Media Guide: The Raisi Administration and Implications for the JCPOA
/By AIC Senior Research Fellow Andrew Lumsden
On August 5, 2021, Ebrahim Raisi was formally sworn in as Iran’s eighth President, succeeding two-term moderate leader Hassan Rouhani, putting conservatives in control of all levels of Iranian government for the first time in eight years.
Western analysts have long been concerned that this political earthquake could mean the end for the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA or ‘Iran Nuclear Deal’), a pact between Iran, the United States and five other global powers which relieved some economic sanctions on Iran in exchange for strict limits on Tehran’s uranium enrichment program. The U.S., under former President Donald Trump, a JCPOA opponent, withdrew from the deal and re-imposed economic sanctions in 2018. Iran has since suspended compliance with the JCPOA’s regulations.
Efforts to re-establish the JCPOA after the inauguration of the new U.S. President Joe Biden in January and before Raisi’s inauguration have failed, and fears about the JCPOA have only been compounded as Raisi’s ultra-conservative cabinet has taken shape. This Media Guide will explore two of the top figures in the Raisi Administration’s foreign policy apparatus, their backgrounds, how they compare with their predecessors and what their ascension may mean for the future of the JCPOA and U.S.-Iran diplomacy.
What Is President Raisi’s Position On Returning to the JCPOA?
It is worth noting that despite a well-earned reputation as a hardline conservative, Raisi himself has expressed a degree of support for the JCPOA, which is not insignificant. During both his 2017 and 2021 campaigns for the Presidency, Raisi backed the JCPOA, calling it a “national document” which Iran should “definitely abide by.” As President, he has said that reopening nuclear talks with the West is “on the agenda,” but warned that moving forward would not be possible if the West attempts to exert political “pressure” on his country. In his speech before the United Nations General Assembly on September 21, 2021, Raisi railed against the United States, but did not rule out returning to the JCPOA, reiterating that Iran considers nuclear weapons “forbidden,” and wants the “lifting of all oppressive sanctions.” Raisi however, has made clear that he does not “trust the promises of the U.S. government.”
Although Raisi himself has consistently expressed moderate views on the JCPOA, his appointment to head Iran’s Foreign Ministry demonstrates a willingness to adopt a far more hardline approach to diplomacy with the West.
Who Is Iran’s New Foreign Minister?
Upon taking office, President Raisi selected Hossein Amir Abdollahian as Iran’s Minister of Foreign Affairs. Abdollahian was confirmed by Parliament on August 25th by a vote of 270-10. He has a PhD in International Relations and a diplomatic career stretching back to the late 1990s. In 2007, Abdollahian led Iran’s delegation to a U.S.-Iran summit in Baghdad regarding possible cooperation between the two countries in achieving stability in war torn Iraq. The talks are generally considered to have been a failure. Since 2007, Abdollahian has served in various diplomatic and foreign policy roles including as Iran’s ambassador to Bahrain, Deputy Foreign Minister for Arab and African Affairs and Special Assistant to the Speaker of Iran’s Parliament for International Affairs.
Like President Raisi, Abdollahian is considered a hardline conservative, and has consistently expressed fanatically anti-American views. In fact, it is alleged, particularly by Iranian conservatives, that his rhetoric was the cause for Abdollahian’s abrupt dismissal as Deputy Foreign Minister and from his role in U.S.-Iran negotiations in 2016.
Abdollahian has called the U.S. “feeble,” and repeatedly accused Washington of supporting terrorism in the Middle East. In July 2018, he claimed that the brutal terrorist group the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), was “created by [Former U.S. President Barack] Obama.” Later that year, in apparent reference to waves of nationwide protests which took place across Iran, Abdollahian accused the U.S. and “Zionists” of “provoking riots and protests'' with the goal of “turning Iran into war-torn Syria and Libya.” In 2020, he compared then U.S. President Donald Trump to deceased ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, writing that both men are “dangerous terrorists who have made the region and the world insecure.” Since President Joe Biden has taken office, Abdollahian’s rhetoric has softened little. He has called Biden “Trump himself,” and “not a friend of Iran.”
Abdollahian has also expressed deep personal affection for the late General Qasem Soleimani, whom he considers his foreign policy mentor. Soleimani was head of the Quds Force, a branch of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), responsible for conducting operations outside of the country. He was designated a terrorist by the United States in 2005 and was killed by a U.S. airstrike in January 2020. The U.S. accuses Soleimani of masterminding plots and attacks against U.S. diplomats and military personnel throughout the Middle East, particularly in Iraq. Washington blames Soleimani for “the deaths of hundreds of American and coalition service members and the wounding of thousands more.”
Whereas he blames the U.S. for creating ISIS, Abdollahian credits Soleimani with the group’s defeat. When Pope Francis visited Iraq in March 2021, Abdollahian wrote that the pontiff was able to do so safely only because of “Soleimani and the martyrs of the fight against terrorism.” Since becoming Foreign Minister, Abdollahian has pledged that his Ministry will “proudly follow the path” of Soleimani, whom he describes as a "commander of peace,” “great martyr” and “hero.”
How Does Abdollahian Compare With His Predecessor?
Abdollahian’s predecessor as Foreign Minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif was a stalwart supporter of the JCPOA and, as leader of Iran’s delegation to nuclear talks beginning in 2013, was a driving force behind the deal’s creation. In contrast to the anti-American Abdollahian, Zarif has a longstanding relationship with the United States, having been educated in America and begun his diplomatic career at Iran’s mission to the United Nations in New York City.
Although he acknowledged that the JCPOA was “not perfect,” he believed that it would open “a new chapter of hope” for Iran, and worked tirelessly to salvage the agreement after the U.S. withdrawal in 2018. Beginning in April 2021, he engaged in what he describes as “difficult and breathtaking” negotiations with other JCPOA signatories (the United Kingdom, France, China, Russia and Germany) and “indirectly” with the Biden Administration in the United States.
Like many Western analysts, Zarif expressed some concern about the JCPOA’s future under a potential conservative successor. In his final report to Iran’s Parliament on the deal in July 2021, Zarif wrote that while “no agreement is perfect for either party,” the JCPOA was the “result of a loving effort to free Iran [from international sanctions].” Pushing back on long standing conservative criticisms, Zarif added that “opponents of a policy, while making constructive comments and criticisms, should not disrupt the implementation of the adopted policy.”
While he acknowledged in his report that domestic and Israeli opposition may prevent a quick U.S. re-entry into the JCPOA, Zarif warned the Biden Administration in a public statement that it must “move fast” to secure an agreement before the Iranian elections after which he “will not be able to do anything serious.” While Zarif expressed optimism that a renewed nuclear deal could be reached before his administration’s exit, talks remained stalled.
In stark contrast to Zarif, Abdollahian has been a critic of the JCPOA. In 2020, he blasted the deal as one which has “not only not benefited Iran but has become a platform to intensify pressure on Iran.” Abdollahian went on to assert that even had Trump never become U.S. President, Washington still would not have honored the pact in a way that benefits Iran. He has even said that if “hundreds of JCPOAs are signed, it [would] not benefit our nation.” Abdollahian reiterated this stance during his confirmation hearings before Parliament in August 2021, saying that the priorities of his Foreign Ministry would be “neighbor-centered and Asia-centered policy,” as opposed to nuclear negotiations with the West.
Does Abdollahian’s Appointment Mean The End For the JCPOA?
It is important to note that Abdollahian has never ruled out negotiating with the United States. In 2018 he wrote that for Iran, such talks have “never been taboo.” In 2020, he said that one lesson he learned from his mentor Soleimani was that “regardless of the ethics of negotiating with the United States,” one should not approach U.S.-Iran talks with preconceived notions. Abdollahian added during the United Nations General Assembly in September 2021, that “Iran will not distance itself from negotiations. We see negotiations as essential.”
Also, Abdollahian’s anti-American rhetoric is by no means uncommon in Iranian politics. It is not even exclusive to hardline conservatives. In April 2019, when then-U.S. President Donald Trump designated the IRGC as a terrorist organization, then-Iranian President Hassan Rouhani called Washington, the “leader of world terrorism.” Foreign Minister Zarif called for U.S. troops in the Middle East to be designated terrorists by Iran. Both men are considered moderates and were some of the leading figures in the JCPOA’s creation. Moreover, a bill formally implementing Zarif’s suggestion overwhelmingly passed Parliament, which at the time was under moderate and reformist control.
Abdollahian has promised to return to nuclear talks “in due time.” However, he has been insistent that the U.S. must first make a “practical move to lift all sanctions” on Iran before talks can move forward. He has also accused the Biden Administration of sending a “negative sign” to Iran by continuing with Trump-era sanctions and has indicated that he may demand more sanctions relief from the U.S. that the original deal offered. The Biden Administration, including the President himself has stated unequivocally that the U.S. will not lift sanctions until Iran first returns to compliance with the JCPOA’s restrictions on uranium enrichment.
Though Abdollahian’s appointment may not in itself mean the end of the JCPOA, he has demonstrated that the Raisi Administration feels little urgency to return to talks and will not be as open to extended dialogue and pragmatic compromise as its predecessor had been.
Who Else Would Be Involved In The Negotiation Process?
While Presidents and Foreign Ministers have generally been the face of JCPOA negotiations, most of the day-to-day diplomacy is generally led by lower level officials. For Iran, this has been the Deputy Foreign Minister.
During the Rouhani Administration, Abbas Araqchi held this position. He was a leading figure both in the establishment of the JCPOA and in recent efforts to preserve the deal, attending and chairing several multilateral talks between Iran and other JCPOA signatories. Like Zarif, Araqchi has been a supporter of the JCPOA, calling it important to curtailing nuclear proliferation and has warned that if the JCPOA were to collapse, it would “add a new crisis” to the already restive Middle East. Some analysts had hoped Araqchi would remain in his position under the Raisi Administration, given his long commitment to the JCPOA and nuclear diplomacy. However, he was quickly removed as Deputy Foreign Minister by Abdollahian and replaced with Ali Bagheri Kani.
Bagheri Kani is also described as a hardline conservative, with close ties with other key figures on the political right, including the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who is his brother’s father-in-law. Similar to Abdollahian, Bagheri Kani has a history of aggressive anti-Western rhetoric.
In 2019, he was appointed head of the Iranian Judiciary’s High Council For Human Rights by then Chief Justice, Ebrahim Raisi. In this role, Bagheri Kani fiercely dismissed international criticisms of Iran’s human rights record and justified its extensive use of capital punishment for nonviolent drug offenses. He also accused the “United States and its NATO allies” of playing a “big role in supporting [narcotic] drug production” in the region. Bagheri Kani also called members of the European Parliament “terrorists whose hands are stained with blood,” and accused Arab states which have normalized relations with Israel of having “stabbed [the] Islamic Ummah (global Muslim community) in the back and extended a hand of friendship to the criminals.”
What Is Bagheri Kani’s Position on the Nuclear Deal?
Bagheri Kani has been highly critical of the JCPOA, lamenting that Iran gave away too much of its nuclear technology and materials to outside forces for benefits he considers insignificant and unmaterialized. While he has not been involved in JCPOA-related negotiations, Bagheri Kani did take part in nuclear talks between Iran and the West under Iran’s previous conserviative President, Mahmoud Ahmedinijad between 2007 and 2013. These talks were led by Bagheri Kani’s political mentor Saeed Jalili.
While he has denounced nuclear weapons, Jalili has been an uncompromising supporter of Iran’s nuclear program. Leaked U.S. diplomatic cables noted Jalili’s “inability or unwillingness to deviate from the same presentation.” The talks he led are considered to have been a failure and ultimately led to U.S. and international sanctions on Iran being dramatically expanded in 2010 and 2011. Since his days as Iran’s lead nuclear negotiator, Jalili has remained active in Iranian politics, running for President in 2013 and briefly in 2021 on a hardline conservative platform. In 2016, Jalili said that he would not have agreed to the JCPOA had he been elected President. More recently, he has criticized efforts to revive the deal.
Bagheri Kani and Jalili have a close and long standing relationship. In addition to working together during pre-JCPOA nuclear talks, Bagheri Kani also served as Jalili’s campaign manager during his first bid for the Presidency. It has also been reported that Jalili lobbied for Bagheri Kani to be appointed Deputy Foreign Minister. Based on these ties, as well as his own statements on the nuclear deal and the West, there is little indication that Bagheri Kani’s approach to nuclear negotiations, should he indeed become lead negotiator, will be much different from Jalili’s, sticking to a hard stance to which Washington has already said it will not agree.
While it is not a given that Bagheri Kani will lead future negotiations, his involvement would only further suggest that Tehran has little interest in compromising on its current position or in returning to talks at all.
Other Organs of Government
It also must be understood that the role Iran’s Foreign Ministry will play in potential future negotiations is limited and uncertain. Before 2013, Iran considered diplomacy surrounding its nuclear program to be strictly an issue of national security; accordingly, talks were led by the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), a body chaired by the President and composed of representatives from the legislature, judiciary, cabinet and armed forces. Former President Hassan Rouhani transferred responsibility for nuclear talks from the SNSC to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs when he took office in 2013.
However, it has been suggested that the SNSC may play a significant role in determining when and how new JCPOA talks are conducted under the Raisi Administration. A spokesman for the Iranian Parliament’s Foreign Relations Committee said earlier this month that while the Foreign Ministry will lead talks, the SNSC may determine the delegation’s diplomatic strategy. The SNSC is a conservative-dominated panel, which once this year has already rejected a proposed agreement to revive the JCPOA on the grounds that it violated a law passed by Parliament ordering the resumption of uranium enrichment.
Moreover, it is important to remember that even if they were willing, neither Bagheri Kani, Abdollahian or Raisi have the authority to agree to or implement a new nuclear agreement. Any deal would require the consent of the Supreme Leader and the conervative-majority Parliament. Both Ayatollah Khamenei and Speaker Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf have expressed opposition to the JCPOA and future U.S.-Iran diplomacy. Khamenei has expressed regret for approving the deal in 2015 and supports furthering uranium enrichment. Qalibaf has called future diplomacy with the United States “strictly forbidden and detrimental.”
Future Outlook
While much remains to be determined, it is abundantly clear that with unified conservative control of Tehran, restoring the JCPOA, even with a new administration in Washington, will be no easy feat. Iranian foreign policy in the Raisi era will be led by men who see little value in the nuclear deal and do not consider diplomacy with the West a priority.
This is a misguided approach. First, Tehran’s new leaders must recognize as Araqchi did, that the JCPOA is not simply an economic agreement, it is also one intended to stave off the threat of armed conflict in the Middle East, at which it has had success. Iran’s cessation of compliance with the JCPOA and ambivalence to returning to negotiations have raised serious concerns in the region, particularly in Israel.
Israel’s Defense Minister said in September that since it is unclear whether Iran will “be willing to sign an agreement and come back to the negotiation table,” the “international community must build a viable ‘Plan B’ in order to stop [Iran‘s nuclear program]” and that Israel will “not hesitate” to act on its own if its deems it necessary. Moreover, the U.S. has refused to rule out military options should talks fail and Iran’s nuclear program continue to escalate. Very real risks to regional security alone should warrant JCPOA talks being prioritized by all sides.
Moreover, the JCPOA has indeed provided economic benefits to Iran. While it was in full effect, Iran experienced significant economic growth and increases in foreign investment. Iranian political figures including Raisi and Abdollahian have fulminated against U.S. sanctions, yet the fact remains that diplomacy will be the only way to secure relief from sanctions and their country’s full participation in the global economy.
AIC’s calls in March are as relevant today as then. Both Washington and Tehran must put politics aside and confront the hard truths of the current situation. Given the U.S.’ unwarranted withdrawal from the JCPOA, Tehran is right to question its ability to trust the U.S. or the durability of a restored agreement going forward. One beneficial step would be for the U.S. to offer to begin talks with proposals on how to prevent future unilateral aborgations of JCPOA responsibilities without due cause or process. On the other hand, Iranian leaders must understand that the current administration in the U.S. is very different from the one which left the JCPOA and should be approached with an open mind as opposed to rigid preconditions.
Former Foreign Minister Zarif perhaps put it best, saying in diplomacy, “the attempt of each actor to win at the expense of the other side's defeat...leads to the failure of both sides.” Success, he adds, in resolving conflicts and solving problems “requires courage, self-sacrifice, and readiness to pay the price of prestige and to prioritize national interests over personal interests.”
