Media Guide: Iran and The Conflict In Ukraine
/By AIC Senior Research Fellow Andrew Lumsden
On February 24, 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin launched what he terms a “special military operation” against Ukraine, ostensibly to “demilitarise and denazify” the country whose government he alleges is controlled by “far-right nationalists and neo-Nazis.”
Western countries have largely been united and vociferous in their condemnation of the Russian invasion, imposing extensive economic sanctions against Moscow. Some non-Western countries, such as Japan, Taiwan and Singapore have also applied sanctions.
Perhaps predictably however, reaction to the Russian invasion of Ukraine has differed in countries like Iran, which have strained relations with the West. This Media Guide will explore Iran’s responses to the invasion of Ukraine, its pre-war relations with the two main combatants and how the conflict may affect Iran directly.
What Is The Current Conflict Between Ukraine and Russia?
The modern Russo-Ukrainian conflict began in early 2014, when mass protests in the Ukrainian capital of Kyiv, brought on by pro-Russian President Viktor Yanukovych’s decision to eschew closer economic ties with the European Union, and instead sign an economic agreement with Russia, resulted in his ouster.
The 2014 revolution, also called the “Revolution of Dignity'' or the “Maidan Revolution,” highlighted Ukraine’s ethnic divisions. In the most ethnically Russian regions of the country, the revolution was met with backlash. The Donetsk and Luhansk regions saw an outbreak of seperatist violence as pro-Russian militants declared breakaway republics. In the Crimean Peninsula, public protests and clandestine Russian military intervention led to the region seceding from Ukraine and being annexed by the Russian Federation.
Russia regards President Yanukovych’s removal as a coup and all subsequent Ukrainian governments as illegitimate. It is also perturbed by Ukraine’s interest in joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), a military alliance of 28 European countries, along with the U.S. and Canada formed during the Cold War. Moscow still considers the alliance a threat to its security.
Western analysts and observers however, counter that Russia’s invasion is not reflective of legitimate security concerns but rather a desire by Vladimir Putin to annex all or part of Ukraine in hopes of somehow restoring Russia to the prestige and power it held during the days of the Soviet Union and the Russian Empire before it.
Putin himself, days before the invasion, claimed that “modern Ukraine was entirely created by Russia,” and that the notion of Ukraine as a separate entity from Russia is solely a result of Soviet leader Vladimir Lenin’s attempts to “appease” Ukrainian “nationalists” by giving them “vast territories that had nothing to do with them” and which were “historically Russia.”
How Has Iran Reacted To The War?
While they have called for a diplomatic resolution to the Russia-Ukraine conflict, Iranian leaders have generally placed blame for the war on the United States and NATO.
Political Leaders
Speaking about the conflict on March 1st, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei said that Iran opposes war “everywhere in the world,” but added that “the root of the crisis in Ukraine is the policies of the United States and the West.” Khamenei accuses the U.S. in particular of having “interfered in Ukraine's internal affairs,” and orchestrated a “coup” in Ukraine. He also calls Kyiv a “victim” of U.S. foreign policy.
Other senior Iranian officials defended Moscow. Admiral Ali Shamkhani, secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council wrote that “nothing is more hateful than war,” but accused the West of seeking to “strike at the national security of nations” and argued that the West therefore is “directly responsible for the wars and crises that are formed in order to resist [its] strategy.” Mahmoud Abbaszadeh Meshkini, spokesman for the Iranian Parliament’s National Security Committee said that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine “was a reaction” to the expansion of NATO and that Moscow is simply “preventing NATO from approaching its borders.”
Iran’s President Ebrahim Raisi, on a phone call with Putin on February 24, said that “the expansion of NATO is a serious threat to the stability and security of independent countries in different regions.” On February 27, addressing the war in Ukraine more directly, he said that while Iran understands Russia’s “security concerns regarding the decades of NATO expansionism,” it “emphasizes the preservation of the territorial integrity and national sovereignty of all countries,” and believes that diplomacy “is the only lasting and just way out of the current situation.”
The Islamic Republic News Agency, Iran’s official state media describes Tehran’s stance on the invasion of Ukraine as an “independent position,” in which it “on the one hand considers the development of NATO and the United States in Eastern Europe as a stimulus to start a war, and on the other hand does not see war as a solution to any crisis.”
Foreign Policy Officials
Iran’s diplomats of course have echoed these positions. Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian wrote that the conflict in Ukraine has been caused by “NATO provocations,” but added that Iran “[does] not see resorting to war as a solution,” and that a ceasefire and finding diplomatic resolutions are necessities.
Saeed Khatibzadeh, spokesman for Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs described the war as a result of “the continuation of U.S.-centered provocative actions by NATO,” but also issued a call “on the parties to cease hostilities and a ceasefire for immediate talks to find a political solution to the crisis.”
Majid Takht Ravanchi, Iran’s Ambassador to the United Nations accused the U.S. and NATO of having “exacerbated” tensions in Eastern Europe through unspecified “provocative actions and decisions;” adding that “the security concerns of Russia must be respected.” However, he added that Tehran believes that the “sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states must be fully respected.”
Media and The Public
It is important to note that Tehran’s official position is not necessarily reflective of the feelings of the Iranian public and it would be difficult to ascertain how the majority of Iranians feel about the conflict. Media coverage on the war, including that of outlets not directly controlled by Tehran, has generally skewed in Moscow’s favor. However, some reformist-run news outlets have presented more diverse points of view, and as the war has dragged on and Russian forces have underperformed expectations, conservative outlets have reportedly scaled back any coverage of the conflict at all.
Media dynamics aside, there have been expressions of support for Ukraine and condemnation of Russia from the Iranian populace on social media, in public demonstrations and in statements by public figures.
Small protests took place in front of the Ukrainian embassy in Tehran in the days following Russia’s invasion, with demonstrators chanting words of support for Ukraine and “Death to Putin.” In response to calls on social media for more protests, Iranian authorities reportedly restricted public access to Russia’s embassy and have been noncommittal regarding applications by activists to protest at the site.
In an open letter to the United Nations, Iranian Human Rights activist Nasrin Sotoudeh condemned Russia’s invasion as a “vulgar act of aggression,” expressed her “solidarity” and called for the UN to “use all the international instruments and resources at your disposal to bring an end to this naked act of aggression.”
Some prominent conservative figures also voiced opposition to Moscow. Former populist conservative President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad called Russia’s invasion a “satanic war,” praised Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s “honorable and almost unrivaled resistance” and suggested that Russian forces will face a “quagmire” in Ukraine akin to Afghanistan. Former conservative Parliamentarian Ali Motahari wrote that “Iran must condemn Russia's invasion of Ukraine to demonstrate its independence,” referenced Russia’s past seizure of Iranian territory in the 19th century and blasted Iran’s state media for reporting on the invasion “like a Russian colony.”
Can Iran’s Position On The Conflict Be Described As ‘Pro-Russia?’
Iran’s government has come under criticism from observers inside and outside of the country for taking a ‘pro-Russia’ stance on the war in Ukraine. Tehran disputes the characterization, with state media maintaining that Iran’s position simply reflects a “lack of haste in a complex crisis,” and denouncing expectations from “political opponents” to take a harder line as “contrary to international practice.”
State media also quotes Javad Larijani, former head of the Iranian Judiciary’s Human Rights Council, who argues that those calling Iran’s position ‘pro-Russia’ “did not understand the position of the Islamic Republic,” which “did not support [Russia’s] military strike at all,” but also “did not turn a blind eye to the sedition that the United States and its allies are carrying out in the region.”
Iran also did not join the five countries (Russia, North Korea, Belarus, Eritrea and Syria) which voted against the March 3rd UN resolution condemning Russia’s invasion, but abstained alongside 34 other primarily African and Central Asian nations. Ambassador Ravanchi argued that the resolution, which passed 141-5, “lacks impartiality” and lamented that “not all member states of the United Nations were given the opportunity to engage in negotiations on the text of the resolution.” He also criticized the measure for lacking “realistic mechanisms for resolving the crisis through peaceful means,” a sentiment also expressed by some African countries. Nevertheless, Tehran’s abstention is notable given that since 2014, it has typically voted against resolutions condemning Russia.
While it may not be correct to label Iran’s positions on the war as ‘pro-Russia’ in the same way as those of states like Belarus and Syria, it is clear that Tehran’s stance reflects a stark bias in Moscow’s favor. Iran’s statements on the invasion all echo Russia’s official rhetoric, blaming the U.S. and NATO for the war and casting aspersions on the legitimacy and independence of Ukraine’s government. Meanwhile, Iranian officials have refrained from criticizing Russia beyond general, anodyne anti-war statements.
What May Explain Iran’s Russia-Leaning Stance?
Despite their mutual antipathy towards the West, Iran and Russia are by no means obvious bedfellows. Iran was a victim of Russian imperial expansion during the 19th century and partial Soviet occupation during the Second World War. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the Islamic Republic’s first Supreme Leader, denounced the Soviet Union as the “worst among all dictatorships in the world” and urged Iranians not to “pull your country into the fold” of Russia and China.
In recent years however, Iran and Russia have developed very similar outlooks on the international political order. U.S. Naval Postgraduate School National Security expert Afshon Ostovar, illustrates this shared worldview, saying that both see themselves as a “besieged fortress,” surrounded and threatened by the “sinister hand of the West.”
For Iran, this “sinister hand” primarily refers to Western sanctions, which President Raisi has described as an “inhumane” “new way of war” being waged against Iran. While Raisi has a long-held reputation as a hardline conservative, similar rhetoric can also be heard from more moderate figures in Iranian politics. Former Vice President Eshaq Jahangiri, said in 2018 that through sanctions, “America is trying…to force us to retreat and surrender.” Former President Hassan Rouhani added that Iran “will not let the enemy bring us to our knees."
Putin echoed the ‘besieged fortress’ narrative in his speech declaring Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. He accused the U.S. and its NATO allies of “pressure and blackmail” against Moscow, while their “military machine…is approaching our very border.” He later called economic sanctions against his country “akin to a declaration of war.”
Iran and Russia have also worked together in pursuit of their similar geopolitical interests; shoring up friendly regimes such as that of embattled Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad with military intervention, and undermining U.S. influence and operations in hotspots such as Afghanistan and Iraq through clandestine armaments support to groups hostile to the West or through competing economic investments.
However, discussion of Iran’s pro-Russia geopolitical tilt raises the question of why Tehran has not fully endorsed Russia’s actions in Ukraine as did the countries which voted against the UN resolution. Harvard International Security Research Fellow, Nicole Grajewski posits that despite Tehran's alignment with Russia on most political issues, it remains uncomfortable with Moscow’s support for and recognition of separatist republics in Eastern Ukraine. Tehran itself has long been concerned about separatist militants in its own ethic minority dominated regions such as Arab-majority Khuzestan and Sunni Baloch-majority Sistan-Balochistan.
For More Information on Russian-Iranian Relations: See AIC’s 2021 Article “Russian-Iranian Relations: A Watchful Partnership” here
What Was Iran’s Prewar Relationship With Ukraine?
Discussing growing tensions between Russia and Ukraine shortly before Russia’s February 24th invasion, Iran’s Foreign Minister said that Tehran has “good relations with both sides.” The relationship between Ukraine and Iran has typically received little attention in geopolitical punditry, but it is one which has undergone subtle but considerable changes over the past two decades.
Cordial Bilateral Relations
Iran recognized Ukraine’s independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, and since 1992, the two countries have enjoyed a cordial diplomatic relationship. Between 1995 and 2008, they signed more than 30 bilateral agreements for cooperation in several fields including, education, tourism, science, tax collection, maritime trade and criminal extradition.
Additionally, Ukraine calls Iran “an important trade and economic partner,” with commerce between the two worth over US$300 million. The two countries’ trade relationship primarily revolves around food and agricultural products, which make up 97% of Iran’s imports from Ukraine and about 60% of Ukraine’s imports from Iran.
Iran and Ukraine also host sizable populations of each other’s nationals. Before the Russian invasion, there were an estimated one to two thousand Iranian students studying in Ukraine, while Ukraine’s Foreign Ministry estimates that there are about 600 Ukrainians living in Iran.
Emerging Political Differences
Amidst the amiability, Ukraine and Iran have in recent years, drifted apart politically. When asked why Iran began voting against UN resolutions condemning Russia, Iran’s ambassador to Ukraine and Moldova, Manouchehr Moradi, responded “please look at Ukraine's votes in support of Western countries' proposed human rights resolutions against Iran over the past ten years.”
The shift in Ukraine’s approach to Iran at the UN actually goes back more than ten years. Between 1993 and 2001, Ukraine abstained from votes condemning Iran’s human rights record, and did not vote at all in 1996. Kyiv went a step further in 2003 and 2004, siding with Tehran and voting against the resolutions. However, beginning in 2005, Ukraine has voted for every UN resolution on human rights in Iran, something that Tehran clearly has taken notice of and offense to.
Fight PS752
Iran-Ukraine relations took a further hit in 2020, when Ukraine International Airlines flight PS752, flying from Tehran to Kyiv, was shot down by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) on January 8, killing all 176 on board. After denying responsibility for the crash for three days, Tehran admitted guilt, with Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif blaming “human error” and “U.S. adventurism” for the incident. The attack on flight PS752 took place soon after the killing of IRGC commander Gen. Qasem Soleimani in a U.S. drone strike and tensions between the U.S. and Iran were high.
Iran released a report in March 2020 claiming that the anti-aircraft system operator “misidentified” flight PS752 as a missile and fired without permission. Ukraine’s Foreign Minister blasted the report, calling it “a collection of manipulations, the goal of which is not to establish the truth, but to whitewash the Islamic Republic of Iran.” In April 2021, Oleksiy Danilov, head of Ukraine’s National Security and Defense Council, argued that Iran made an “intentional” and “conscious” attack on flight PS752 possibly to demonstrate its military capabilities to the United States. Tehran on the other hand, accused Ukraine of “linking this painful accident with its local issues or foreign affairs with other countries,” and of pushing “personal and bespoke hypotheses.”
How May The War Affect Iran?
Though far from the Middle East, the war in Ukraine may well have a direct impact on Iran, having already brought a new international spotlight on ongoing nuclear talks between Iran and world powers.
In response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Western countries imposed unprecedented economic sanctions. Russia has even surpassed Iran as the world’s most sanctioned economy. Some of these penalties have also included bans on imports of Russian oil and gas. The possible disruption of Russian fossil fuel exports have raised fears of skyrocketing gas prices, particularly in Western countries. The 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan Of Action (JCPOA or ‘Iran Nuclear Deal;’) has come to be seen as a means of keeping fuel prices low, especially as other Middle Eastern producers have resisted calls to increase their outputs.
Russia, alongside Western powers including the U.S., UK, France and Germany have been in talks for more than a year to restore the JCPOA. The deal eased economic sanctions on Iran in exchange for limits on its nuclear program. The United States, under former President Donald Trump, withdrew from the JCPOA in 2018 and reimposed sanctions. Iran subsequently ended compliance with the deal and resumed uranium enrichment. Since President Joe Biden has taken office, negotiations for a possible U.S. return to the JCPOA have been underway in Vienna.
The current situation may provide a unique incentive for Western powers, the United States in particular, to secure an agreement as soon as possible. Iran’s national oil company estimates that within six to nine months of sanctions relief, “a 5-10 percent fall in the [global] oil price would be likely.” Both Western and Iranian officials have described a deal as close at hand.
However, the conflict in Ukraine has also raised new obstacles to JCPOA restoration. Russia has made its support for the JCPOA conditional on the exemption of its trade with Iran from Western sanctions. Russia’s Foreign Minister has claimed that Moscow has already received “written guarantees” that its conditions will be met.
This has caused consternation among lawmakers in Washington of both parties. Sen. Bob Menendez (D-N.J.), Chairman of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee and JCPOA-skeptic, said “obviously that would be a problem” if “Russia gets any benefit” from a restored JCPOA. In addition to revenues from its trade with Iran, it is estimated that Russia’s role in the JCPOA’s implementation could earn it some US$20 billion. Sen. Mitt Romney (R-UT) said in response “any deal that allows Russia to get funding through a new JCPOA makes no sense.”
Other Senate Democrats such as Sen. Chris Murphy (D-CT) and Chris Van Hollen (D-MD) argue that the focus of the JCPOA is on preventing Iran from creating a nuclear weapon and in that regard it should be supported. However, the fact remains that the conflict in Ukraine has led to the deal no longer being seen simply in terms of preventing conflict with Iran, but also as a vehicle for Russian profiteering and sanctions evasion. Given the even divide of the U.S. Senate, unified Republican opposition, Democratic support in doubt and majority public opinion supporting a harder line on Russia, whether a deal seen as beneficial to Moscow could garner the necessary political or public support in the U.S. remains to be seen.
