Iranian Foreign Policy: Developments Under President Raisi
/By AIC Research Associate Brooke Lowe
Introduction
Following Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi’s ascent to office on August 3 2021, Iran has witnessed several shifts in its foreign policy pursuits and overall agenda compared to those under former President Hassan Rouhani. While Raisi has been cautious on the foreign front, several significant changes have taken place, including an increased focus on relations with Russia and China. In Iran, although the President guides the direction of foreign policy, he is just one member of the Supreme National Security Council, which is the body responsible for establishing Iran’s national security policy. Therefore, while Raisi has the potential to alter the direction of foreign policy, he requires support from other actors. Nonetheless, Raisi finds himself leading an Iran with growing regional prominence and likely sees little reason to take major risks or even to negotiate with the West.
US-Iran Relations Under the Raisi Administration
In contrast to former Iranian President Hassan Rouhani, current President Raisi has limited his outreach to Western powers. He is more skeptical of the intentions of the United States than Rouhani was, asserting that he would reject a meeting with Biden if the opportunity were presented, and instead placing his administration’s focus on improved regional and Asian relations, especially China. Raisi has also affirmed that Iran’s ballistic missile program is a non-negotiable pursuit, despite United States concerns and demands for compliance with the proposed plan of agreement for the Iranian Nuclear Deal.
Raisi has warned that his administration will adopt a tougher stand on diplomacy, asserting that the situation in Iran has changed through the people’s vote, and the West should recognize that. More recently Raisi has used protests in Iran to accuse the United States of meddling in its internal affairs.
While the Rouhani administration saw diplomacy and engagement with the West as a potential solution to economic problems in Iran, Raisi has focused on a resistance economy approach, which aims to achieve economic self-sufficiency for the country, rendering foreign sanctions toothless. Although the Raisi administration has said that it will make attempts to get the sanctions lifted, it has emphasized a nullification of sanctions approach vs negotiations to remove sanctions.
The decreased focus of the Raisi administration on US-Iran relations in favor of regional and Eastern relations can in part be explained by a change in the cabinet. While Rouhani’s cabinet was largely composed of ministers who received an education in the West, or who were in support of increased relations with the West, Raisi’s cabinet members were primarily educated in Iran and have advocated expanding allegiances with Asian powers. Former President Rouhani’s foreign minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif, for example, was fluent in English and obtained his B.A, M.A, and PhD from US universities. Zarif also worked as the Iranian ambassador to the UN for five years in New York. As foreign minister to Rouhani, Zarif used his knowledge of the West and his time in the United States to help negotiate the 2015 nuclear deal and develop a working relationship with former Secretary of State John Kerry. In comparison, President Raisi’s current foreign minister, Hossein Amir-Abdollahian speaks limited English and received his education in Iran. Throughout Amir-Abdollahian’s career, he has undergone regional postings in Iraq and Bahrain, vowing as foreign minister to focus the foreign policy agenda on regional relations and dialogue with Asian states.
Beyond these measurable shifts in foreign policy, the Raisi administration has also taken an increasingly hardened tone with the US. While Rouhani’s government was said to be a group of optimists in regards to the success of the JCPOA and the removal of sanctions, this ended poorly for the last administration after former United States President Trump unilaterally withdrew from the JCPOA in 2018. This unilateral withdrawal not only discredited Rouhani, but further escalated tensions between Iran and the United States. As a result, the Raisi administration has used Rouhani’s failures as an example of US broken promises and more evidence as to why Iran should focus on trade opportunities with the entire globe. Adding to this agenda shift, Iranian politician, diplomat, and ally of Raisi, Saeed Jalili, states that foreign policy should not involve a stagnated Iran that merely stands by for the the decision of a few states, but instead should turn the “potential of trade and cooperation opportunities with more than 200 countries into reality”.
Focus on Resistance Economy
A noticeable change in Raisi’s foreign policy agenda is his focus on the concept of a resistance economy, which is a strategy aimed at the reduction of Iranian vulnerability to sanctions through economic protectionism. Raisi aims to increase internal production, expand exports, and minimize imports, ultimately acquiring a self-sufficient economy, with little need to negotiate with the West for the removal of sanctions. The concept of economic protectionism is not new and can be traced back in the United States to Alexander Hamilton’s proposal of protecting US entities from foreign competition. Protectionism continued to be widely seen in the years before the Great Depression in the United States. Raisi is therefore prioritizing economic diplomacy, focusing on the 15 neighbors of Iran who in total make a market of 500 million individuals (or possible customers for Iranian goods). Raisi is also focusing on the export of products that are harder to sanction, such as gasoline and other non-crude oil products. Reducing taxes for producers of goods in order to increase production and propagate a self-sufficient economy is an additional measure for self-sufficiency. Still, Raisi is expected to continue to engage with the West in some part to attempt to reduce sanctions, though primarily by focusing on diplomatic expansion with regional and Asian powers.
Pivot to Asia
The key foreign policy shift under the Raisi administration is bettering relations with Russia and China, also described as Iran’s pivot to the East. While this is aimed at improving diplomatic relations with the East, it is more aptly a tactic designed to mitigate the impacts of Western sanctions and improve relations with the Asian bloc in order to counteract the influence of Western powers, such as the United States. Iran’s foreign minister Amir-Abdollahian has repeatedly emphasized the increase of trade between Iran and the Asian bloc, as well as the continued development of bilateral relations, saying in his confirmation hearing that “the 21st century belongs to Asia” with Asia being the arena for emerging economic powers to develop. Amir-Abdollahian further reiterated that in addition to the development of regional relations, an Asia-centered policy approach was an integral element and top priority of Iran’s future foreign policy agenda under Raisi.
To highlight this pivot to Asia, Raisi’s first trip abroad as the new President of Iran was to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which is an organization dedicated to the discussion of regional, economic, and security issues. Raisi aims to diverge from Rouhani’s focus on the West to solve Iran’s problems by placing his attention on the economic might of powers such as China in order to create trade opportunities and sustain economic growth. In particular he is prioritizing a 25-year framework agreement between Iran and China to secure China’s investment into Iranian infrastructure, energy, petrochemicals, and maritime projects which further develop the role of Iran in the China belt of cooperation. This 25-year agreement between Iran and China was described as a strategic partnership with the potential to deepen economic, security, and political relations. While the official agreement was not publicly released, a draft of the partnership was released in June of 2020 which demonstrated that China would invest in Iran’s economy and Iranian infrastructure in exchange for receiving heavily discounted Iranian oil.
Economically, this policy shift appears to be somewhat successful for the administration with Iran’s Gross Domestic Product growing by 2.5 percent after its pursuit of increased ties with China, despite continued sanctions from the United States. Of course with persistently high inflation (rates between 35 and 50 percent), and ongoing protests in the country, any modicum of good economic news cannot come soon enough. Diplomatically, this policy shift has already borne fruit, with China leading the way in helping to repair relations between Iran and its long-time regional rival Saudi Arabia. More details on this development below.
Regarding Iran’s relations with Russia, Raisi has demonstrated eagerness to improve them. Following Raisi’s election win, the first person to offer their congratulations was Russian President Vladimir Putin. Shortly thereafter, Raisi stated his determination to complete a 20-year cooperation agreement between Russia and Iran, which had been in development since 2020. During the first seven months of 2022, Raisi and Putin met three times for discussions and negotiations. In Putin’s July visit to Tehran, his invasion of Ukraine was endorsed by Khamenei, with Raisi echoing this support. Russia’s purchase and Iran’s continued supply of drones to Russia highlights Iran’s increasing engagement with Russia and arguable entrance into the Ukrainian war through its military support of Russia. Additionally, Russia and Iran continue to cooperate on energy as part of OPEC, attempting to keep oil prices high. However, Russia has begun to heavily discount oil that it sells to China, entering it into competition with Iran as Raisi competes for the position of the primary provider of oil to China. Nevertheless, Putin’s visits to Tehran and Raisi’s continued backing of Russia amidst its violent hostility and attacks in Ukraine demonstrate Iran’s determination to increase and further develop Iran-Russia relations.
JCPOA Negotiations
Raisi continues to state that he wishes to see through the success of JCPOA negotiations in order to alleviate economic sanctions, however his actions have failed to support this statement. In the midst of stalled negotiations, Iran continues to develop its nuclear capacity. Following the introduction of a global nuclear watchdog on behalf of the United States and Europe, Raisi responded by restricting nuclear inspections which ultimately impeded the negotiations.
Recently, in perhaps the most decisive commentary on the state of JCPOA affairs, President Joe Biden has, in an unofficial statement, declared the nuclear deal to be effectively dead. This tone towards the JCPOA is also reflected in the United States Congress. While Democrats have broadly been keen to not walk away from JCPOA negotiations entirely, many Republican Senators believe JCPOA negotiations will continue to stall and yield no results. Now, after Biden’s comment, it seems unlikely that even the Democrats will pursue the deal’s success. Despite continued insistence from both the United States and Iran regarding their optimism of the success of negotiations, efforts appear halted on both sides for the foreseeable future.
Regional Relations
In terms of regional relations, one of Raisi’s stated goals has been to increase dialogue and better relations with Saudi Arabia. As of March 10th, 2023 this has been realized as Iran and Saudi Arabia formally agreed to re-establish diplomatic relations after talks brokered by China. This deal spurs hopes for regional stability across the Middle East, with a specific focus on a potential easing of tensions and conflicts such as the ongoing Yemeni Civil War. Iran and Saudi Arabia have agreed to reinstate diplomatic relations along with unconditionally agreeing to reopen embassies within the next two months.
This openness to better relations with Saudi Arabia is a notable divergence from the Rouhani administration, during which period Saudi Arabia executed well-known Shiite cleric, Nimr al Nimr and relations with Saudi Arabia were severed. Raisi had previously expressed his interest in containing tensions with the Saudi government and more notably claimed that Iran had no problem in reopening the Saudi embassy, opening the door to diplomatic pursuits with the Saudi government. This shift in tone was first evidenced in 2021 when Iran and Saudi Arabia had direct talks after five years of severed and nearly nonexistent diplomatic and foreign relations. These talks included events in Yemen (where both countries have supported opposing sides in the civil war), and the political and economic state of Lebanon. Three more talks similar in nature between Iran and Saudi Arabia were convened in 2021.
Although talks of bettering relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia have been on the rise since 2021, this deal brokered by China marks the first formal and official reinstatement of diplomacy between the two states since 2016. The deal between Iran and Saudi Arabia not only reinstated diplomatic ties, but also reinstated a security cooperation accord first proposed in 2001, along with additional pacts on trade and the economy. As of March 19th, 2023, President Raisi has welcomed an invitation from King Salaman to visit Saudi Arabia. If President Raisi accepts this invitation, it will mark the first time since 1998 that an Iranian President has visited the country. An official date has yet to be set, however Iran maintains the position that it welcomes an opportunity to visit Riyadh, with an official date expected soon.
Azerbaijan
Iranian-Azerbaijani relations have been complex and at times strained since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. Tensions continue to arise over issues such as territorial disputes, energy resources, and political differences.
In recent years, specifically under Rouhani’s Presidency, the two countries have made efforts to improve their relationship. Former President Rouhani visited Azerbaijan several times, and in 2019, the two countries signed more than 50 agreements aimed at increasing cooperation.
Despite these initial positive developments, relations between the two states have recently been deteriorating. One major point of contention is the status of Nagorno-Karabakh, a territory that is internationally recognized as part of Azerbaijan but is controlled by ethnic Armenians. Iran has claimed it has tried to remain neutral in the conflict, but Azerbaijani officials have accused Iran of supporting Armenia. The strain continues to grow with the Azerbaijani government sending two protest notes to Tehran in March of 2023, claiming a military aircraft belonging to Iran has been spotted flying along the border. This comes after a deadly attack on the Azerbaijani embassy in Tehran, resulting in the Azerbaijani government issuing travel advisory to its citizens, stating not to travel to Iran unless absolutely necessary. It is predicted that relations, at the moment, will continue to worsen between the two states, especially as Azerbaijan continues to closely collaborate with Israeli military services.
Qatar
Another regional focus of the Raisi administration is boosting ties with Qatar, which were already improving after Iran backed the country during a years-long blockade by several Arab States. In his trip to Doha, Raisi signed fourteen agreements regarding the cooperation of the two countries. The Qatari emir then traveled to Iran in the following weeks to further diplomatic relations and explore cooperation with Iran.
Oman
Both Iran and Oman have vowed to boost relations, demonstrating this pledge by signing twelve agreements when Raisi made the first official state visitation representing Iran since 2020. In November 2022, Sayyid Badr Albusaidi, Foreign Minister of Oman, visited Tehran to meet with Raisi. Badr expressed the best wishes of His Majesty Sultan Haitham bin Tarik. Raisi and Badr then discussed their eagerness for bilateral relations between Oman and Iran across several spheres. Iran-Oman relations under President Raisi primarily focus on regional security and energy diplomacy. Oman helped Raisi evade the effects of sanctions by authorizing Iranian use of banks and ports in Oman, while continuing to pursue energy diplomacy. While energy agreements between Iran and Oman are nothing new, with the first agreement on the Iran-Oman gas pipeline signed in 2004, the project has been suspended several times due to Iran’s nuclear program and US sanctions. However, under President Raisi a new agreement has been reached to construct two gas pipelines and an oil field along the sea border.
Syria
Syria is another focus of the administration. For his part, President Bashar al-Assad continues to renew his support for Iran’s regional policy agenda under President Raisi, even making a surprise visit in May 2022, which was his second visit since the beginning of the Syrian Civil War. Raisi said that Iran will stand by Syria in the reconstruction period. The defense and security relations between Tehran and Damascus are based on their shared views about regional and international issues. The Iranian president also called for boosting economic cooperation with Damascus and offered to help rebuild the war-torn country. President Ayatollah Ebrahim Raisi’s visit to Syria is seen as an important milestone in strengthening relations between Iran and Syria. Under Iranian President Hassan Rouhani, Iran’s policy of legitimizing its presence in Syria and expanding its influence there has been well documented. Under the current president, Ebrahim Raisi, the policy appears to remain the same with an intent to entrench and continue Iranian presence in the country.
Iraq
With respect to Iraq, Iran is continuing to pursue the development of diplomatic relations, specifically through increased energy ties. In a press conference held between Raisi and the Prime Minister of Iraq, Mohammed Shia' al-Sudani, Raisi shared his hopes that the ongoing cooperation between the two states will be improved in the future.
While this regional focus by the Raisi administration is nothing new and has always been an important element in the Iranian foreign policy agenda Raisi, unlike past administrations, develops this regional focus by placing a heavy emphasis on the economic aspect of these regional ties or geoeconomics. Raisi’s administration has two key goals: to preserve Iran’s role in the fragile balance of power regionally and intertwine Iran’s economy with its neighbors.
What Comes Next?
While Raisi made his goals clear in the first part of his administration, forecasting next steps has been made more difficult due to the current political state in Iran following the death of Mahsa Amini. In 2022, many predicted and hoped for the success of JCPOA negotiations, however given recent events this appears to be stalled indefinitely. The war in Ukraine also adds an element of uncertainty. It is expected that Iran’s supply of weapons to Russia for use in Ukraine will widen and broaden, indirectly or directly influencing Iran’s foreign policy agenda in the process. Iran for its part is expected to soon be receiving unprecedented amounts of military equipment from Russia in return for Iran’s supply of weaponry. The military equipment Iran could obtain from Russia includes Sukhoi Su-35 fighter jets and air defense systems in addition to other military equipment, which may cause concern among some of its neighbors.
The economic state of Iran continues to be exceptionally poor with an inflation rate that may reach 40% this year. However, some of Raisi’s engagement policies may be bearing fruit, with the economy expected to grow by roughly 3% in 2023 and 2024. If Iran is able to obtain 8% growth in its economy over the span of the upcoming six years, then it could once again be at the size it was in 2011. This situation, however, highlights the serious need of the Raisi administration to continue to rely on and pursue relations with Russia and China. Undoubtedly Raisi will continue to focus on Eastward diplomatic expansion, hoping to mitigate tensions with the West while pursuing ties with the East.
