Beyond the JCPOA: Expanding negotiations and diplomacy with Iran in a region-conscious manner
/By Senior Research Fellow Gabriela Billini
Going beyond the JCPOA in pursuit of a stable Middle East
While the United States and Iran each calculate the best way to return to the JCPOA, pressure on the Biden administration continues to mount from domestic parties and concerned US allies abroad. Many argue that the JCPOA as it exists today simply does not go far enough to regulate Iran’s regional posture and related activities. The extent to which Iranian authorities would realistically consider renegotiating the nuclear deal, however, is a serious concern. However, if the Iranians would be willing to return to the negotiating table to discuss regional security matters, mutually-beneficial partnerships with regional partners could be proposed in exchange.
The JCPOA can serve as a model to extend Iran’s global integration - a kind of “JCPOA Plus”. Signatories should therefore consider which states in the region are ideally positioned to engage as sponsors and allies to help establish and promote a more tenable agreement. While the JCPOA does not currently include other regional actors, the best and most sustainable solution for long-term stability of this deal is a renegotiated JCPOA that also addresses the broader concerns of regional actors, in exchange for economic and political reassurances to Iran.
The New Wishlist
Iran’s regional influence
Should the Iranians return to the negotiating table, the primary issue that concerns the US and most states in the Middle East is the country’s elaborate proxy network. Iran’s regional posture has been strengthened in recent years due to its support for non-state actors in Iraq, Yemen, and Syria, particularly following former President Trump’s withdrawal from the JCPOA in May 2018. After the US withdrawal and other apparently escalatory maneuvers, the Iranian government felt vindicated in its assessment that the US was not a reliable negotiator. As a result, targeting of US and Western assets rose noticeably. The threat environment has since worsened in these states, for their civilians as well as foreign troops.
These heightened tensions were near their zenith in January 2020, following the targeted death of Major General Qassem Soleimani in Baghdad. Later that year attacks across Iraq on US and coalition troops and their bases became near-daily exercises for Iran-supported Shi’a militias. While these were often low-impact attacks resulting in no casualties or significant material damage, they did raise the threat level for US assets. There was a temporary halt to these attacks at the end of 2020 following Biden’s election and inauguration, both to avoid a targeted attack on Iran under Trump’s direction and to offer Biden an opportunity to re-engage with Iran. The attacks, however, resumed in February after both parties failed to take the first step in such negotiations.
Iranian support for the Houthi movement in Yemen has also increased, demonstrated through the munitions used in and frequency of attacks. In 2020 and early 2021, Houthis have been able to increasingly attack Saudi cities as well as civilian and government infrastructure, signaling an increase of sophistication and intelligence in their strategy. This comes, presumably, due to increased Iranian support. These and other examples demonstrate how Iranian regional influence has contributed to a rise in security and operational risk throughout, deeming it an essential area of negotiation.
Ballistic missiles
Despite reduced media coverage on the topic in recent months, Iran’s ballistic missile program has been cause for significant concern for the United States as well as neighbors Israel and Saudi Arabia. The missile program gains in sophistication every year, with reach and capabilities expanding. In the interest of preserving its position as the security guarantor for its regional allies, negotiators would benefit from approaching this subject in future negotiations, though it will be met with resistance by Iran.
Around the world, ballistic missiles are seen as an essential aspect of a well-equipped military. Iranians believe they reserve the right to develop such a program as do other nations. Considering Iran’s relations with the West and political isolation in recent years, it has sought military self-sufficiency and repeatedly stated its need for defensive capabilities, and as a deterrent against neighbors and adversaries that are perceived as hostile. The ballistic missile program was developed first with the assistance and support of North Korea and then independently, ultimately becoming the largest ballistic missile program in the Middle East.
Iranian leadership has consistently stated that the ballistic missile program is non-negotiable. Foreign Minister Javad Zarif asserted in a March 2021 interview with Politico that the issue of his country’s ballistic missile program has already been addressed to the extent that is necessary in the JCPOA. Specifically, the text states that the country must avoid developing ballistic missiles that would be capable of delivering a nuclear weapon. Zarif also expressed the importance of regional disarmament as a tenant of regional security, which could potentially enter into a regional cooperative effort.
It is therefore reasonable to conclude that the issue of regional disarmament more broadly would need to be tackled in a deal that concerns regional security, to encourage Iran to make concessions on its ballistic missile program. As Zarif notes in the interview, Iran has in the past proposed a regional security arrangement, a non-aggression pact, and the Hormuz Peace Endeavor. Equally interested in de-escalating tensions in the Persian Gulf, these prior overtures indicate Iran’s willingness to cooperate and find ways to achieve greater regional stability. Greater diplomatic efforts that draw on these inclinations by Iran and also engage with other concerned actors in the region to provide Iran with a sense of security may therefore help bring about an extended or revised JCPOA.
This may be a defining factor to future negotiating success. Suggestions for potential partners to approach and topics to cover are detailed below.
Potential Partners
Dynamics in the Middle East have changed considerably since 2015, when the JCPOA entered into effect. As a result of the changing dynamics - including the shifting tensions with Israel and Iran’s increased activity throughout the region - signatories must consider what other stakeholders are best poised to support further negotiating strides with Iran. These partners must have an interest in not only participating due to security concerns, but should also have solid relations with Iran in order to maintain pressure on it to remain compliant.
Qatar
In June 2017 when the Quartet - Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, and Egypt - broke diplomatic and economic ties with Qatar due to a number of claims, Qatar found itself in a compromising position. With 40 percent of its food coming from Saudi Arabia - the only country it shares a land border with - and unable to use GCC airspace, Qatar was obliged to turn to Iran. Shortly after the blockade was announced, Iran began providing it with planes of perishable goods, allowing Qatar to implement a strategy of survival and later resilience against the blockade, bringing the two states closer. The support Qatar received from Iran and Turkey was enough to resist the pressure the Quartet sought to impose on Qatar for over three years.
In January 2021, when the Quartet normalized relations with Qatar, Foreign Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani insisted that Qatar will keep its independent foreign policy, including the preservation of close ties with Iran. Now that Qatar is in the process of recalibrating its relations with each GCC member, it is in a unique position to serve as a mediator and advisor in the JCPOA negotiations or broader regionally focused arrangement. Qatar's Foreign Minister Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani claimed to be in talks with both the US and Iran in February 2021, working towards de-escalation through diplomacy with the aim of encouraging all parties to return to the JCPOA.
Oman
Under Sultan Qaboos bin Said, Oman has historically positioned itself as a neutral regional negotiator. With ties to Saudi Arabia through the GCC and important bilateral links, Qaboos also maintained good relations with Tehran. The country played an active role in key contentious international issues involving Iran. This includes talks between the US and Iran that eventually led to the JCPOA. It also helped mediate the release of Western nationals arrested by Iranian authorities. Leadership in Iran has occasionally heeded his advice on managing contact with the US and its regional activities. Following his death in 2020, his successor Sultan Haitham bin Tarik has signaled a desire to continue this mediatorial posture.
In February 2021, Foreign Minister Sayyid Badr bin Hamad Al Busaidi voiced his optimism that all parties would return to the JCPOA and acknowledged that his offices “are always ready to assist.” Then in May, Oman also expressed interest in continuing discussions to import Iranian gas and establish a pipeline between the two countries. However, Omani Oil and Gas Minister Mohammed al-Rumhy stated that such a deal would depend on the JCPOA being reinstated. The sultanate and Iran will therefore benefit from a return to the deal, encouraging economic growth and regional cooperation.
The strong relationship between Muscat and Tehran has continued since the new Sultan has taken the throne and Oman may therefore be a key ally in future negotiations between Iran and the US. Omani Foreign Minister Sayyid Badr bin Hamad Albusaidi shared his optimism in February concerning a return to the JCPOA by all signatories and underlined his country's role in supporting Iranian inclusion into regional issues.
Europe
European signatories have long acted as balancing actors between Iran and the US and were the first to reenter the Iranian market following the JCPOA’s implementation. Following the US departure from the deal in 2018 and as Iran began scaling back its compliance, European leaders consistently urged and called upon both parties to reconsider actions threatening the deal and return to compliance. As the Europeans represent three of the original seven signatories, they will remain important mediating partners to encourage compliance. In addition, the Europeans represent a key economic ticket for Iran. For example, following brief initial hesitation, European entities resumed investing and conducting business in Iran for a short-lived period - between the JCPOA’s implementation and the US’ withdrawal. Key areas of investment in the past by Europe include the automobile, oil, and banking sectors.
While pursuing these opportunities after all parties return to JCPOA compliance is likely, additional regional security agreements could further boost investor confidence and provide reassurance to European and international firms that there will not be a rash return to international sanctions forcing them to divest yet again. Therefore, France, Britain, and Germany must do their part to encourage reentry into the JCPOA along with any potential security agreement addendums that could reduce the risk of their businesses returning to the Iranian market.
Other Stakeholders to Consult
Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia is a significant player in regional power politics and Iran’s primary competitor for influence. Before 2021 it may have seemed fantastical to consider the Kingdom as a potential player in a renegotiated JCPOA, however the winds are shifting on this front.
In early March, Saudi authorities held informal meetings with Israeli, Emirati, and Bahraini officials regarding a potential regional security alliance - what some media sources are referring to as a NATO of the Middle East - to protect against a nuclear Iran. Such an alliance will be perceived as a significant escalation of tensions and hostile threat by Iran, therefore increasing regional competition and isolation for Iran. To avoid such an escalation and a quasi-arms race, Saudi Arabia has an interest in participating in negotiations/deals that may determine the security structure of the region at large.
As of late April, reports emerged that Iran and Saudi Arabia have held meetings in Baghdad, with Iraqi leadership serving as mediators. While the substance of these talks remained under wraps, it is very likely that both parties are interested in establishing a semblance of trust to begin discussion of regional security and paths to establish it. Such negotiations between the two countries are encouraging and vital to regional security. Currently, the primary discussions between the two countries appear to be regarding the conflict in Yemen. Iran’s involvement in Iraq and Syria were reportedly topics of discussion.
In response to the reports, Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman stated, “Iran is a neighboring country, and all we aspire for is a good and special relationship with Iran.” The regional foes have likely come to terms with the changing Middle East, a US that is increasingly withdrawing from the region at large, and the high cost of regional instability. In all cases, the slight warming of ties creates leverage for regional cooperation that involves both parties at the negotiating table at a later time once trust will begin to be established.
JCPOA negotiators may be wise to take advantage of these ongoing discussions and spirit of regional collaboration by following up and developing a security addendum in this JCPOA plus-type model. Specifically, security concerns of both Saudi Arabia and Iran - that neither country is pursuing a nuclear weapon - might be addressed. A resolution to the Yemeni conflict in which both states have vested interests is an essential topic of discussion.
Israel
Like Saudi Arabia, Israel’s priority is ensuring a non-nuclear Iran, and while Israel is not a viable signatory to the deal, it is essential that whatever deal emerges addresses the Jewish state’s safety concerns, not only because it is a US ally, but because Israel has telegraphed its willingness to attack Iran and Iranian interests if it does not feel secure. While Israel will not be a signatory to the deal, it has inserted itself into the playing field via threats and actions, indicating that no deal will be secure from interference without some modicum of Israeli support.
Israeli involvement can be indirect, moreso as a concerned regional state and advisor to its principal ally, the US. Its participation may involve consulting the diplomatic process and voicing its concerns to the US during the course of negotiations. As such, it feels engaged and listened to, increasing the chances of regional stability and reducing the opportunity for a regional arms race, and miscalculation.
Possible Reassurances to Iran
The Biden administration’s overtures to Iran have already demonstrated that Iran is not eager to adjust the terms of a deal that it feels the US has improperly abandoned. Therefore, getting Iran to consider a revision to the deal must be strategically done and demonstrate that all parties are participating in good faith. Support for the Iranian economy is the primary way to encourage Iranian participation in supplementary negotiations.
Iranian authorities are willing to go great lengths to relieve the economic pressure that has taken hold domestically, as seen from January to April 2021 when the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps detained a South Koean tanker in the Persian Gulf. Several weeks after the incident first occurred, officials agreed to release the ship and its captain after South Korean authorities agreed to discuss the unfreezing of USD 7 billion of Iranian funds in the country.
Moving forward, the US and other signatories in the JCPOA can cooperate with nations that hold frozen Iranian assets as a result of sanctions. They can help Iran receive a quick injection of funds that the US can commit to.
Another fast-acting benefit for Iran may include US support for Iran’s request to the International Monetary Fund for USD 5 billion emergency funding, previously blocked by the Trump Administration in April 2020. Ultimately, any effort to improve economic conditions for average Iranians would be welcome in Iran, and also have the side effect of creating public pressure on the regime to continue cooperating with the US.
Conclusion
Following Ebrahim Raisi’s election on June 18, it is unlikely that the Iranians would be immediately willing to return to the negotiating table for revisions to the JCPOA or creation of a JCPOA-”Plus.” A return to the negotiating table to address these various concerns will first depend on a successful return to the primary terms of the JCPOA, which seems imminent and which Raisi will be obliged to accept.
The benefit of using the JCPOA model for additional negotiations is the possibility of interlacing regional and external players to ensure greater buy-in and sustainability. To this end, it is imperative that the US and Iran provide evidence of good faith effort in the negotiations. In addition, as described above, the presence of well-meaning regional partners may aid in further engagement and collaboration on important regional security issues. Consulting parties that are deemed Iran’s foes can yield an even more robust agreement that can be sustained over a longer period.
