Media Guide: Iran and the Yemeni Civil War
/By Research Fellow Andrew Lumsden
The Republic of Yemen, located on the southwestern tip of the Arabian Peninsula, is the Middle East’s poorest country and it has been embroiled in a brutal civil war since 2014, one which so far has claimed the lives of some 90,000 people and left 2 million displaced.
The Yemeni conflict is seen by many Western officials and analysts as a proxy war between Iran, the dominant Shi’a power in the Middle East and its rival Saudi Arabia, the dominant Sunni power. This Media Guide will explore the ongoing civil war in Yemen, and the extent to which Iran has been involved in its origins and current conduct.
How did the Yemeni Civil War begin?
Modern Yemen has been no stranger to civil war and unrest. In fact, what is now the Republic of Yemen only came to be in 1990. For the previous three decades, Yemen was divided into two very distinct, and often warring, states. The Yemen Arab Republic (referred to as North Yemen), controlled the northwest of the country, with Sanaa as its capital. The rest of Yemen was controlled by the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (called South Yemen), a communist state formed after the end of British rule in the 1960s with its capital in the port city of Aden.
North Yemen had been ruled for more than 1,000 years by Zaidi religious leaders. Zaidism (or Zaidiyyah) is a branch of Shi’a Islam which originated in the eighth century. A military coup in 1962 overthrew the Imamate and gave rise to a Saudi-backed Sunni regime under which Zaidis faced active repression and marginalization as means of preventing a possible return to power. Zaidism’s presence in northern Yemen declined dramatically thereafter.
In 1990, both Yemeni states agreed to form a single ‘Republic of Yemen’ with the North’s leader, Field Marshal Ali Abdullah Saleh as President. A Zaidi rights and revivalist movement began in Saada, Yemen’s northernmost province, in 1994 calling for greater freedom for Zaidi education and culture. Over time, some radical Zaidis became vocally opposed to the Saleh government due its pro-U.S. stance in the global ‘War on Terrorism’ and its economic neglect of their communities. In 2004, a Zaidi militant group, Ansar Allah (Partisans of God), commonly referred to as the ‘Houthis’ after their leaders Hussein Badraddin al-Houthi and his successor Abdul-Malik al-Houthi, began an insurgency against the Saleh government and emerging Sunni extremist groups in northern Yemen.
In 2012, Arab Spring protests led to the ouster of President Saleh who was succeeded by Vice President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi. In 2014, allegedly with assistance from Saleh, Houthi rebels seized control of Sanaa, Yemen’s capital, forcing the Saudi-backed Hadi to flee the country. In response to the Houthi takeover, Saudi Arabia, along with the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and Sudan, with U.S. support, launched a military intervention in Yemen to dislodge the Houthis. Since then, the country has been in the midst of a grizzly, multi-faceted conflict between the Houthis, Saudi coalition forces, Sunni jihadist groups (including Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State) and socialist South Yemen separatists.
How is Iran involved in the Civil War?
Military Involvement
Given its 40-year history of backing Shi’a militant groups across the Middle East, the rise of the Houthis immediately sparked international discussion on the role Iran may be playing in the Yemeni conflict. Tehran has denied accusations of any involvement in the Yemeni Civil War and has condemned the suggestion as “baseless propaganda.” However, since 2009, Yemeni government, Saudi and Western officials have maintained that they have evidence of consistent and escalating Iranian military support for the Houthis.
In 2009, Yemeni government forces claimed to have intercepted two arms shipments meant for the Houthis at the Red Sea ports of Midi and Hodeida. Yemeni officials also claimed that five Iranian military advisors were aboard one of the captured vessels. Iran also that year, deployed what U.S. officials have described as an “intelligence gathering ship” to the Red Sea, near the Yemeni coast, with crew members dressed in Iranian naval uniforms and smaller craft used to ferry personnel to and from Yemen. It should be noted that leaked documents reveal that U.S. officials at the time were skeptical of the Saleh-government’s claims of Iranian involvement and believed that the Houthis were instead being supplied via the black market. The United Nations Security Council however, determined in 2015 that Iranian arms shipments to the Houthis began in or before 2009, as the Saleh government had alleged.
Beginning around 2011, Western officials became more convinced that Iran indeed was providing arms and other assistance to the Houthis as the size and value of the arms shipments intercepted near the Yemeni coast spiked. Between 2013 and 2016, U.S., French and Australian naval forces, as well as the Yemeni Coast Guard reported capturing stockpiles of sophisticated Iranian arms, including anti-aircraft weaponry, night-vision equipment, rockets, explosives and landmines. U.S. officials have noted that many of these devices are strikingly similar to those captured by Israeli forces in Lebanon, where Hezbollah, a known Iranian proxy group, is active. In 2013 and 2018 reports, the United Nations determined that “all available information” suggests that Iran is “at the center” of pro-Houthi arms smuggling operations in Yemen, and that drones and missiles deployed by the Houthis are “virtually identical in design, dimensions and capability” to those produced by Iranian aircraft manufacturing companies.
Technical Training and Tactical Advice
In 2018, the United States Military Academy West Point’s Combatting Terrorism Center issued a report stating that the evolution of the Houthis’ military tactics and battlefield proficiency over the course of their insurgency is also evidence of Iranian support. The report highlights the ease with which the Houthis have been able to make maximally effective use of the unfamiliar and relatively sophisticated Yemeni government weaponry it acquired after its conquest of Sanaa.
For example, after taking control of the Yemeni Coast Guard’s fleet, the Houthis converted speedboats into “self-guiding… explosive drone boat[s]” which have been deployed against Saudi naval vessels to good effect. The Houthis have also taken control of Yemen’s coastal missile batteries and ballistic missiles. Since 2015, they have used these weapons to strike targets in Saudi Arabia, as well as Saudi coalition command centers and frontline troops.
According to U.S. officials, informants within the Yemeni military in Sanaa have reported that the Houthis have not included Yemeni military personnel in their operations, they already knew how to operate these sophisticated weapons when they took power and immediately transferred government missile stockpiles from Sanaa to their power base in Saada Province. U.S. and Saudi experts therefore conclude that the Houthis have been receiving extensive technical training from Iranian and Hezbollah operatives. The West Point report also notes that Houthi military strategies resemble those utilized by Hezbollah in Lebanon during that country’s civil war in the 1980s.
Iran’s Public Reactions to Events in Yemen
Again, Iran has denied involvement in the Yemeni Civil War, but has offered consistent verbal praise for the Houthis, as well as political and economic recognition of their self-declared revolutionary government. In 2014, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani called the Houthi conquest of Sanaa, a “brilliant victory.” The following year, Iran’s Deputy Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian, praised the Houthis for having “taken major steps to restore domestic peace and stability to [Yemen]” and re-iterated Iran’s support. Tehran also received a Houthi delegation in 2015, and pledged “economic aid,” to help rebuild Yemen’s ports and power plants.
In 2019, Iran accepted an ambassador appointed by the Houthis. While receiving the Houthi representative, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei formally declared his support for “the resistance of Yemen’s believing men and women,” as well as his confidence that the Houthis will “establish a strong government.”
Despite the evidence presented by Yemeni and Western officials, and Tehran’s vocal praise of the Houthis, not all experts are convinced that Iran is providing any significant military aid to the Houthis. A 2017 report by the Atlantic Council argues that evidence suggesting Iranian military involvement in Yemen is “strongly suggestive rather than categorical,” and that it is possible that the arms smuggled to the Houthis could have come from Russia, the black market or via elements within Iran not acting on behalf of the government.
Are the Houthis a Proxy of Iran?
Citing evidence of Iranian involvement in Yemen, officials from Saudi Arabia and allied countries, have labeled the Houthis a proxy organization, entirely under Tehran’s control.
U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo in a June 2019 statement, asserted that the Houthis and the civil war in Yemen were “conceived of and perpetuated by the Islamic Republic of Iran.” These sentiments were echoed by Mohammed Abdullah Al-Hadhrami, the Hadi-government’s Foreign Minister in his address before the United Nations General Assembly in September 2019. He described the civil war in Yemen as an Iranian “coup d’état,” and part of Tehran’s “expansionist agenda.” In May 2019, following a Houthi missile attack on a Saudi oil facility, Saudi Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir issued a statement accusing the Houthis of being an “indivisible part of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps.” In August 2019, citing meetings between Houthi representatives and Iran’s Supreme Leader, the United Arab Emirates’ Foreign Minister said that it is now clear in “black and white” that “the Houthis are a proxy [of Iran].”
Analysts and experts however, largely remain skeptical that Iran’s relationship with the Houthis is as clear cut as U.S. and Saudi coalition officials have maintained. Thomas Juneau, former analyst for Canada's Department of National Defense argues that the Houthis are absolutely not a proxy of Iran. He argues that the Houthis’ emergence and the war in Yemen are exclusively the result of “local grievances” within the country, not any kind of Iranian machinations. Juneau believes that Iran’s involvement in Yemen is ultimately “minimal” and that it reflects an attempt by Tehran to capitalize upon the Houthis’ prior successes and gain influence in Yemen, as opposed to a longstanding Iranian grand design.
This opinion is shared by Atlantic Council Fellow Elisabeth Kendall. She points out that Iran and the Houthis do not share deep ideological or religious bonds and goals. The Zaidi branch of Shi’a Islam is very different from the Twelver Shiism which dominates Iran. Also, Houthi leaders have acknowledged that they have no intention of creating a Shi’a state in Yemen, in part due to the country’s overwhelming Sunni majority. Kendall also notes that that the Houthis have been at war with the Yemeni government for at least four years before any Iranian activity in Yemen was detected or alleged, suggesting that Tehran had no role in the group’s foundation. Kendall also cites reports that Iran argued against the Houthis’ takeover of Sanaa in 2014, as evidence that “Iran does not enjoy command and control over them.”
Skepticism of Houthi subservience to Iran also appears to be growing among U.S. officials as well. In December 2019, Brian Hook, Washington’s Special Representative for Iran, said that recent Houthi attempts at de-escalation negotiations with Saudi Arabia show that “Iran clearly does not speak for the Houthis.” Hook also goes to echo experts such as Juneau and Kendall, adding that the relationship between Tehran and the Houthis has simply been a “strategic alliance.”
How has the Yemeni conflict affected Iran?
Whether or not it controls the Houthis, it is clear that Tehran has reaped some rich rewards from the group’s successes in Yemen and the escalating conflict there.
Its recent pledges of economic aid and stated plans for future economic cooperation with Houthi-controlled Yemen show that Iran already enjoys far more political and economic access to a country which has for decades been firmly within the U.S./Saudi orbit. Moreover, the conflict and its relationship with the Houthis means that Iran likely will play an indispensable role in any Yemeni peace process, potentially offering it an opportunity to secure its political gains.
The Yemeni conflict has also given Iran a boost in its ‘cold war’ with its chief regional rival, Saudi Arabia. The war has thoroughly undermined Riyadh both economically and geopolitically. It is estimated that its intervention in Yemen is costing Saudi Arabia upwards of $5 billion a month, on top of the at least $2 billion Riyadh has already donated to the Hadi government to keep it financially afloat. Moreover, the escalating attacks on Saudi airports and oil fields, allegedly carried out by the Houthis with Iranian weaponry, is likely to have a severe impact on the Kingdom’s economy.
Riyadh’s international credibility and relationships with its allies have also suffered. It has received international condemnation for its naval blockade of Yemen. Meant in part to prevent the smuggling of arms to the Houthis, the blockade has also resulted in devastating food shortages within the country. The World Food Programme estimates that some 20 million Yemenis, 70% of the national population, are now food insecure and half of these are “one step away” from starvation.
Also, Human Rights Watch has reported that Saudi Arabia has launched “unlawful” airstrikes against civilian targets in Yemen including schools, hospitals, mosques and markets. They estimate that the majority of the nearly 7,000 Yemeni civilians killed so far in the conflict were victims of Saudi airstrikes. The Saudi blockade and strikes have weakened support for the Kingdom among U.S. lawmakers. In January 2019, both houses of the U.S. Congress passed a bipartisan resolution calling for an end to U.S. support for the Saudi intervention in Yemen. The resolution failed only because of a veto from President Donald Trump.
Conclusion
Iran did not start the current conflict in Yemen and, given that it involves a myriad of different sides and interests including socialist separatists and Sunni jihadists, it is likely that Yemen would still be in a state of civil war had Iran never been involved. Nevertheless, substantive evidence exists suggesting that the Houthis do have a substantive political and military relationship with Tehran and it is important that all sides use whatever influence they have to promote peace, reconciliation and reform in Yemen as opposed to militant escalation.
