COVID-19 in Iran
/By Research Associate Lauren Elmore
Iran, like most countries around the world, has experienced severe economic and social impacts due to SARS-COV-2, the virus that causes COVID-19. Unlike other countries, however, Iran has been hit particularly hard as a result of (1) an especially strong early wave with limited government response, (2) general public distrust of government directives, and (3) existing economic difficulties, which further complicated the government’s ability to respond with effective health measures. These factors, in turn, have resulted in an increased level of social unrest across the country.
International aid for Iran during the pandemic has been mixed. Russia has been a strong partner for Iran and has continually provided it with medical equipment, vaccines, and research regarding the virus. China has also remained a key ally to Iran, predominantly providing economic support. However, Western relations have remained poor as a result of a deep-seated distrust among the countries. Aid during the pandemic was consistently blocked by both Iran and Western nations.
Given the continued spread of the virus in Iran, the ongoing difficulties between Iran and the West, and the broad lack of vaccines in the country at the time of this writing (June 2021), it is very likely that these difficult economic, health, and societal consequences of the pandemic will last well into 2022 and beyond.
Background
COVID-19 was first identified in Wuhan, China in December of 2019. In February 2020, the first case of COVID-19 was reported in Qom, Iran. Soon, the disease spread to neighboring areas, including Iran’s capital, Tehran, 120 km North of Qom. Iran was one of the first countries to experience a COVID-19 related epidemic.
During the genesis of the pandemic, Iran’s infection rates were greater than those of other countries that were also battling a severe initial outbreak (China, Italy, etc.). This, in part, was due to a slow government response aimed at preserving Iran’s overall public image. Despite a reportedly low number of deaths, images and videos of extra burial sites along with lines of body bags began to surface in the initial months. Iran’s hospitals were overrun by the beginning of March, only two weeks after the first case, which indicated an extremely high infection rate. Iran’s health minister, Iraj Harirachi, gave a speech claiming that coronavirus was of no danger to Iran, but then was quarantined due to having contracted the virus only a day later.
While the Iranian government bears some blame for its initial slow response, it is worth noting that Iran was one of the first hotspots of coronavirus infections. During this time, little was known regarding the true nature of the virus, making an apt response difficult to develop. Since that time, however, much more knowledge has been gained, including effective response strategies. Despite this, Iran remains one of the worst affected countries in the world, with continued poor response from the government.
As of the date of this writing, June 2021, Iran has officially had over 3 million COVID-19 cases, which amounts to approximately 3.5 percent of the population. Due to limited diagnostic capabilities during the initial months of the pandemic, however, this number is believed to be extremely inaccurate. Even in the early months of the pandemic, serological testing and other infection estimation models indicated that the actual number of total infections could have already been upwards of 25 million individuals, or 30 percent of Iran’s population, by July 2020.
Officially, Iran has reported over 83,000 coronavirus-related deaths. At the start of the pandemic, Iran’s Case Fatality Rate (CFR) was estimated to be 7.5 percent, two times the global average. Even with these grim reports, however, the death count is likely grossly inaccurate, and many deaths were left undocumented.
Reprieve is on the horizon. In April 2021, Iran finalized a deal with Russia to purchase 60 million doses of Russia’s Sputnik V Coronavirus vaccine. Given in two doses, this could inoculate 30 of Iran’s 85 million population. Though its primary partnership is with Russia, Iran also imports vaccines from China (Sinopharm Vaccine) and India (COVAXIN). They have also received 100,000 doses of the unapproved Cuban Soberana-02 vaccine and have purchased approximately four million AstraZeneca doses through the worldwide COVAX vaccine initiative. While currently reliant on foreign vaccination aid, Iran has approved its first homegrown vaccine (BAREKAT), and production began in June 2021. Recent clinical trials indicate an over 90 percent efficiency rate. This is the most developed vaccine candidate, however another local vaccine, Razi, is set to begin its third phase of clinical trials soon.
Government Response
The Iranian government did not respond swiftly to the initial outbreak in February of 2020 and instead sought to prevent widespread panic and the dissemination of false information. This initial inaction, in part, was the byproduct of Iran’s close economic and strategic relationship with China. Over the next couple of months, as cases surged, harsher lockdown measures were required and applied. Unfortunately, due to its struggling economy, long-term lockdowns were, and continue to be, unsustainable for the preservation of the Iranian economy as a whole, and Iran’s overall social stability. Because of this, substantial progress against Covid-19 without mass inoculations is unlikely.
Restrictions and Lockdowns
In February 2020, in light of significant viral spread in Wuhan, Iran began restricting flights between China and Iran. Not all flights were banned, however, and Iranian citizen evacuations, cargo shipments, and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp transportation air travel continued. It was not until late February before these flights were completely halted. In March, Iran began to implement some internal travel restrictions. These restrictions were mainly aimed at warding against unnecessary intercity travel.
Later, in mid-March, due to fears of large gatherings and other potential spreading events, the Iranian government strongly urged against celebrations for Nowruz, the Persian New Year. Moreover, holy places, such as Mashhad’s Imam Reza Shrine and Qom’s Fatima Masumeh shrine, were closed due to fears of transmitting the virus. Despite these initial restrictions, few were dissuaded. Indeed, harsh public backlash ignited as a result of religious restrictions. Demonstrations occurred immediately following the announcement of these closures, which only aided in further spreading the virus. Fears of a second wave emerged, and in late March, President Rouhani closed shopping centers, bazaars, schools, and universities, stating that this would be a 15-day closure.
The first complete lockdown in Iran consisted of strict enforcement of social distancing and the halting of inter-city travel. These measures lasted until mid-April, at which time lockdown measures were loosened, and low-risk businesses were reopened as case counts and death tolls fell. Although the virus was still in circulation, the decision to reopen was made to restimulate the economy, which was in difficult straits. However, shortly after reopening, cases began to increase once again. Two weeks later, lockdowns were put back in place regionally. This was primarily within Southern provinces of Iran due to a tripling of Covid-19 cases and a 60 percent increase in hospitalizations. Newer restrictions were not as extensive as initial lockdown measures, with the Iranian government citing new testing capabilities rather than an actual increase in infection rates as the reason for an uptick in cases.
Iran did not enter into another lockdown during the summer months as the government feared it would be too detrimental to Iran’s economy. In late 2020, however, SARS-COV-2 infections and hospital admission rates began to overwhelm medical systems and cemeteries, and Rouhani placed lockdowns on multiple “high-risk red zone” areas. This time, he claimed that lockdown measures could last well past two weeks. Schools, religious events, and other culturally important events were once again closed and cancelled.
Most recently, in April 2021, Iran was hit with its 4th wave of the coronavirus. Subsequently, 23 of its 31 provinces were placed under lockdown as hospitals and other healthcare services became overrun as Iran awaited foreign vaccination aid. At the time of this writing, face masks within enclosed public spaces are required and enforced. Non-essential businesses and shrines are closed. Some public events have been cancelled. Outside travel into the country is only permitted with a negative COVID-19 test. These restrictions vary regionally across Iran, and provinces enact restrictions in accordance to their own infection rates.
Public Economic Aid
One of the primary measures taken by the Iranian government to support people during lockdowns and other public health measures was to delay business taxes and loan repayment until May 2020. This was put in place in late March amidst the initial strict lockdown measures. The Iranian government gave three million families handouts of up to six million rials, which is the equivalent of 400 U.S. dollars. The government also gave out cash loans to another four million households with low-interest payments. Other bills, like health insurance, taxes, and utility bill payments were postponed for three months after the initial outbreak. Iran itself has an extensive health insurance system, which prevented the pandemic from causing a mass increase in poverty. On a holistic level, the Iranian government intervened a multitude of times in order to stimulate the economy by extending loan repayment exemptions for businesses, compensating for lost wages during isolation and quarantine, limiting renewal rent increases, and running online campaigns and marketplaces to keep afflicted businesses running.
This economic aid has been met with mixed reactions. Though rent increase caps are beneficial to the majority of the public, property owners have expressed dissatisfaction in this government action and oftentimes disregard this cap as inflation rates continue to rise. Additionally, although other payments did stave off immediate economic concerns, social unrest grew over the course of the initial months of the pandemic, and many protests erupted in response to the government’s pandemic policies and the increasingly bleak economic downturn. The greatest focus of these protests were on the lack of employment opportunities and poor wages. However, additional governmental support was very difficult to provide given the economic damages of the pandemic and American sanctions.
Cyber Control and Censorship
The Iranian government very strictly controlled the spread of COVID-19 misinformation, primarily during the first few months of the pandemic. In February 2020, the Iranian Cyber Police gave notices to 118 people and arrested 24 others in an attempt to discourage the dissemination of false information. In the first month of the pandemic, this censorship was targeted at online fear-mongering tactics as well as government criticism. For example, Mohammad Mokhtari, an Iranian football player, posted to Instagram criticizing the government's response to the outbreak. He was arrested by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.
In March 2020, Iran expanded its censorship by banning all printing and distribution of newspapers and other print media. This was purportedly done to further inhibit the spread of COVID-19, but it also served to control information. Though print media was moved online, the only paper that received a full digital edition was Iran, which is a government-supervised newspaper. Even as such tactics buffeted the government’s censorship goals, the battle against the spread of false information was also a real matter of public safety. In April 2020, over 700 Iranians had died from alcohol poisoning and an additional 5,000 were hospitalized. This was primarily due to the spread of false information that methanol could treat the COVID-19. Iran, within the first three months of the pandemic, had arrested 3,600 people for spreading false information about the virus.
The media narrative about the virus was further controlled due to government manipulation of official statistics. As described earlier, case counts and death tolls were a particular target of authorities. These data adjustments were, in part, a response to the upcoming parliamentary election, set to occur in late February, since officials were concerned that COVID-19 fears would reduce voter turnout.
Medical professionals who reported statistics contrary to those presented by the government did so anonymously in fear of retribution. Months after the initial outbreak, Iranian doctors stated that they “were given special instructions not to release any statistics on infection and death rates” with the aim of reducing public panic.
Medical Capabilities
Though initially reliant on foreign aid to provide medical support and treatments, Iran, throughout the course of the pandemic, has become increasingly independent of outside intervention.
Medical Equipment Production
Some foreign medical aid was provided to Iran in the first months of the pandemic. This included diagnostic kits, health specialists, Personal Protection Equipment (PPE), ventilators, and other medical equipment. This aid came from numerous countries within the Middle East, Asia, and Europe. However, in April 2020, Iran opened Southwest Asia’s largest mask-producing factory with the capability to produce four million masks per month. This halted the need for the importation of PPE. The Headquarters of Execution of Imam Khomeini’s Order (EIKO) produced 25 million three-layered masks, N95 masks, and coronavirus test kits; began research on medicine for treatment of COVID-19; launched the 4030-system (a phone screening system for coronavirus); and commenced the production of 400 thousand liters of disinfectant gel. Furthermore, one thousand fixed and mobile detection clinics were set up in Iran to provide PPE and beds for infected patients.
Medical Services and Other Support
Iran has 773 hospitals located in urban areas, allowing about 75 percent of the population to have access to medical professionals. Given such coverage, during the initial stages of the pandemic, Iran had a good response plan for the outbreak and prepared hospitals for an upcoming surge in hospitalizations. Iran also has a home health care system in place, which has been valuable in staving off extreme hospital overruns and has been utilized as a good source of outpatient care. However, as cases began to increase, hospitals and medical services eventually became overwhelmed, leaving Iran to rely on army hospital support and forcing medical centers to turn away people for treatment if it was not deemed an emergency. This became the primary rationale behind lockdown initiatives.
Multiple virtual consultation and screening systems were engineered in 2020. At the beginning of March, the Iranian government set up an online COVID-19 tracking system to follow the initial spread of the virus. The aforementioned 4030-system was also introduced at the beginning of the outbreak to aid in citizen patient consultations and COVID-19 screening. The system employed 2,200 doctors and paramedics. After screening, patients would either be sent home or would be recommended to go to the hospital.
In addition to medical facilities, Iran further employed large-scale sanitation operations and social distancing enforcement. Three hundred thousand soldiers were deployed in cities to stop the spread of the virus during the initial outbreak. Water cannons and drones were used to disinfect streets. Iran also treated their wastewater with chlorine, UV, and other disinfectants. This resulted in zero detection of the virus within sewage water and decreased the overall number of transmission routes. Treated wastewater in Iran is used for agriculture and irrigation purposes, making transmission in agricultural sectors possible if such precautions were not taken.
Vaccinations
Iran began vaccinating its population in February 2021, approximately one year after the first reported case of COVID-19. At the time of this writing, Iran has administered over four million doses of coronavirus vaccinations, accounting for about 2.9% of their population. Vaccines are currently being offered free of charge to all groups in Iran. A charge may be incurred however if an individual wishes to get their vaccination ahead of the normal distribution schedule.
Iran currently has received and distributed vaccines from Russia, China, India, and Cuba. Initially, the Iranian government banned U.K. and U.S. vaccinations, as Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei stated these vaccines were untrustworthy. The Deputy Chief of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps advised against the usage of foreign vaccinations as they may contain mRNA, even though one of Iran’s local vaccines, Razi, also is effective via the usage of mRNA. However, despite these restrictions, via the WHO, Iran has accepted more than four million doses of the AstraZeneca vaccine, a British-Swedish vaccination.
The Iranian government has asserted that by the end of summer 2021, their local vaccine, BAREKAT, will reach a production rate of 18 to 20 million doses per month. With this in mind, the Iranian Health Ministry seeks to vaccinate all Iranian adults by September 2021. Despite this claim, many Iranian citizens view this to be overly enthusiastic. Current vaccination rates are slow in distribution. Wealthier citizens of Iran have left the country in order to receive a vaccination elsewhere; poorer Iranians are unable to do so. As of June 2021, Iran is still reliant on foreign vaccination aid, leaving it in close partnership with China and Russia.
Compared to neighboring countries like Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, Iran is at a comparable vaccination rate, with each country at approximately less than five percent of its total population vaccinated. However, Iran currently has better footing with the importation of vaccines due to its close ties with China and Russia. Neighboring countries are reliant on the COVAX initiative, which strives to provide COVID-19 vaccines to all countries, primarily focusing on developing countries. However, this mass distribution of vaccines has led to shortages of stock, resulting in slow delivery to countries reliant on this system.
Medicine and Treatment
In July 2020, Iran announced that Remdesivir and Favipiravir, two antiviral medications, would be locally produced as effective COVID-19 treatments. Within the next few months, 305 clinical trials had been registered within Iran for the evaluation of certain medications, mainly focusing on their safety and efficiency. Other outpatient therapies, such as oxygen therapy, rehydration, and antibiotic treatments, were provided to infected patients. One of the more common treatment regimens given was hydroxychloroquine sulfate, a common drug used to treat the virus globally. More traditional Iranian herbal medicines were also tested and used to treat patients.
Economic Implications
Iran’s economy was in a weakened state prior to the pandemic. Because of this, Iran’s economy has suffered exacerbated consequences compared to other countries, which also saw downturns over the past year. As lockdown measures continue and global consumption remains depressed, economic disparities will likely continue to be an issue until the pandemic ends. On an individual level, this means fewer employment opportunities, decreased financial support, and less disposable income, making it difficult to stimulate the economy past its current state. Economic recovery before widespread vaccination distribution is unlikely.
Broad Scale Impact
A major component of Iran’s economy is its exportation of oil and natural gas. Despite American sanctions, Iran still exports a hearty amount of nonrenewable energy resources to China, India, and South Korea, totalling about 1.2 million barrels of oil a day. Though Iran is not entirely dependent on nonrenewable energy revenues, these still play a large role in the stability of Iran’s economy. Global oil demand and consumption have decreased as a result of lockdown measures. Expenditure, along with plummeting oil revenues, has increased Iran’s fiscal deficit to GDP ratio to its highest in the decade. The GDP has declined by 11 percent, and overall living standards, which is defined by household per capita expenditure, have declined by 13 percent. Even as an isolated crisis, this pandemic would have caused Iranians many economic difficulties. However, Iran has now entered into its third consecutive year of recession following sanctions placed by the United States and the oil market crash in 2018, making the economic consequences of this pandemic more damaging overall to Iranian society.
Tourism comprises another large segment of Iran’s economy as it is one of the few sectors not directly impacted by U.S. sanctions. Unfortunately, this sector was hit hard by the pandemic, as it was all around the world. Travel restrictions were implemented at the start of 2020, which limited travel in and out of Iran. Moreover, other countries added Iran to their “do not travel” lists. The Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), as of June 2021, for example, recommends that all individuals who are unvaccinated should avoid travel to Iran if possible. Additionally, the U.S. Department of State issued a “Level 4: Do Not Travel” advisory in regards to Iran. Along with this, Iran has also banned citizens of other countries from entering. In April 2021, in light of a new strain of COVID-19 now called Delta, Iran banned all travellers from India. Iran’s tourism sector accounted for approximately 6.5 percent of its total GDP in 2019, and 2016 estimates indicated that foreign expenditure made up about 20.2 percent of Iran’s economy. This pandemic has impacted that component of Iran’s economy and has resulted in high unemployment rates in fields related to travel and tourism.
Mimicking the downturn in the economy, the rial too has been dropping in value. While this was already a serious problem in Iran before Covid hit, after the pandemic began, the rial dropped to the weakest point it had been since September of 2018 after sanctions were reimposed. In 2018, in concordance with the rial’s depreciation, inflation rates in Iran rose. During the initial reimposition of sanctions, “Iran’s inflation rate exploded in 2018, growing to 30% and then to 34% the following year”. In light of COVID-19, a similar trend has occurred. In the initial months following the outbreak, the rial continued to drop in value, and in the summer months, one dollar was the equivalent of 215,000 rials. As of March of 2021, inflation was at nearly 48 percent, almost double that of what it was in 2020. The cost of food in Iran has increased, with some products raising in price by over 30 percent in just the last year. The cost of living has also increased, severely impacting the quality of Iranian life.
Individual Impact
The pandemic affected job availability and other labor-intensive activities. Overall, in Iran, as around the world, there was less economic participation. As prices for necessary goods have increased, this has decreased the available disposable income for consumers of other goods, like clothing, services, and manufacturing, hurting these areas of the economy as well. Additionally, employment levels fell by over one million within the year. This caused unemployment levels to rise to 12.2 percent in 2020. Compounding these problems, wage earnings have decreased, and the new minimum wage for Iranians is set below the poverty line.
Social Implications
The COVID-19 pandemic has exposed and highlighted many issues already present within Iranian society. Socioeconomic divides were broadened, and general social unrest increased. As vaccine distribution expands, concerns about the government response to Covid may wane, even as the divide between economic classes continues to grow.
Economic Issues and Social Unrest
Undeniably, there has been broad societal discontent with the Iranian government before the pandemic. However, the government’s handling of COVID-19, along with the economic impacts of coronavirus, have resulted in a notable rise in protests, uprisings, and riots. The sharp depreciation in currency and increased inflation placed further stress on low and middle-income households, ultimately resulting in widespread social unrest across Iran. In May 2020, massive worker protests broke out. In July, three weeks of worker protests occurred across Iran due to a lack of paid wages, employment opportunities, and poor policies related to the pandemic and the economy. These protests included doctors, medical professionals, teachers, and truck drivers. In total, there were 237 protest movements in 85 cities in Iran in July of 2020.
Unrest continued past the summer of 2020 and well into 2021. In October 2020, protests and strikes occurred across Iran in response to delays in individuals receiving their paychecks. These strikes, the largest since the Iranian Revolution in 1979, came with demands of “payment of all unpaid of wages and benefits,” the “return of all fired workers…”, the “recognition of independent labor organizations…”, the acknowledgement of “the right to protest, strike, rally, etc,” and other labor-related rights. In February 2021, retirees protested against the lack of compensation for inflation. Based on Article 96 of Iran’s Social Security Act, as living expenses increase within the country, so must pension payments. This has not occurred. Protests over working wages and conditions have continued throughout 2021.
Prison Crises
Social unrest over COVID-19 has not been limited to the general Iranian public. In March 2020, rioting broke out within the overcrowded prisons of Tehran due to coronavirus fears. Though no exact statistics are available for the case toll within prisons, a large number of COVID-19 related deaths within these prison systems were reported. Because of this, 100,000 prisoners who were serving less than five years were temporarily released from prisons. At the time, Judiciary chief Ebrahim Raisi stated that the releases would continue “to the point where it doesn’t create insecurity within society”. Prisoners with harsher sentences were not released, and this included political activists and journalists. Despite the releases, the prison populations remained overcrowded, and in April 2020, hunger strikes, demonstrations, and marches broke out within the prisons due to mistreatment. This was deemed one of the deadliest prison protests in Iran.
General Social Consequences
Though there was broad, overall social instability because of the pandemic, social changes also occurred on an individual level. Due to social distancing measures and a lack of organized events, interactions within communities decreased. Many religious and culturally important ceremonies and holidays were cancelled on account of the pandemic. Mass celebrations for Nowruz, a two-week celebration of the Persian New Year, have been cancelled in Iran for its second consecutive year. This holiday represents a “new day”, and is often celebrated with gifts and family gatherings. However, due to low wages from the depressed economy along with the highly contagious nature of the virus, these hallmark traditions were not as practiced in the same way they normally would be.
Meanwhile, economic disparities continue to broaden in Iran. In this regard, Covid has exacerbated existing rifts and will only continue to do so as vaccine distribution is performed unequally, with upper-class Iranians being more likely to receive it early on.
International Interplay
Politically speaking, Iran has developed closer ties between both Russia and China during the pandemic. Both allies have continually provided financial and medical support to Iran. Western relations, on the other hand, have remained poor. Continued mistrust between the countries has created an environment of suspicion and increased tensions between Iran and Western nations.
Foreign Aid
At the start of the pandemic, Iran was extremely reliant on foreign aid to mitigate some of the initial medical and economic distress it was experiencing. This initially came in the form of medical supplies, including diagnostic kits, health specialists, PPE, and other medical equipment like ventilators. This aid came from multiple countries across the Middle East, Europe, and Asia. Along with official government-associated aid from other countries, humanitarians from the European Union (EU) and philanthropists from the United States provided support to Iran, including aid specifically intended for Afghan refugees. The World Health Organization (WHO) also gave essential medical equipment to Iran.
In 2021, vaccines rather than medical equipment became the primary form of aid. This was mainly provided by Russia, China, and India due to the ban on U.S. and British vaccines.
Political Relations
China-Iran relations have grown stronger on a policy front. Aside from the medical assistance offered throughout the pandemic, China has been a valued economic partner to Iran during the pandemic. China has continued purchasing crude oil from Iran despite threats of increased sanctions, providing Iran’s economy some reprieve. In March 2021, China and Iran signed a 25-year cooperation agreement. This establishes a long-term political and economic partnership between the two countries. However, Iran’s struggling economy, especially in light of the pandemic, creates an asymmetrical power imbalance between China and Iran, favoring China. From a public perception standpoint, this strengthening of the relationship is not mirrored. Polls following the start of the pandemic indicate that Iranians have a record high unfavorable view of China. Though this unfavorability has begun to decrease, it is still of the majority opinion.
A similar trend of improved relations on the policy front has been observed in Russia-Iran relations. In the beginning months of the pandemic, there was increased cooperation between Iranian and Russian Health Ministries, primarily with respect to research and medicine. Russia has also stepped in to be the primary donor of vaccines to Iran. Recent agreements between the countries indicate an ever-strengthening bond. In March 2021, Iran and Russia signed a cyber agreement that allows for future cooperation of technology and cybersecurity measures.
Meanwhile, Western relations with Iran during the pandemic have been poor. This is primarily the result of sanctions handicapping Iran’s economy, creating a sense of deep mistrust of Western aid within Iran. The U.S. attempted to provide humanitarian aid within the first month of the outbreak. This, however, was blocked by Iran. Additionally, Western vaccines were banned by Iran even as Iran blamed Western countries for “hoarding vaccines” and hampering Tehran’s access to foreign medical aid through sanctions and other financial restrictions. For its part, the West also blocked some crucial aid to Iran. At the beginning of the outbreak, the Central Bank of Iran requested a 5-billion-dollar loan from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in order to combat the growing epidemic within Iran. However, former President Trump blocked this bill before it came to fruition.
Given the recent change in the U.S. administration, there are signs of improvement in U.S.-Iran relations. President Biden plans to re-enter the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), “the agreement that prevented Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon in return for alleviating strenuous U.S. sanctions and the return of frozen Iranian assets”. However, negotiations are still underway, and a final agreement on the future of this deal is not a certainty.
Conclusion
While initially the pandemic was not taken seriously by the Iranian government, the government has begun taking increasingly severe measures to stop the spread. However, such measures require a delicate balancing act to keep the economy from completely collapsing. Iran’s economy has been seriously damaged by Western sanctions, fluctuations within the oil market, and more recently, the pandemic. This, in turn, has led to a notable increase in social instability. Though it is likely that as vaccinations increase and restrictions are loosened, mass protesting will decrease, the socioeconomic divides left in COVID-19’s wake will likely remain for many years. Internationally, Iran’s struggling economy has left it more in need of foreign and assistance. So far, China and Russia have stepped in to take advantage of that need and have positioned themselves well for increased cooperation and engagement with Iran moving forward.
Unfortunately, Iran’s current vaccination distribution rate does not indicate it will achieve the goal of vaccinating all Iranian adults by September 2021. However, given foreign aid and Iran’s development of multiple national vaccines, vaccination rates are likely to increase significantly within the coming months and may pave the way for at least a minor economic turnaround in time for a new Iranian administration.
