion of Lebanon by Israel in 1982 contributed to the fragmentation of Amal and the rise of an Islamist faction within the movement. Israel invaded Lebanon in June 1982 after the PLO, armed with rocket launchers and artillery, shelled towns in northern Israel from their base in Beirut. The New York Times reported on 7 June that Israel aimed “to crush the P.L.O. militarily and to drive its weapons beyond the range of northern Israel.'' In response, Lebanese President Elias Sarkis established the Rescue Committee to mitigate the consequences of Israel’s destructive invasion and occupation of the country. Among the political figures to join the committee was Nabih Berri, the leader of Amal. By joining the committee, Berri agreed to work with President Sarkis and one of the Christian community’s most prominent hardline leaders, Bashir Gemayel. The committee sought to negotiate with the Israelis instead of using military force against them. Previously, divisions had appeared in the Amal movement after Berri was challenged by his own deputy, Husayn Al-Musawi. Musawi was a vocal supporter of the Iranian Revolution and believed that the Amal should strive to create a Lebanese Islamic republic. Berri’s rejection of the revolutionary vision of the Islamists, his continued support of the confessional political system of Lebanon, and his desire to negotiate with Israelis in the wake of their invasion of Lebanon in 1982 angered al-Musawi. According to a CIA report released in 1984, al-Musawi gathered more than 800 followers and founded the Iran-backed Islamic Amal in the Bekaa Valley in 1982. The CIA described al-Musawi as “little more than a puppet for Iran '' who was loyal to Ayatollah Khomeini. According to the 1984 report, the objective of Islamic Amal was “to spread the fundamentalists tenets of the Iranian revolution among Lebanese Shias, develop a strong group of militant followers willing to carry out terrorists attacks in support of Iran, and create conditions conducive to a revolution in Lebanon.” Furthermore, Iran sponsored Islamic Amal by providing arms, financial support, training, and personnel to the militia. In 1983, there were close to 700 Iranian Revolutionary Guards providing assistance to Islamic Amal in Lebanon. Islamic Amal would later be absorbed into Hezbollah.
The Role of AMUL in Exporting the Revolution to Lebanon
One of the most significant foundations of Hezbollah was the network of clerics who formed the Association of Muslim ‘Ulama’ in Lebanon to resist the Israeli invasion of 1982. Inspired by the Iranian Revolution, AMUL was led by a community of ‘ulama’ who took an active role in revolutionary politics and advocated resistance to the perceived enemies of Islam who were guilty of imperialism and blocking the formation of an international Islamic polical order. After Israel invaded Lebanon, news of the attack quickly reached Palestinian and Lebanese clerics as they were arriving in Tehran to attend a conference hosted by the IRGC on the Global Day of the Downtrodden, an occasion honoring the Muslims involved in the struggle against Israel and imperialist powers. It was during this conference that clerics agreed to join forces to fight the Israeli occupation and establish AMUL.
Importantly, the clerics who belonged to AMUL used mosques as centers from which to disseminate their ideology and build popular opposition against Israel and the Maronite-dominated political system of Lebanon. The use of mosques for political purposes had been a key feature of the Iranian Revolution and reflected Khomeini’s belief that Islam should not be separated from political matters. He believed that imams who avoided discussing political and social issues would contribute “to the destruction of Muslim countries and open the door to the bloody colonialists.” Khomeini and those who were inspired by him believed that the future of Islam was closely linked to the social and political landscape of Muslim countries. Most importantly, it was believed that the future of Islam hinged on the ability of Muslim populations to defend themselves against threats from outside powers. The fusion of Islam and politics was inevitable in Lebanon where Muslims were both marginalized by their own government and threatened by the occupying forces of a non-Muslim country.
What is clear is that AMUL was designed to recreate the Iranian Revolution in Lebanon by taking advantage of the country’s susceptibility to revolutionary ideology amid political unrest and occupation. The founders of AMUL belonged to a faction of Lebanese and Iranian clerics who opposed the Shia leadership in Lebanon. One such leader was Shaykh Shams al-Din, the leader of the Supreme Islamic Shi`i Council, who intended to pursue economic and social reforms while preserving Lebanon’s traditional sectarian system. The goals of Shams al-Din clashed with those of the radical clerics who sought to overthrow Lebanon’s political order and establish a government modeled after that of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Previously, Khomeini’s supporters in Lebanon had developed an acrimonious position towards Shams al-Din’s predecessor, Musa al-Sadr, because of his opposition to the Palestinians. Al-Sadr accused Palestinian militants of creating anarchy, believing their activities in Southern Lebanon would endanger the country’s security by inviting Israeli attacks. Al-Sadr’s position drew condemnation from Iranian revolutionaries who regarded the Palestinians as their close allies. Following al-Sadr’s disappearance, AMUL encouraged Palestinian clerics to join its revolutionary movement.
Importantly, AMUL transcended Islamic sectarian divides and successfully unified and and mobilized Muslim leaders from both the Sunni and Shia communities. That AMUL’s Shia leaders possessed an unwavering commitment to defending the Sunni-majority Palestinian population is further indication of their efforts to overcome any sectarian divisions that would prevent the formation of a unified Islamic resistance. Furthermore, the clerics possessed a strong belief that Sunni-Shia hostilities were both deeply immoral and the result of meddling by foreign powers who sought to weaken Islam. This belief was espoused by Ayatollah Khomeini himself who declared: “Those who attempt to cause discord among our Sunni and Shi'ite brothers are people who conspire for the enemies of Islam and want the enemies of Islam to triumph over Muslims.” Khomeini recognized that all Muslims, regardless of sect, were brothers who should resist propaganda generated by the western imperialist powers to foment discord within the Islamic community. Unity was necessary to create an Islamic power which “none of the global powers will be able to cope with.”
One of the foremost leaders of the initiative to bring together Sunni and Shia ʿulamaʾ was Iranian Ayatollah Hussein-Ali Montazeri, who invited Muslim leaders from around the world to convene for Unification Week in 1984. The conferences held in Tehran during Unification Week were attended by prominent clergymen from both Shia and Sunni sects. Montazeri used this opportunity to unveil his vision for a transnational and inter-sectarian coalition of ‘ulama’ who would collectively strive to resist the enemies of Islam and ignite revolutions in countries where Muslims were considered to be oppressed. Montazeri and his fellow revolutionary clerics particularly abhorred the Maronite-controlled government of Lebanon which ruled a Muslim-majority population and failed to protect the country from repeated attacks by Israel. As a result, Montazeri built a network of associates which included members of the Sunni clergy and the al-Jamaʿa al-Islamiyya branch of the Muslim Brotherhood in Lebanon. The goal of Montazeri and his associates was to overthrow the government of Lebanon and establish a new Islamic government that would represent Lebanese Muslims and effectively fight Israel.
The Rise of Hezbollah
There were three important factors that facilitated the formation of Hezbollah in 1982. First, the clerics that formed AMUL were successful in disseminating their ideology of revolutionary Shiism across Lebanon. Using the Iranian Revolution as a model, the ulama who founded AMUL used their positions in mosques to promote their ideas of Muslim solidarity, resistance to imperialism, and revolution that would lead to the establishment of an Islamic government in Lebanon. These ideas were attractive to a Muslim population that was under attack by Israel and neglected by the Lebanese government.
The second factor that facilitated the formation of Hezbollah was the consolidation of Islamist groups. The message of Muslim solidarity espoused by AMUL helped to unify Muslims in their fight against Israel and the status quo. Hezbollah gained a number of recruits among the Palestinians who held positions in Fatah. Additionally, many of Hezbollah’s members belonged to the ad-Da’wa Party, which was formed by a group of religious scholars who studied in Najaf under the guidance of Ayatollah Muhammed Baqir al-Sadr as early as the 1950s. Al-Sadr and his followers in the ad-Da’wa Party believed that clerics should have the power to strike down ‘‘un-Islamic” laws created by secular governments. When the Iraqi government began to threaten ad-Da’wa Party members in the 1970s, the Lebanese students who had gone to Najaf to study under Ayatollah al-Sadr made their return to Lebanon and joined Amal. Amal became increasingly factionalized after ad-Da’wa members voted at an international conference to accept wilayat al-faqih, a foundational doctrine of the Iranian Revolution that gives a supreme jurist power over the state. The ad-Da’wa party faction’s acceptance of wilayat al-faqih and their official recognition of the supreme authority of Ayatollah Khomeini alienated them from Amal’s more moderate members. When Amal’s leader, Nabih Berri, joined the Committee of National Salvation with the intention of negotiating with Israel following the invasion of Lebanon in 1982, many ad-Da’wa members chose to defect from Amal. This coincided with the formation of Islamic Amal by Husayn al-Musawi. What is clear is that Hezbollah’s ranks were filled with Palestinians and recruits from Shia Islamist groups, such as ad-Da’wa and Islamic Amal. Ad-Da’wa produced the first Secretary-General of Hezbollah, Sobhi Tufayli, his two successors, Abbas al-Musawi and Hassan Nasrallah, as well as Vice-Secretary General Naim Qassem. Among the notable Palestinians who joined Hezbollah was Husayn al-Khalil, an experienced Fatah operative. Al-Khalil later ascended the ranks of Hezbollah and became the leader of the organization’s security service and an advisor to the Secretary-General. Furthermore, Shiites who had formerly served Yasser Arafat as his elite special operations soldiers in Force 17 were recruited to join Hezbollah.
Iranian Support for Hezbollah
The third factor that facilitated the formation of Hezbollah was the sponsorship it received from Iran in the form of weapons, financial assistance, and training. Iran contributed to the growth of Hezbollah by providing the organization with $140 million on an annual basis. The organization used the financial support it received from Iran to pay its combatants monthly salaries of $150-200. Hezbollah’s ability to provide decent compensation to its members was a factor that influenced its expansion into a formidable militant group with a fighting force of 7,000 men. Militants who were employed by Amal were very underpaid, and many left the organization to join Hezbollah where they could take advantage of higher salaries.
In addition to supporting Hezbollah financially, Iran provided the organization with other forms of assistance, including combat training. In 1984, the CIA noted in a report that “some 800 Revolutionary Guards were sent to Lebanon through Syria to help recruit Hezbollahi, provide political and religious indoctrination and military training, including instruction in terrorist tactics” following the Israeli invasion in 1982. The IRGC maintained a presence in the Bekaa Valley, where they advised and trained recruits from multiple radical Shiite paramilitary groups. During this time, the activities of the IRGC in Lebanon were facilitated by Syria. Iran had benefited from a close alliance with Syria since March 1982 when the two countries formed bilateral trade and military agreements. Previously, Syria had provided critical military and diplomatic support to the Islamic Republic after Iraq’s invasion of the country in 1980. When Israel invaded Lebanon in 1982, cooperation between Iran and Syria reached new heights as the both countries sought to destroy their mutual enemies, especially the Israeli forces who were occupying Lebanon. According to the aforementioned CIA report from 1984, Iranian officials used the Iranian Embassy in Damascus as a base from which to provide critical support and direction to the IRGC in Lebanon. Furthermore, Syria supported Hezbollah by “permitting the movement of men and material through Syrian checkpoints in the Bekaa Valley.'' It is clear that Iran provided both ideological backing and substantial material aid to Hezbollah during the organization’s formative years.
In the 1980s, Hezbollah sought to obscure any connection to Iran by falsely representing itself as the Islamic Jihad Organization. However, the CIA soon reached the conclusion that the terrorists who referred to their organization as Islamic Jihad were attempting to obscure their relationship to the Islamic Republic. The Agency expressed the following in their 1983 Terrorism Review: “With little specific information to indicate that Islamic Jihad is a distinct, organized terrorist group, we believe that its name more likely is a cover used by Iran for its terrorist operations, whether employing local Shias in Lebanon or locally recruited agents of other nationalities.” In 1984, the CIA reaffirmed its belief that Islamic Jihad was “only a cover for Iranian-inspired or directly controlled operations.” Additionally, the Agency noted that “Tehran could change the present character of “Islamic Jihad” from a loose association of largely independent, irregularly organized Shiite factions factions into a more formalized, international organization.” This assessment proved to be accurate. With active support from Tehran, Hezbollah became a powerful and well-funded terrorist arm of Iran.
Importantly, the group's terroristic activities are underpinned by a deep religious and ideological commitment to the Islamic Republic. This became especially clear when Hezbollah formally revealed itself and explained its ideology and goals in an “Open Letter” in 1985. In the document, Hezbollah expresses its belief in velayat-e faqih and identifies Khomeini as their leader: “We obey the orders of one leader, wise and just, that of our tutor and faqih (jurist) who fulfills all the necessary conditions: Ruhollah Musawi Khomeini. God save him!” The group also describes their intention to destroy Israel, fight the Americans until they are expelled from Lebanon, and promote the creation of an Islamic regime in Lebanon. Echoing Khomeini, Hezbollah argued that an Islamic government was necessary to ensure “justice and liberty for all” and resist “attempts of imperialistic infiltration” into the country.
Conclusion
The characterization of Hezbollah as an export of the Islamic Republic is based on a close analysis of the history of the organization, from its ideological roots to its creation and expansion into an infamous militant group with a self-proclaimed allegiance to Ayatollah Khomeini. The first factor influencing the rise of Hezbollah was the successful dissemination in Lebanon of the same radical Shia ideology that had inspired the Iranian Revolution. First, it must be understood that radical Shia clerics were able to expand their influence in Lebanon by taking advantage of long-standing causes of unrest among the country’s Shia population. From the 1950s through the 1970s, Shias were drawn to a number of radical socialist and communist organizations, Palestinian militant groups, and most importantly, Musa al Sadr’s Amal. Shias joined these radical groups to protest the political and socioeconomic deprivation of the Shia population, the inequalities produced by the Maronite-controlled confessional political system, and the continued aggression of Israel against the country. Following the 1982 invasion of Lebanon by Israel, the Iran-backed radical Shia clerics began a campaign in Lebanon to promote their vision of revolutionary Islam as the solution to the problems facing the Shia community. The clerics called for bold resistance to Israel and the establishment of Islamic government at a time when prominent Shia political figures such the leader of Amal, Nabih Berri, and Supreme Islamic Shi`i Council head, Shaykh Shams al-Din, were determined both to make peace with Israel and preserve the confessional-style politics that alienated the Shia population. As a consequence, many Lebanese Shias began to accept Khomeini’s radical ideology that had been exported to Lebanon via AMUL led by figures such as Iranian Ayatollah Hussein-Ali Montazeri and Khomeini followers within the ad-Da’wa party.
In the 1980s, many Lebanese Shias accepted Khomeini as their ideological leader and adopted his teachings on topics such as wilayat al-faqih, anti-imperialism, and Islamic government. It is clear that Khomeini’s ideas were spread throughout Lebanon and became the ideological foundation of several radical groups, including Hezbollah. The second factor influencing the rise of Hezbollah was the direct and substantial support provided by Iran to the organization in the form of funding, recruitment, and training in combat tactics. The aid of the IRGC facilitated the consolidation and growth of Hezbollah into the formidable organization that exists today. To argue that Hezbollah is an export of Iran does not equate to characterizing the organization as a purely Iranian creation. However, the significant role Iran played in facilitating the rise and expansion of Hezbollah leads to the following conclusion: Hezbollah would not exist in the same form if at all without the ideological and material influence of Iran. It is clear from Hezbollah’s Open Letter that Ayatollah Khomeini was the originator of the core beliefs that constitute the ideological basis of the organization. The money and training received by Hezbollah from Iran only provides further confirmation that the organization was, in part, the invention of Iran. For these reasons, it can be argued that Hezbollah derives its defining characteristics and purpose from Iran and can accurately be characterized as an Iranian export.
